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Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Contracts and 
agreements in international trade and business are now to be conducted 
within the parameters laid down under various multilateral trade agreements 
under the operational control of World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
In fact, the progressive transformation of traditionally 'power-oriented' 
trade, monetary and other international policies into 'rule-oriented' policies 
constitutes one of the most important achievements of international law and 
policy since World War II. A 'power-oriented' technique suggests discussions, 
negotiations or dispute settlement in which one party asserts or uses the 
relative power at its disposal in order to influence the conduct of the other 
party. But the 'rule-oriented policies' suggests negotiations amongst 
governments or individuals on the elaboration and observance of general 
rules of conduct, which all participants voluntarily accept because the rules 
reconcile their short term conflicting interests with their common long term 
interests in a mutually beneficial manner. 
The dispute settlement procedure basically aims at removing the 
friction in the actual working of multi-lateral trade agreements, which in turn 
aims at free flow of trade and commerce amongst countries. It seeks the 
optimal use of the world resources with the objective of sustainable 
development consistent with the needs of concerns at different level of 
economic development of member states. 
Often described as the 'crown jewel' and a 'near miracle' of Uruguay 
Round, the WTO dispute settlement system is the improvement on the GATT 
dispute settlement rules and procedures. In the early stages of multilateral 
trading regime that formally came into existence after the adoption of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948, the system of dispute settlement was 
weak and non-detailed. The GATT text only had a semblance of dispute 
settlement by allowing a country to complain if a benefit accruing to it was 
nullified or impaired. 
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The 'positive consensus' rule was converted into a 'negative 
consensus' rule, during Uruguay Round negotiations in which it was agreed 
that the reports of the Panel would be adopted unless and until all the 
member countries unanimously decide not to adopt the report. In other 
words, one country or two countries or a group of countries are now not in a 
position to block the adoption of a report unlike the practice in pre-WTO 
jurisprudence. This was a salutary change and the victory of small countries 
over bigger powers which has played a significant role in developing the faith 
of these small or developing countries not just in the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) bur also in the multilateral trading regime. 
The Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU) forms the backbone of the WTO jurisprudence. When a 
country encounters a trade measure that seemingly violates the WTO 
Agreement, the first action would normally be to raise the matter directly 
with the trading partner in question. In many cases informal bilateral 
consultations may resolve the problem. However, if the issue can not be 
settled informally, the complainant has the right to bring the matter to the 
WTO for adjudication. 
The formal process takes its beginning when a country requests 
consultation at the WTO. The request includes a brief description of the 
measures concerned and the legal grounds for the complaint. The respondent 
is obliged to reply to the request within ten days, and to grant opportunity to 
consult, in order to resolve the dispute amicably, within thirty days. Should 
the respondent refuse to consult on the matter, the complainant can request 
the establishment of a Panel after thirty days. Otherwise, the consultation 
period is set to sixty days to allow the parties sufficient time to sort out their 
differences bilaterally. Should a settlement be reached, it must be notified to 
the Dispute Settiement Body (DSB) and the relevant Councils and Committees 
in order to ensure that it does not violate any provisions of the WTO 
Agreement to the disadvantage of other members. If within sixty days no 
solution can be reached, and unless parties to the dispute agree to an 
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extension of the consultation period, the complainant can proceed to the 
adjudication stage. 
The adjudication starts with a formal request for a panel inquiry into 
the matter. Panels will be automatically established the second time such a 
request appears on the agenda of the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The composition of the Panels will be agreed by the parties or, in case parties 
cannot agree within 20 days, will be decided by the WTO Director-General. 
The Panel proceedings consist of written submissions and oral hearings 
where the parties are provided two or more opportunities to present their 
case before the Panellists, and to rebut the legal and factual arguments of the 
other side. The Panellists, with the assistance of the staff of the Legal Division 
of the WTO will then issue a report, including the ruling. This report should 
be circulated within six months after the initiation of the Panel, or 
exceptionally within nine months unless the parties to the dispute request a 
suspension of proceedings. Once issued; Panel reports must be adopted 
within sixty days, unless one or both sides decide to appeal against the 
rulings to the Appellate Body. 
The mandate of the Appellate Body is limited to reviewing the legal 
arguments of the panel report. The Appellate Body must issue its report 
within sixty, and in exceptional circumstances, within ninety days. The report 
must be presented before the Dispute Settlement Body for adoption within 
thirty days from its circulation and will be adopted unless it is unanimously 
rejected. 
Respondents found guilty of violating the rules will be accorded a 
'reasonable period of time' to bring inconsistent measures into compliance 
with their WTO obligations, not exceeding fifteen months. At the end of this 
period there are two possibilities, if the respondent takes no action towards 
the compliance, the complainant can request authorisation to take counter 
measures, which will be granted within ten days. These measures have to be 
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, and thus do not allow 
for any form of punitive damages. On the other hand, if the respondent did 
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take some action towards compliance, but the actions are deemed 
unsatisfactory by the complainant, recourse must be made within ninety days 
to the original panel, if possible, to rule on the adequacy of implementation. 
The DSU includes some provisions that referred to developing 
countries special needs. However, Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
measures have turned out to be of very limited value to developing countries. 
After fourteen years experience with the system, many developing countries, 
and most comprehensively those in sub-saharan Africa, are still bystanders. 
However, there are certain functional and structural aspects of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which have been in centre stage and matter 
of significant debate during last 15 years of its inception. Issues of 
transparency, poor country's accessibility to the DSB system, the cost of 
litigation for many countries especially developing and last developed 
countries, poor compliance record of develop countries with regard to DSB 
decisions and finally, the ultimate remedy against non-compliance, that it, 
retaliation through withdrawal of concessions, which in practice is an 
impractical option for two-thirds of the member countries, has triggered the 
debate for its reform. 
One question that is now raised is whether or not the dispute 
settlement mechanism has in fact been a success, and especially whether it 
represents a gain for developing countries. But this latter discussion is only 
now emerging and only a few observers have taken part in it. Furthermore, it 
does not yet constitute a distinct field of debate. The prime focus of academic 
commentary on the dispute settlement mechanism remains on how it has 
been used, rather than why it has not been used. 
There is no doubt that the new dispute settlement process has brought 
a certain degree of improvement over the past but some trends have been 
developing recently which are adverse to the interests of developing 
countries. The Panels and Appellate Body have often adopted interpretations 
which constrain the rights of developing countries and enhance their 
obligations. 
1. The Choice of Topic 
The following facts guided the choice: 
1. Twenty first century is the century of international trade and trade 
conflicts. 
2. A legally viable and effective mechanism is necessary to resolve trade 
conflicts and avoid trade wars. 
3. There is often a lot of hue and cry and protests against WTO rulings 
involving developing countries by NGOs, social groups and civil society 
organizations. 
4. There is a common belief that developing countries stand in 
disadvantageous position in the dispute settlement mechanism of World 
Trade Organisation. 
5. There is a need to make dispute settlement system of WTO more 
equitable, democratic, efficient and effective. 
2. Need for the Study 
The need for this research work stems its origin from debates, discussions and 
controversies regarding position of developing countries in the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Though the new dispute settlement process has brought about a certain 
degree of improvements over the past, some trends have been developing which are 
adverse to the interests of developing countries. The Panels and Appellate Body have 
often adopted interpretations which constrain the rights of developing countries and 
enhance their obligations. The failure of Panels and Appellate Body to apply the 
'special and differential treatment' provisions especially provided for developing 
countries. A fully impartial and independent dispute settlement mechanism can 
provide meaningful international trade regime in future, hence, the need for research 
in this area. 
3. The Objective of the Study 
The objective is to undertake this research work pertaining to: 
i) Analyse the WTO dispute settlement procedure from an economic 
perspective to address the issue of developing countries participation in 
this system. 
ii) To find out whether, the dispute settlement mechanism is as neutral as 
it would like to be. 
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iii) To find out the general pattern highlighting the factors which affect the 
dispute settlement procedure and hence influence the final outcome? 
iv) With more 'legalisation' of the DSU, does power still play the 
dominant role in dispute settlement procedure? 
4. Hypothesis 
The research proceeds on the following hypothesis: 
(i) The establishment of WTO dispute settlement mechanism brought a 
shift from 'power-oriented' settlement of disputes to 'rule-oriented' 
settlement of disputes. 
(ii) If the dispute settlement mechanism 'only' succeeds in normalising 
world trade then it will serve the purpose of encouraging commerce 
and economic growth thereby reducing the risk of war. 
(iii) The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) represents a 'quasi-judicial' 
model for determining trade conflicts peacefully. 
(iv) Dispute settlement process preserves developing countries rights to 
challenge measures imposed by massive developed countries such as 
US or EU for the sake of protecting their interests. 
(v) The limited use of DS system by non-industrialised countries has 
promoted a debate about whether the DS system is biased against 
smaller and poor countries. 
(vi) Retaliations authorised by the DSU and the threat which they represent 
during the procedure favour large countries to the detriment of small 
ones. 
(vii) Asymmetry in legal capacity disadvantages the countries which have 
fewer resources. The more important legal resources engaged by a 
country that it is plaintiff or defendant, are, higher the probability of 
success is. 
5. Scope of the Study 
The scope is restricted to the following: 
(i) Progressive development of the dispute settlement mechanism under 
the GATT/WTO regime 
(ii) The rule oriented set up under which the mechanism operates. 
(iii) The reflections of 'north south' divide within the operative system. 
(iv) The treatment given to developing countries by Panels, Appellate Body 
and Dispute Settlement Body. 
(v) The manner in which the mechanism could be made more judicialised 
and equitable. 
(vi) Participation of India in the system, its experience, difficulties and 
solutions. 
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6. Impact of the Study 
Since the subject matter of the study exhaustively deals with 'in-built' 
mechanism and points out grey-areas, deals with the problems of developing countries 
and solutions thereof, the impact of the study would be to add something to the 
existing literature on the subject and provide latest update, so as to be of use in the 
present and in the future. 
7. Methodology 
Methodology adopted is doctrinal and analytical. Different provisions of DSU, 
annexed agreements, rulings of Panels and Appellate Body have been studied and 
analysed. 
8. Chapter-wise Introduction 
The brief chapter-wise contents are, as under: 
Chapter-I pertains to the original framev^ork of dispute settlement system 
as it existed under GATT Agreement of 1947. An attempt is made to analyse 
the real nature of dispute settlement system under GATT and the defects 
therein, and subsequent improvements made in the system through 
prominent round of talks such as Tokyo and Uruguay. 
Chapter-II exhaustively deals w i^th legal framework of the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
Analysis is made regarding substantive provisions in relation to consultation, 
nullification or impairment, rulings, recommendations and suspension of 
obligations. 
Chapter-Ill deals with the principles of international law and question of 
their applicability to the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO. Relevant 
provisions of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 are discussed 
vis-^-vis dispute settlement of WTO. 
Chapter-IV is devoted to the impact of 'north-south' divide on the dispute 
settlement system of WTO, position of the developing countries under 
the dispute settlement system of GATT and the WTO, an analysis of the 
participation of developing countries. It also includes discussion on problems 
of developing countries. 
Chapter-V exclusively pertains to the response of panels and Appellate 
Body of WTO in cases involving developing countries. It also mentions how 
the US unilateralism adversely affects the reform process of DSU. Different 
proposals made by developing countries regarding improvements in 
the DSU, implementation of DSB recommendations, technical assistance to 
developing countries and implementation of special and differential 
treatment provision for developing countries are mentioned. 
Chapter-VI attempts to deal with the issue of India's participation in the 
dispute settlement mechanism of WTO from 1995 to 2009. India's position as a 
complainant and as a defendant is analysed with the help of data available 
through the presentation by way of tables. 
Suggestions 
The following suggestions are advanced by the researcher for 
removing the existing anomalies in the present Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) of WTO so as to make it more effective, efficient and 
equitable which will be beneficial for all member countries of the WTO 
irrespective of there size, strength, place in the global map and 
economic value in the international trade regime: 
1. Expand the Appellate Body's scope of review to allow, under 
certain circumstances, the Appellate Body to review manifestly 
erroneous or unreasonable characterization or appreciation of the 
facts before a Panel. 
2. The present rules of DSU allow the Appellate Body to hear cases in 
appeal from the Panels only on the substantive legal issues of 
WTO and not on facts. So, no appeal could be made to clarify the 
facts of the case that the Panel may not have established or 
overlooked and which may be central to that particular dispute. It 
is, therefore, suggested that if the Appellate Body finds that some 
facts are missing or have not been established it should be able to 
send back or remand the case to the original Panel. 
3. There is also a need to change the manner in which the Appellate 
Body selects divisions to hear particular cases. 
8 
4. Experience shows that disputes remain pending including 
important disputes, for long time before the Appellate Body due to 
paucity of time. The Appellate Body, therefore be allowed to sit in 
plenary in cases which were considered to be 'important'. 
5. The current number of Appellate Body members is not sufficient 
and there is a need to increase the number of Appellate Body 
Members by at least two or four persons. 
6. Under the present structure, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding process remains out of view and insulated from 
public scrutiny. It needs to be changed to ensure mere 
transparency into the system by making Appellate Body hearings 
open to the public. 
7. It would be convenient to allow WTO Members which had not 
been third parties before a Panel to appear before the Appellate 
Body on appeal. 
8. A WTO's Centre should be developed in each developing country 
to overcome those problems. 
9. There must be 3-4 Panellists specialized in each field having a 
wide range of general experience in the WTO. 
10. The problems relating to interpretations may be resolved by 
the establishment of a committee composed of three specialists 
supervised administratively by the Director-General to be in 
charge of such interpretation. 
11. The retaliation procedure should be struck out of the system as it 
completely distorts trade and instead a compulsory compensation 
system should be adopted. 
12. Remedies should involve private companies which incur loss due 
to the violation of the WTO or one of the covered agreements. 
Those private companies should have the right to directly bring 
actions to Panels under strict restrictions. 
13. The Dispute Settlement Understanding should be divided into 
sections according to subject matters and perhaps should address 
new issues to cope with globalization. 
14. The General Council should issue guidelines to the Panels and 
Appellate Body in respect of the interpretations of the agreements. 
There should be specific instruction that the Panels and Appellate 
Body should not undertake substantive interpretations. In 
particular, when a conflict between two provisions of the 
agreements in noticed, the Panel/Appellate Body should refer the 
matter to the General Council for an authoritative interpretation 
rather than itself undertake the exercise of determining which 
provision is more binding. 
15. It is very necessary for all the contracting parties of WTO in 
general, and that of developing countries in particular, to evolve a 
consensus on DSU review and work effectively in that direction in 
near future so that the existing anomalies in the DSU could be 
rennoved and it is further strengthened. 
16. Several provisions are set out in the DSU for special and 
differential treatment for developing countries in various WTO 
Agreements are rather of declaratory nature and in the absence of 
implementation modalities, have not been of practical use to 
developing countries. This needs to be made practicable otherwise 
the p-arpose behind 'special and diifeTential tTeatmenV in favour 
of the developing countries in the DSU would remain colourless 
and would exist merely in the legal documents as they have been 
in the past. 
17. The developing countries as well as the economies in transition 
can take the following steps to improve their position by means of 
co-operative action: 
i) Establishing a joint service for legal expertise, or a south 
network accessible and available to all, at minimal or no 
cost. 
ii) The regular exchange of information and experience 
between developing countries. 
iii) Undertaking regular group consultation and reviews 
regarding the functioning of the dispute settlement 
system, including the outcomes of individual cases. 
18. Unless the legal foundations of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
are supportive of development and cognizant of developing 
countries specific characteristics, needs and aspirations, it is 
unrealistic to expect that the DSU will generate outcomes that will 
be balanced and equitable from the perspective of the South. 
Except with matters of process, the DSU itself can hardly become 
development friendly. The potential inherent in DSU can only be 
harnessed more deliberately and systematically in support of 
development needs of developing countries, as a group, press in a 
concerted way for changes in the basic thrust of policies across the 
spectrum of WTO agreements, both present and future. 
19. At present, only members of the WTO, States and Custom Unions 
like the European Union may participate in Dispute Settlement 
proceedings. To ensure greater transparency in the system, the 
proceedings of Panel/Appellate Body should be opened to the 
NGOs to present amicus curiae briefs and that will make civil 
society organizations to participate in the best of manner. 
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In view of the existing difficulties, balanced with the desirability 
of permitting private claims, it may be advisable to establish an 
additional Dispute Settlement forum for private parties at the WTO. 
Private parties would still have to apply through the WTO member 
state authorities under municipal law and would have to meet 
International Law standards for bringing a claim, but Member States 
would have the option of bringing the claim or allowing the private 
party io file a complaint directly with the WTO. 
Last but not the least, good intentioned pledges and well-directed 
steps for reforms would go a long way in making the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Process as one of the best and most effective settlement 
mechanism in the history of International Organisations and would 
become a "role model" for other International and Regional 
Organisations in times to come. 
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"I totally agree that it is an unequal world. But the only way to 
equalize it is a multilateral agreement. There is no other way but a rule 
based international trading system. The multilateral forum does not 
really equalize everything but at least one can make the best use of it to 
one's best advantage." 
Anwarul Hoda 
Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Contracts and 
agreements in international trade and business are now to be conducted 
within the parameters laid down under various multilateral trade agreements 
under the operational control of World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Several international measures were undertaken to liberalise trade and 
payments between nations in the aftermath of World War 11. Initiated by the 
United States, these plans envisage a close economic co-operation of all 
nations in the field of international trade, payments and investment.^ 
Institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were set up. A third 
institution, called International Trade Organisation (ITO), was also sought to 
be set up to handle the trade side of international economic co-operation. 
However, ultimately the International Trade Organisation could not 
come into existence due to refusal of the U.S. Congress in 1950 to ratify the 
treaty establishing the ITO, while efforts were on to form the ITO, principal 
countries like U.S., U.K., Canada and some other developed countries met on 
the sidelines and dealt bilaterally on products where the negotiating countries 
were each other's principal supplier. In fact, the progressive transformation of 
traditionally 'power-oriented' trade, monetary and other international policies 
1. Rao M.B and Guru Manjula; WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths, New Delhi, p. 1 
1 
into 'rule-oriented' policies constitutes one of the most important 
achievements of International Law.2 
The progressive transformation of traditionally 'power-oriented' trade, 
monetary and other international policies into 'rule-oriented' policies 
constitutes one of the most important achievements of international law and 
policy since World War II. A 'power-oriented' technique suggests discussions, 
negotiations or dispute settlement in which one party asserts or uses the 
relative power at its disposal in order to influence the conduct of the other 
party. But the 'rule-oriented' policies suggest negotiations amongst 
governments or individuals on the elaboration and observance of general 
rules of conduct, which all participants voluntarily accept because the rules 
reconcile their short term conflicting interests with their common long term 
interests in a mutually beneficial manner .^  
The dispute settlement procedure basically aims at removing the 
friction in the actual working of multi-lateral trade agreements, which in turn, 
aims at free flow of trade and commerce amongst countries, which in tern, 
aims at raising of standards of living, ensuring full employment, expanding 
production and trade in goods and services. It seeks the optimal use of the 
World resources with the objective of sustainable development consistent 
with the needs and concerns at different levels of economic development of 
member states. 
The emergence of liberal international trade order and its subsequent 
culmination into General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a 
landmark event in the post-World War-II era. The underlying aim of General 
2. E.U. Petersmaim; The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, 
International Organisations and the Dispute Settlement, p. 70. 
3. Ibid. 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was confined not only to facilitating 
international trade relations but also to prevent trade Wars amongst the 
contracting parties. For that purpose, a mechanism was evolved within the 
broad legal framework of GATT so as to resolve trade conflicts amicably. 
The mechanism evolved to resolve trade conflicts amongst the member 
countries came to be popularly known as 'Dispute Settlement Mechanism' 
of GATT. In fact, a dispute arises when a member state believes that another 
member state is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made in 
the GATT/WT0.4 The disputants first try to solve their dispute through 
consultation, which is said to be one of the oldest and most effective methods 
of resolving disputes. 
Often described as the 'crown jewel' and a 'near miracle' of Uruguay 
Round, the WTO dispute settlement system is the improvement on the GATT 
dispute settlement rules and procedures.^ In the early stages of multilateral 
trading regime that formally came into existence after the adoption of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948, the system of dispute settlement was 
weak and non-detailed. The GATT text only had a semblance of dispute 
settlement by allowing a country to complain if a benefit accruing to it was 
nullified or impaired. At first, the diplomatic negotiations were the sole 
means of dealing with controversies. Then 'working parties' began to be 
established to investigate and formulate recommendations. Working parties 
were typically composed of representatives of various countries who received 
instructions from their governments. 
4. Rao M.B. and Guru Manjula, op. cit., p. 40. 
5. Avinash Sharma; "Improving Dispute Settlement in WTO: Flattering or Faltering", 
Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 8, No. 6, Kluwer Law, Int p758. 
In 1955, the GATT contracting parties began referring disputes to 
'Panels', ad hoc groups of experts who acted as neutrals and not government 
representatives. Panel decisions had no official or binding effects but 
were referred to GATT Council, which could make the 'appropriate 
recommendations'. A major lacuna was related to the power of a single 
country to bloc a particular ruling, wherein any ruling given by the Panel will 
be binding only if all the countries unanimously accepted it. This situation 
coupled with inordinate delays eroded the faith of member countries in the 
dispute se,ttlement system under GATT, 1948.^  
However, this rule was dramatically changed during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations wherein the 'positive consensus' rule as converted into 
a 'negative consensus' rule, in which it was agreed that the reports of the 
Panel would be adopted unless and until all the member countries 
unarumously decide not to adopt the report. In other words, one country or 
two countries or a group of countries are now not in a position to block the 
adoption of a report unlike the practice in pre-WTO jurisprudence. This was a 
salutary change and the victory of small countries over bigger powers which 
has played a significant role in developing the faith of these small or 
developing countries not just in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) bur also 
in the overall multilateral trading regime. 
Prior to Uruguay Round, the underlying discussion about how 
disputes should be settled was between United States and the European 
Union.'' The United States- inter alia, because of its interests in ensuring that 
all countries applied GATT rules supported a 'rule based' system, while the 
6. Rao M.B. and Guru Manjula, op. cit., p. 4. 
7. Shell, G.R.; Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organisations (1995), p. 339. 
European Union supported a 'diplomacy-based' model. During the Uruguay 
Round, the idea of a formal system, which could also deal with disputes in 
new areas such as trade in services and intellectual property rights, was 
tabled by the United States. In part because of some positive experience with 
cases it had initiated, under the GATT and also because of its aim of limiting 
U.S. Unilateralism, the European Union at this point abandoned its opposition 
to a legalised system. Subsequently as in many other areas of the negotiations 
where the major trading countries were in agreement- a formalised dispute 
settlement system became a realistic outcome. At the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, the dispute settlement mechanism was officially established 
in 1995 with the declared objective of ensuring that WTO rules would be 
observed and applied.^ 
When drafting the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the 
countries active in the negotiations (the U.S., the E.U., Canada, Mexico, Brazil, 
Jamaica and Japan) had two objectives in mind.^ The new system was to 
correct the GATT system's shortcomings and be 'stronger', which meant that 
it should have the ability to issue mandatory rulings and have its own 
organisational structure. All member countries supported this; the main 
players wanted a stronger and more binding system that could deal with the 
increased range and complexity of WTO issues, while developing countries 
supported the system because it was 'rule-based' and not 'power-based' as 
during the GATT. This they understood to be in their interest, since fuller 
legalisation was supposed to entail a levelling of difference among WTO 
8. Amin Alavi; "African Countries and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism" 
Development Policy Review, 2007,25(1) p. 26. 
9. Stoler A.L; "The WTO Dispute Settlement Process: Did the Negotiations Get What They 
Wanted?" World Trade Review, 2004,3(1), p. 99. 
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members and give them equal opportunities to use the system to defend their 
rights.io 
Furthermore, the DSU included some provisions that referred to 
developing countries special needs. However, 'Special and Differential 
Treatment' (SDT) measures have turned out to be of very limited value to 
developing countries. After fourteen years experience with the system, many 
developing countries, and most comprehensively those in sub-saharan Africa, 
are still bystanders. 
The Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU) forms the backbone of the WTO jurisprudence. Since the 
WTO agreements are based on the idea of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous economic benefits through trade liberalisation," it is principal 
objective of the WTO dispute settlement to reinstall, as quickly as possible, a 
situation in which every Member can fully enjoy the benefits it is entitled to 
under the various agreements. It has indeed worked reasonably well in the 
past 15 years. Small countries have participated and won disputes even 
against big WTO members.^^ 
When a country encounters a trade measure that seemingly violates the 
WTO Agreement, the first action would normally be to raise the matter 
directly with the trading partner in question. In many cases informal bilateral 
consultations may resolve the problem. However, if the issue can not be 
settled informally, the complainant has the right to bring the matter to the 
WTO for adjudication. 
10. Amin Alavi; op. cit., p. 27. 
11. Third Para of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement as well as Article 3.3 DSU 
stresses the importai^ce of effective functiorung of the WTO- "maintenance of a proper 
balance between the rights and obligations of Members." 
12. Supra note 5, p. 757. 
The formal process takes its beginning when a country requests 
consultation at the WTO. The request includes a brief description of the 
measures concerned and the legal grounds for the complaint. The respondent 
is obliged to reply to the request within ten days, and to grant opportunity to 
consult, in order to resolve the dispute amicably, within thirty days. Should 
the respondent refuse to consult on the matter, the complainant can request 
the establishment of a Panel after thirty days. Otherwise, the consultation 
period is set to sixty days to allow the parties sufficient time to sort out their 
differences bilaterally.^^ Should a settlement be reached, it must be notified to 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the relevant Councils and 
Committees,^^ in order to ensure that it does not violate any provisions of the 
WTO Agreement to the disadvantage of other members. If within sixty days 
no solution can be reached, and unless parties to the dispute agree to an 
extension of the consultation period, the complainant can proceed to the 
adjudication stage.^^ 
The adjudication starts with a formal request for a panel inquiry 
into the matter, panels will be automatically established the second time 
such a request appears on the agenda of the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The composition of the Panels will be agreed by the parties or, in case parties 
cannot agree within 20 days, will be decided by the WTO Director-General.^^ 
The Panel proceedings consist of written submissions and oral hearings 
where the parties are provided two or more opportunities to present their 
case before the Panellists, and to rebut the legal and factual arguments of the 
13. Henrik Horn, Petros C Mavroidis & Hakan Nordstrom; "Is the use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System Biased?" Centre for Economic Policy Research, No. 2340, p. 3. 
14. Article 3.5 of the DSU 
15. Article 4.3 of the DSU 
16. Article 8.7 of the DSU 
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other side. The Panellists, with the assistance of the staff of the Legal Division 
of the WTO will then issue a report, including the ruling. This report should 
be circulated within six months after the initiation of the Panel,!^ or 
exceptionally within nine months^^ unless the parties to the dispute request a 
suspension of proceedings.^^ Once issued; Panel reports must be adopted 
within sixty days,20 unless one or both sides decide to appeal against the 
rulings to the Appellate Body. 
The mandate of the Appellate Body is limited to reviewing the legal 
arguments of the panel report. The Appellate Body must issue its report 
within sixty, and in exceptional circumstances, within ninety days.^ ^ 
The report must be presented before the Dispute Settlement Body for 
adoption within thirty days from its circulation^^ and will be adopted unless it 
is unanimously rejected. 
Respondents found guilty of violating the rules will be accorded a 
'reasonable period of time' to bring inconsistent measures into compliance 
with their WTO obligations, not exceeding fifteen months.^ '^' At the end of this 
period there are two possibilities, if the respondent takes no action towards 
the compliance, the complainant can request authorisation to take counter 
measures,24 which will be granted within ten days.25 These measures have to 











Article 12.8 of the DSU 
Article 12.9 of the DSU 
Article 12.12 of the DSU 
Article 16.1 of the DSU 
Article 17.5 of the DSU 
Article 17.14 of the DSU 
Article 23.3 of the DSU 
Article 22.2 of the DSU 
Article 22.6 of the DSU 
Article 22.4 of the DSU 
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allow for any form of punitive damages. On the other hand, if the respondent 
did take some action towards compliance, but the actions are deemed 
urisatisfactory by the complainant, recourse must be made within ninety days 
to the original panel, if possible, to rule on the adequacy of implementation.27 
However, there are certain functional and structural aspects of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which have been in centre stage and matter 
of significant debate during last 15 years of its inception. Issues of 
transparency, poor country's accessibility to the DSB system, the cost of 
litigation for many countries especially developing and last developed 
countries, poor compliance record of developed countries with regard to DSB 
decisions and finally, the ultimate remedy against non-compliance, that is, 
retaliation through withdrawal of concessions, which in practice is an 
impractical option for two-thirds of the member countries, has triggered the 
debate for its reform. 
One question that is now raised is whether or not the dispute 
settlement mechanism has in fact been a success, and especially whether it 
represents a gain for developing countries. But this latter discussion is only 
now emerging and only a few observers have taken part in it. Furthermore, 
it does not yet constitute a distinct field of debate. The prime focus of 
academic commentary on the dispute settlement mechanism remains on 
'how' it has been used, rather than' why' it has not been used. 
A majority of experts working on Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) do so from within the legal tradition and have studied it as a litigation 
process by analyzing case law and the rulings. They implicitly regard the 
system as a success in allowing countries to settle their disagreements. 
27. Article 21.5 of the DSU 
However, the DSM is also a political process, and cases have important 
economic impacts. Recently, lawyers have been joined by economists and 
political scientists in analysing the DSM. Unlike the lawyers, these last two 
groups are interested in determirung the conditions under which countries 
participate in the DSM, and the costs and benefit of this participation-^^ 
A first set of observations from this source concerns possible relations 
between countries level of engagement in the DSM, their shares and patters of 
trade, and the retaliation opportunities that these provide. Popular Scholars 
like C.P. Bown and B. Hoekman, H. Horn, P.C Mavroidis and H. Nordstrom 
consider country's shares of world trade, numbers of related products and 
numbers of trading partners as determinants of their participation. Their 
hypothesis is that 'the probability of encountering disputable trade measures 
is proportional to the diversity of a country's exports over products and 
partners which means that larger and more diversified exporters would be 
expected to bring more complaints than smaller and less diversified exporters. 
Another observation is in relation to the negative consequences a case 
may have as a reason why small developing countries especially has not been 
active in the DSM. Examples of this are provided by C.P. Bown,^ ^ who 
develops a model to analyse a subset of disputes, namely, those dealing with 
issues of market access. He finds that lost market access and economic losses 
determine countries decisions to initiate cases. However several other political 
economy factors affect the decision not to litigate. Other things being equal, 
adversely affected exports are less likely to participate when they are 
involved in a preferential trade agreement with the respondent, when they 
28. Supra noteS, p. 27. 
29. Bown, C.P; "Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complaints, Interested Parties and Free 
Riders", World Bank Economic Review 19(2) pp. 287-310. 
10 
lack the capacity to retaliate against the respondent by withdrawing trade 
concessions, when they are poor or small, and when they are particularly 
reliant on the respondent for bilateral assistance. 
A final set of observations from this literature focuses on biases and 
inequalities within and between institutions managing trade, including the 
WTO in general and DSM in particular. Here, the main problem identified is 
that the DSM and the WTO has became too technically complex and 
demanding for most developing countries to use effectively in the absence of 
adequate assistance. Underlying this is the observation that there is too much 
law and too little politics in the system.^o 
There is no doubt that the new dispute settlement process has brought 
a certain degree of improvement over the past but some trends have been 
developing recently which are adverse to the interests of developing 
countries. The Panels and Appellate Body have often adopted interpretations 
which constrain the rights of developing countries and enhance their 
obligations. Four particular cases may be cited in this regard. 
First in the Venezuela Gasoline Case, the Appellate Body has expanded 
the discretion of a country in taking trade restrictive measures for the 
conservation of non-renewable natural resources. The Appellate Body has 
said that the discretion of a country in this matter is not limited by the test of 
necessity; rather it is adequate if there is a nexus between the particular trade 
restrictive measure and the protection of non-renewable natural resource. 
Second, the Appellate Body said in India Woollen shirts case^^ that the 
onus of justifying the trade restraint in the textiles does not lay on the country 
30. Supra note 29, p. 28. 
31. United States Measures affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India 
(Complainant- India) WT/DS 3, 14"" March 1996. 
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applying the restrictive measures; rather it is the complaining country which 
has to demonstrate the conditions prescribed for the restraint have not been 
fulfilled. 
Third, the Panel in the Indonesia car case'^^ has denied developing 
countries the flexibility, allowed by the Agreement on Subsidies, to give 
subsidies for the use of domestic products in preference to an imported 
product. The Panel has taken the stand that such a measure would violate the 
Agreement on Trade- Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 
Fourth,.the Appellate Body in the recent shrimp- Turtle case^^ has given 
interpretations, at least four of which have adverse implications for 
developing countries. These are enumerated below: 
(i) It has tried to establish the primacy of the conservation of the 
environments over the free flow of goods under the normal GATT 
rules, and thereby it has diluted the descriptions on the general 
exceptions as provided in Article XX of GATT, 1994. 
(ii) It has, considered the turtle to be an 'exhaustible natural resource' 
on the ground that it is covered by some multilateral environment 
agreements for the protection of endangered species. 
(iii) It has directly implied that a country can take trade restrictive 
measures for actions and affects outside its jurisdiction, on the 
ground that the extra-territorial nature of the action gets blurred as 
the turtles are migratory. 
(iv) It has approved the filing of briefs and opinions before the Panels 
by persons and organisations outside the governments which are 
involved in the particular case. 
32. Indonesia- Certain Measures affecting Automobile Industry, WT/DS54. 
33. U.S Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS 58/AB/R. 
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Mr. Bhagirath Lai Das, former Indian Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative to GATT, says that serious implications of these 
interpretations are likely to unfold over the coming years.^^ 
Then there is the problem of significant loopholes that have been left in 
some important agreements which act to the detriment of developing 
countries. The following three examples will illustrate this feature.^^ 
(a) In the Agreement on Textiles, the developed countries undertook the 
commitment to bring products accounting for 33 percent of their 
imports into the normal WTO discipline and thus exclude them from 
the restrictive regime of the textile sector by 1 January 1998. The 
totality of the products out of which this percentage is to be calculated 
is listed in an annex to the agreement. The loophole is that the list in 
this annex includes a very large number of items which have not been 
under restraint. The developed countries have taken advantage of this 
loophole and chosen for the liberalisation process upto 1 January 1998, 
only such products which are not under restraint. In this manner, the 
obligation is fulfilled and yet there is no liberalisation by them in 
practice. 
(b) Then the Agreement on Textiles also contains a faintly visible trap. Its 
Article 7.3 contains a requirement of sectoral balance of rights and 
obligations, a concept which is alien to the GATT/WTO system which 
works on the principle of overall balance. There is apprehension that it 
may be a trap for justifying the possible reluctance of developed 
countries on 1 January 2005 to abolish the special restrictive regime in 
34. Das, B.L.; "Strengthening Developing Countries in the WTO". Trade & Development series 
No. 8, p. 7. 
35. Ibid. 
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this sector on the plea that developing countries have not adequately 
liberalised their textile sector. 
(c) The special provision for dispute settlement in the Agreement on Anti-
dumping is also an example of a major loophole. While this agreement has 
brought in some measure of objectivity in the investigation of dumping, the 
whole subject of anti-dumping has been practically excluded from the normal 
dispute settlement process of the W.T.O. In these cases, the role of the dispute 
settlement panels has been severely curtailed in as much as they can not 
pronounce whether an action or omission of a country violates its obligation, a 
role which almost is a routine feature in disputes in al other areas. 
All the WTO members have a right to seek adjudication for their trade 
grievances. However, there may be other impediments that hold back certain 
members from exercising this right.^ ^ First, the legal proceedings are often lengthy, 
and many involve considerable costs. Second, small countries may be discouraged 
from bringing complaints if their prospects of enforcing rulings in their favour are 
bleak because of limited retaliatory power, especially since there is no mechanism for 
collective punishment of recalcitrant respondents. Small developing countries may 
also exercise self-constraint in picking their fights in order not to jeopardise privileges 
they depend on, including development aid and unilateral trade preferences. 
1. The Choice of Topic 
The following facts guided the choice: 
1. Twenty first century is the century of international trade and trade 
conflicts. 
2. A legally viable and effective mechanism is necessary to resolve trade 
conflicts and avoid trade wars. 
36. Supra note 13, p.4. 
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3. There is often a lot of hue and cry and protests against WTO rulings 
involving developing countries by NGOs, social groups and civil society 
organizations. 
4. There is a common belief that developing countries stand in 
disadvantageous position in the dispute settlement mechanism of World 
Trade Organisation. 
5. There is a need to make dispute settlement system of WTO more 
equitable, democratic, efficient and effective. 
2. Need for the Study 
The need for this research work stems its origin from debates, discussions and 
jtroversies regarding position of developing countries in the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Though the new dispute settlement process has brought about a certain 
degree of improvement over the past, some trends have been developing which are 
adverse to the interests of developing countries. The Panels and Appellate Body have 
often adopted interpretations which constrain the rights of developing countries and 
enhance their obligations. The failure of Panels and Appellate Body to apply the 
'special and differential treatment' provisions especially provided for developing 
countries. A fixlly impartial and independent dispute settlement mechanism can 
provide meaningful international trade regime in ftiture, hence, the need for research 
in this area. 
3. The Objective of the Study 
The objective is to undertake this research work pertaining to: 
i) Analyse the WTO dispute settlement procedure from an economic 
perspective to address the issue of developing countries participation in 
this system. 
ii) To find out whether, the dispute settlement mechanism is as neutral as 
it would like to be. 
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iii) To find out the general pattern highlighting the factors which affect the 
dispute settlement procedure and hence influence the final outcome? 
iv) With more legalisation of the DSU, does power still play the dominant 
role in dispute settlement procedure? 
4. Hypothesis 
The research proceeds on the following hypothesis: 
(i) The establishment of WTO dispute settlement mechanism brought a 
shift from power-oriented settlement of disputes to 'rule-oriented' 
settlement of disputes. 
(ii) If the dispute settlement mechanism 'only' succeeds in normalising 
world trade then it will serve the purpose of encouraging commerce 
and economic growth thereby reducing the risk of war. 
(iii) The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) represents a 'quasi-judicial' 
model for determining trade conflicts peacefully. 
(iv) Dispute settlement process preserves developing countries rights to 
challenge measures imposed by massive developed countries such as 
US or EU for the sake of protecting their interests. 
(v) The limited use of DS system by non-industrialised countries has 
promoted a debate about whether the DS system is biased against 
smaller and poor countries. 
(vi) Retaliations authorised by the DSU and the threat which they represent 
during the procedure favour large countries to the detriment of small 
ones. 
(vii) Asymmetry in legal capacity disadvantages the countries which have 
fewer resources. The more important legal resources engaged by a 
country that it is plaintiff or defendant, are, higher the probability of 
success is. 
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5. Scope of the Study 
The scope is restricted to the following: 
(i) Progressive development of the dispute settlement mechanism under the 
GATTAVTO regime 
(ii) The rule oriented set up under which the mechanism operates. 
(iii) The reflections of 'north south' divide within the operative system. 
(iv) The treatment given to developing countries by Panels, Appellate Body 
and Dispute Settlement Body. 
(v) The manner in which the mechanism could be made more judicialised 
and equitable. 
(vi) Participation of India in the system, its experience, difficulties and 
solutions. 
6. Impact of the Study 
Since the subject matter of the study exhaustively deals with in-built 
mechanism and points out grey-areas, deals with the problems of developing countries 
and solutions thereof, the impact of the study would be to add something to the 
existing literature on the subject and provide latest update, so as to be of use in the 
present and in the future. 
7. Methodology 
Methodology adopted is doctrinal and analytical. Different provisions of DSU, 
annexed agreements, rulings of Panels and Appellate Body have been studied and 
analysed. 
8. Chapter-wise Introduction 
The brief chapter-wise contents are, as under: 
Chapter-I pertains to the original framework of dispute settlement system 
as it existed under GATT Agreement of 1947. It puts focus on 'consultation' 
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as the most popular method of settUng disputes in general and international 
trade disputes in particular. An attempt is made to analyse the real nature of 
dispute settlement system under GATT and the defects therein, and 
subsequent improvements made in the system through prominent round of 
talks such as Tokyo and Uruguay. A comparison is also made between 
dispute settlement mechanism of GATT 1947 and WTO. 
Chapter-II exhaustively deals with legal framework of the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
Analysis is made regarding substantive provisions in relation to consultation, 
nullification or impairment, rulings, recommendations and suspension of 
obligations. Then a detailed discussion is made with regard to establishment 
of panels, form and content of request, and terms of reference with the help of 
prominent cases. Appellate procedure rules, collegiality principle and scope 
of the power of the Appellate Body, compensation and suspension of 
concessions are discussed alongwith the relevant cases. 
Chapter-Ill deals with the principles of international law and question of 
their applicability to the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO. Relevant 
provisions of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 are discussed 
vis-ci-vis dispute settlement of WTO. Prominent general principles such as 
stare dicises, burden of proof, judicial economy in dispute settlement, doctrine of 
legitimate expectation, doctrine of in dubio mitius and certain other principles 
are discussed with the help of relevant cases. 
Chapter-IV is devoted to the impact of 'north-south' divide on the dispute 
settlement system of WTO, position of the developing countries under the 
dispute settlement system of GATT and the WTO. An analysis of the 
participation of developing countries as complainant as well as in the capacity 
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of defendant from 1995 to 2009 is made with relevant tables, facts and figures. 
It also includes discussion on problems of developing countries. 
Chapter-V exclusively pertains to the response of panels and Appellate 
Body of WTO in cases involving developing countries. It also mentions how 
the US unilateralism adversely affects the reform process of DSU. Different 
proposals made by developing countries regarding improvements in 
the DSU, implementation of DSB recommendations, technical assistance to 
developing countries and implementation of special and differential 
treatment provision for developing countries are mentioned. 
Chapter-VI attempts to deal with the issue of India's participation in the 
dispute settlement mechanism of WTO from 1995 to 2009. India's position as a 
complainant and as a defendant is analysed with the help of data available 
through the presentation by way of tables. 
Prominent disputes in which India has been one of the parties such as 
Wool Shirts and Blouses case, India-Patents case. Shrimp and Shrimp products case 
etc are discussed in detail so as to make the actual picture clear in relation to 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
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Chapter-I 
DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
Chapter-I 
"The WTO dispute settlement system is the most important 
change in the jurisprudence of the global economy in the 
second half of the tiuentieth century". 
- P. Nicholas 
Prologue: Under general public International Law, states are essentially 
free to enter into any agreement of any kind and content. Equality of states 
entails the power to choose partners, and to discriminate against others. 
There are hardly any limitations in customary law on engaging in 
preferential or discriminatory treatment, beyond the principles and rules 
enshrined in the charter of United Nations. 
Following the end of Second World War, international leaders were 
anxious to build safeguards and institutions into the international system 
that would protect the world from the recurrence of such disastrous 
events. The United States took the lead in advancing the view that free 
trade provided an important mechanism for achieving world peace. 
The outcome of this approach was the Havana Charter, the draft 
agreement for the creation of the International Trade Organisation (ITO), 
which was signed by 53 of the 56 countries participating in the conference. 
But unfortunately the International Trade Organisation never came into 
existence. 
However, the negotiations at the Geneva Conference, 1947 gave 
concrete results in the form of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) including a mechanism to resolve trade disputes amicably without 
disturbing the credibility of the agreement. This mechanism to resolve 
trade conflict amongst the Member Countries came to be popularly known 
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as 'Dispute Settlement Mechanism' of General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), 1947. 
In fact, the dispute settlement mechanism of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was primarily based on consultative process 
outlined in Articles XXIP and XXIIP of the Agreement. Although the 
GATT dispute settlement system worked relatively well since its creation 
and improvements were made from time to time yet there were a number 
of shortcomings in the system which resulted in demands being made for 
more 'legalistic' and 'rule-oriented procedures for the settlement of 
disputes. Demands for improvements in the nascent dispute settlement 
system of GATT resulted in Uruguay Round Negotiations which were 
most extensive round of negotiations in the history of trade negotiations 
1. Article XXII states • 
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford 
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be 
made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation 
of this Agreement. 
The contracting parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any 
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible 
to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1. 
Article XXIII states -
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this agreement is being mollified or impaired or that the attainment 
of any objective of the agreement is being impeded as the result of:^  
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this 
agreement; or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this agreement; or 
(c) the existerice of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the 
satisfactory, adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals 
to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any 
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the 
representations or proposals made to it. 
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from 1986-1994 that finally paved the way to the establishment of World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Many negotiators and scholars agree that while the achievements of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations were many, but 'jewel in the crown' 
of these achievement is the powerful Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). The emergence of this powerful mechanism imparts an 
imprecedented level of legalisation to the World Trade Organisation. 
Its rules are precise and determine what may be expected of its members. 
In case of dispute, members delegate the authority to settle these disputes 
to a Dispute Settlement Panel, an Appellate Body, and ultimately the 
Dispute Settlement Body. Through the dispute settlement understanding, 
the World Trade Organisation has acquired strength to enforce the 
relevant rules with an atomicity and with consequences that were quite 
alien to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
These are major developments with system-wide consequences 
have deprived developed coimtries (particularly US) of the excuse that the 
inadequacies and poor enforcement capacity of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade compelled them to resort to unilateral and bilateral 
measures. They have also imported greater certainty and predictability to 
the international trading system, which are particularly valued by the 
developing countries. 
In this chapter, the researcher examines the Dispute Settlement 
Process provided under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
analysing the relevant provisions therein for the settlement of disputes. 
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The analysis primarily relates to Article XXIP and XXIII* of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Then the issue of demerits of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism under GATT, 1947 is discussed so as to point out as 
to why there was need for improvement in such Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. 
Finally different rounds of talks such as Kennedy Round, Tokyo 
rotmd and Uruguay Round were held to bring improvements in the 
defective dispute settlement mechanism of General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 1947. These rounds to talks in general and Uruguay Round in 
particular, relates to the emergence of legalism in the Dispute Settlement 
system of World Trade Organisation. 
(a) Dispute Settlement under General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) 
In the global economy, the year 1948 was a historic landmark with 
the formation of the GATT, which is a multilateral treaty on rules, terms, 
and conditions for the international trade amongst the participating 
member countries. Since the underlying aim of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade was to establish and maintain commercial stability at the 
global level, it became evident for member countries to incorporate such a 
mechanism, which could solve various trade disputes between the 
member countries without disturbing the credibility of the multilateral 
agreement. 
3. Supra note 1 
4. Supra note 2 
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For that purpose, the GATT contained several Articles, with clauses 
dealing with the resolution of disputes.^ Articles XXII and XXIII 
supplemented by the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, and the 1982 
Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement are the most important.^ 
(I) Analysis of relevant provisions of GATT dealing with Dispute 
Settlement: 
(i) Consultations: Resolving conflicts through consultations is one of the 
oldest and pertinent method at all levels. This popular method finds its 
due place in the GATT provisions also. Article XXII as amended in 1955 
provides for consultations with respect to any matter affecting the 
operation of the GATT. Contracting parties are invited to solve their trade 
disputes by bilateral consultations and, if it fails, by the conciliatory 
intervention of the contracting parties. 
Article XXII of GATT provides as follows'': 
Consultation: 
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, 
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, 
such representations as may be made by another contracting party 
with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
2. The contracting parties may, at the request of a contracting party, 
consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any 
matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory 
solution through consultation under paragraph 1. 
5. J.H.Jackson; World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969), p. 164. 
6. (1978-79) B.I.S.D., 26th Supp.210 
7. G. Mores & P. Gillies; International Trade and Business Law, Policy & Ethics,pl7.. 
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In fact, if the contents of Article XXII, as mentioned above, are 
analysed, it contains a diplomatic solution of international trade disputes 
among the members of GATT.s Although working parties may be 
established under article XXII but the contracting, parties have resorted to 
this procedure on only ten occasions between 1948 and 1986. 
Moreover, the 1979 understanding adds that contracting parties 
undertake to respond to requests for consultations promptly and to 
attempt to conclude them expeditiously with a view to reaching mutually 
satisfactory conclusions.^ 
(II) Nullification or Impairment: Article XXII provides that a 
contracting party may have recourse to the procedures provided therein 
when it considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under the GATT is being nullified or impaired. 
Article XXIII provides as under: 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under this agreement is being nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the agreement is 
being impeded as the result of :io 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its 
obligations under this agreement; or 
8. J.S. Castel; "The Uruguay Round and the Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement 
Rules and Procedures", I & CLQ (Oct., 1989), Vol.38, p.835. 
9. Any contracting party requesting consultations under Article XXII.2 must inform the 
Director General to allow notification of all other contracting parties, 1958 
10. Article XXIII 1. 
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(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement; 
or 
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, 
with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make 
written representations or proposals to the other contracting 
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any 
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic 
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it. 
What is contained in Article XXIII of the GATT, as mentioned above, 
is that a presumption exists that a breach of the rules of the GATT has an 
adverse impact on other contracting parties, and in such a case it is up to 
the contracting party against which the complaint is made to rebut the 
charge.^^ The object is to stop the violation of agreed upon rules in order to 
preserve the integrity of the GATT. In fact, the emphasis is placed on 
adjudication. 
If a contracting party bringing an Article XXIII case claims that 
measures which do not conflict with the provisions of the General 
Agreement have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it under the 
General Agreement, it will be called upon to provide a detailed 
justification. 12 jjig complainant is required to prove that a benefit accruing 
to it under the GATT had been nullified or impaired. In this case the 
emphasis is placed more on negotiation than adjudication since no agreed 
upon rules are involved. 
Bilateral consultations between the disputants under Article XXII, 
XXIII.lor XXXVIII.2 and 5 in order to obtain a satisfactory adjustment of 
11. 1979 Understanding, Annex, para 5. 
12. 1979 Understanding, Annex, para.5. The concept of nullification or impairment is 
related to the expectations of a contracting party. 
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the matter must precede recourse to the dispute settlement procedures 
foui\d in Article XXIII.2 Thus, when the contracting parties failed to 
resolve their dispute through consultation, negotiation or conciliation," 
the aggrieved party^^ could request the council of GATT to appoint a panel 
to adjudicate such dispute. Although there was no legal requirement, a 
request for the establishment of a panel could usually be granted by the 
council in accordance with the "standard practice" of the GATT, unless the 
request is opposed by the other party. 
In fact, the underlying object was that the dispute settlement 
procedures were not intended as a contentious act and all parties were 
required to engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve 
the dispute.^5 
Then, the panel, in pursuance of its terms of reference, had to start 
investigating the dispute in the light of rules of the GATT, hear the 
arguments of the parties concerned and make such findings as would have 
assisted the contracting parties in making recommendations or rulings.^^ It 
was however; always possible for the parties to the dispute to reach a 
settlement before the panel submitted its report to the council, in which 
case it was the end of the matter.^'' 
13. 1979 Understanding, para 5. 
14. Private persons have no standing under the GATT. They must act through their 
governments. 
15. 1979, Understanding, para 9. The function of Article XXIII.2 is to encourage the parties 
to settle their disputes. 
16. Idem, para 16. 
17. Idem, para 16. 
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The panel might, if nullification or impairment was found, 
recommend that the offending measure be withdrawn, or if it could not 
have been done immediately, that the injured party be compensated, for 
instance, by lower tariffs until the withdrawal took place. 
The report containing the findings and recommendations or rulings 
was required to be given prompt consideration and approval by the 
Council, which is empowered to act on behalf of the contracting parties in 
order to acquire legal force. Adoption of the report and action taken 
pursuant to it within a reasonable period of time were decided by 
consensus. Thus, any contracting party, including the party, which was the 
object of the recommendations or rulings, could block the adoption of 
the report. However, obstruction in the dispute settlement was to be 
avoided.18 Interestingly consensus did not mean unanimity especially in 
view of Article XXV.4 of the GATT, which stated that except as otherwise 
provided, decisions of the contracting parties were taken by a majority of 
the votes cast. 
The contracting parties had to keep under surveillance any matter 
on which they made recommendations or rulings to make sure that 
implementation takes place within a reasonable period 10 time.^^ If the 
recommendations or rulings are not implemented, the aggrieved party 
may seek the authorization of the council to take retaliatory action against 
the offending party. 
18. 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute settlement, para (X). 
19. 1979, Understating, para.22; 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute 
Settlement, para (VIII). 
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The contracting parties preferred Inspite of the progressive 
codification of the basic procedures for the settlement of disputes by third 
party adjudication, consultations and conciliation leading to an amicable 
settlement through diplomatic negotiations. The object, indeed, was to 
redress the contractual balance of rights and obligations between the 
disputants in particular and among the contracting parties in general. 
(II) Greater co-operation between North & South: 
In 1966,20 the contracting parties adopted a decision, confirmed in 
1979,21 which established the procedure to be followed for consultations 
and conciliation between developed and developing contracting parties. 
This procedure provided the Director General of the GATT to 
employ his or her good offices with a view to facilitate a solution, for 
setting up a panel with the task of examining the dispute in order to 
recommend appropriate solutions, and for time limits for carrying out of 
the different parts of this procedure. 
(III) Consultation as the Most Popular Method of Dispute 
Settlement 
Statistical data compiled by the GATT secretariat^^ indicates that, in 
practice, most disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of 
the GATT were settled through bilateral consultations without involving 
the contracting parties. This explains why between 1948 and 1986 only 106 
complaints were made that formally invoked Article XXIII.2 Also, in some 
20. (1966) B.I.S.D., 14th Supp.18 
21. 1979 Understanding, paras-7-8. Annex, paras 2-3. 
22. FOCUS, GATT Newsletter, May 1987, No.46, p.2. 
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instances the contracting parties brought their disputes to the attention of 
the council without reference to this provision. 
Moreover, fifty-tv/o of the 104 complaints resulted in the submission 
of a report by a panel. Of these reports, 50 led to a mutually satisfactory 
solution and hence withdrawals of the complaint or in two cases were 
implemented without adoption. It was only in two cases that the panel 
reports did not result in the resolution of the dispute. The other 52 
complaints were settled during sessions of the contracting parties, by 
working parties, by groups of experts or through bilateral consultations 
before the panel had met.23 
However, seven panels were established in 1987 and fourteen in 
1988, which shows that contracting parties had more confidence in the 
quality of the work of the panels. 
(B) Demerits of Dispute Settlement System of General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 
Although it was generally agreed, that the GATT system of 
settlement of trade disputes worked relatively well since its creation in 
1948. Timely improvements were also made on a number of occasions to 
further strengthen the system. Yet there were shortcomings in the system 
and in the way in which it operated .2* The prominent shortcomings may be 
listed as under:-
1. lack of automatic access to panels. 
23. R.E. Hudec; Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985, p. 79 
24. R.E. Hudec; The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (1975), Adjudication 
of International Trade Disputes (1978) and "GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo 
Round: An Unfinished Business" (1980) 13 Cornell Int. L.J. p. 145. 
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2. delays in appointing them and in establishing their terms of 
reference, 
3. slow consideration of the cases due to absence of strict time limits 
for the various stages of the procedure, 
4. an inadequate panel selection process, 
5. often a lack of competent and neutral panellists and the poor quality 
of panel reports, 
6. decision making by consensus which allowed blockage by the losing 
party, 
7. difficulties and delays in implementation of panel reports.^s 
As a result of the above mentioned defects, demand for a better 
system of surveillance to ensure compliance with recommendations and 
rulings was made. It was thought that a 'more legalistic' and 'rule-
oriented' procedures for the settlement of disputes would discourage the 
breach of the GATT rules and ensure greater compliance with them than 
did the consensus system. 
It was, indeed, realized that the negotiated settlements favoured 
countries, which had considerable political and economic strength 
irrespective of the merits of the dispute. The contracting parties, therefore, 
committed themselves to the adjudicative process for the settlement of 
disputes. An adjudicative approach stressed fairness and was more likely 
to protect the rights of small countries. 
25. I.G. Castel - "The Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures", I & CLQ (Oct., 1989), p.841. 
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Moreover, a better system of dispute settlement was believed to 
eliminate other, less legitimate methods of resolution of disputes, 
especially resort to "Voluntary restraints" agreements, "Orderly marketing" 
agreements and unilateral action in the form of retaliatory measures in 
national trade legislation. For these reasons, the members of the GAIT 
decided to review the rules and procedures of the dispute settlement 
process and to appoint a Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, 
at the Uruguay Round of negotiations that began at Punta de Este on 15 
September 1986. In 1988 this group proposed a number of improvements 
which served as a basis for those which the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, meeting at Montreal on 9 December 1988 at the Ministerial 
level, recommended for approval by the contracting parties on a trial basis 
a) Tokyo Round Improvements in Dispute Settlement System: 
The Tokyo Round of talks, which started in 1973 and continued 
until 1979 also brought certain significant improvements in the dispute 
settlement mechanism. In fact, the non-tariff barriers agreements 
negotiated in the Tokyo Round contained procedures for the settlement of 
disputes, which applied only to GATT members having signed them. 
Some of them followed more or less the model of 1979 Understanding 
others adopted new and more elaborate and rigorous procedures, which 
may be enumerated as under: 
i. Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the 
GATT (Code on subsidies and Countervailing Duties); 
ii. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 
(Revised Anti Dumping Code). 
iii. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; 
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iv. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 
V. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code): 
vi. Agreement on Government Procurement; 
vii. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Code of Customs Valuation).^^ 
The procedures were operated by the committee administering the 
agreement concerned. For instance, it was provided in the code on 
subsidies and countervailing duties that when a signatory believes that 
any subsidy granted or maintained by another signatory either causes 
injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment of benefits 
accruing to it under the GATT, or serious prejudice to its interests, such 
signatory might request consultations with such other signatory. In the 
event that no mutually acceptable solution is reached, the next step was 
conciliation mediated by the administering committee. Only then 
the aggrieved party had the right to a proceeding before a panel. 
The administering committee upon receipt of the panel report might make 
recommendations to the parties and if they were not followed within a 
reasonable period of time, authorize appropriate counter measure strict 
time limits apply to each phase of the dispute settlement procedures. 
However, the dispute settlement procedures of the codes had been 
used sparingly. Between 1979 and 1986 three reports presented by panels 
established under the code on subsidies and countervailing duties were 
not adopted because they raised fundamental questions concerning the 
26. Supra Note 25, p. 842 
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interpretation of certain articles of the code, on which the committee 
disagreed.27 
(b) Uruguay Round Improvements in the Dispute 
Settlement System 
From its inception, the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement 
was confronted with a large number of proposals made by the 
participating countries for the improvements of the dispute settlement 
rules and procedures.^s 
The popular suggestions made by-the participating countries may 
be enumerated as follows:^^ 
i. a mechanism for early warning; 
ii. notification to the council of mutually agreed solutions where 
any GATT member could raise matters relating to such solutions; 
iii. provision for going directly to the council and requesting a panel 
should the other party fail to respond to a request for 
consultations within an established time period; 
iv. the enhancement of consultation, mediation and conciliation 
process, especially mediation by the Director-General; 
v. new options such as voluntary or mandatory binding arbitration 
to respond to the different nature of disputes, provided the 
rights of the third parties are not effected; 
vi. automatic access to panels; 
vii. strict time limits for the council when establishing panels; 
viii. creation of a permanent tribunal of legal experts or the holding 
of regular meetings of the council devoted exclusively to dispute 
settlement; 
27. Ibid, page 834 
28. (1987) B.I.S.D., 33rd Supp.l9; GATT Newsletter, Jan-Feb 1987, No.43, p.6 
29. Supra Note 25 
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ix. the use of standard terms of reference by panels; 
X. expansion and regular updating of a roster of nongovernmental 
panellists; 
xi. imposition of strict time limits on the work of panels and the 
examination and implementation of their reports by the council; 
xii. modification of the consensus rule, especially with respect to the 
adoption of the panel reports by the council, by excluding the 
parties to the dispute from the decision making process; 
xiii. avoidance of differences of interpretation of the GATT rules by 
the panels; 
xiv. more important role for the secretariat and its legal staff; 
XV. a better quality of government participation; 
xvi. an improved follow up procedure; 
xvii. clarification of the procedure in disputes involving several 
complaints; 
xviii. right of intervention of third parties, including access to 
information. 
xix. special and more favourable treatment should be accorded to the 
developing countries which would include specialised legal 
assistance, supplementary training course and post-consultation 
review by the council so long as these measures do not infringe 
the principle of equality of treatment. 
In fact, the above listed proposals enabled the Group to identify 
certain important issues for negotiations and to prepare the list of 
improvements that was submitted to the Trade Negotiations Committee 
meeting at the ministerial level in December 1988.30 
The text adopted at the ministerial meeting begins with a 
declaration that the GATT dispute settlement system serves to preserve the 
30. Supra Note 25, p.843. 
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rights and obligations of the contracting parties. It is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.^^ 
Existing rules and procedures were continued to be enforced but the 
improvements were to be applied on a trial basis only, from 1 May 1989 to 
the end of the Uruguay Round, in respect of Articles XXII and XXIII. 
The application of these improvements will also be kept under review 
during the remainder of the Round for the purpose of deciding on their 
permanent adoption. Meanwhile the Negotiating Group on Dispute 
Settlement was to continue its work for the full achievement of the 
negotiating objectives. 
The prominent improvements brought about in the dispute 
settlement system through the Uruguay Round may be enumerated as 
follows: 
1) Mutually agreed solutions to matters raised under Articles XXII. 1 
and XXIII. 1 as well as arbitration awards within the GATT must be 
notified to the council where any contracting party may raise any 
point relating thereto. 
2) A contracting party to which a request is made for consultations 
under Article XXII. 1 or XXIft.l must, unless otherwise mutually 
agreed, reply to it within ten days after its receipt and enter into 
consultations in good faith within a period of not more than 30 days 
from the date of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually 
satisfactory solution. If the requested party does not respond within 
ten days, or does not agree to enter into consultations within a 
31. (1987) B.I.S.D., 33rd Supp.l9; GATT Newsletter, Jan-Feb.1987, No.43, p.6. 
36 
Chapter-I 
period of 20 days or any other period otherwise mutually agreed, 
from the date of request, the complaining party may then proceed 
directly with a request for the establishment of a panel or working 
party.32 
If the consultations under Article XXII. 1 or XXIII. 1 fail to settle a 
dispute within 60 days after the request for consultations, the 
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel or 
working party under Article XXIII.2. This may also be done earlier if 
the parties jointly consider that consultation have failed to settle the 
dispute. 
Any request for consultations must be in writing, contain the 
reasons for the request and be notified to the GATT council. 
3) Good offices, conciliation and mediation are voluntary procedures 
that may begin and be terminated at any time. The Director General 
may, acting in an ex-officio capacity offer his or her services with the 
view to assisting the contracting parties to settle a dispute. This is 
important when developing countries are involved. 
4) The contracting parties were provided the opportunity of settling 
dispute by expeditious and binding arbitration which was absent in 
the original GATT system. But the arbitration agreement must 
contain a selection of the arbitral procedure and be notified to all 
GATT contracting parties sufficiently in advance of the actual 
commencement of the arbitral process. It must also be assumed that 
32. J.C.BIiss - "GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in Uruguay Round: Problems & 
Prospect" (1987) 23 Stan. J. Int. L. 31. 
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the procedure to be chosen by the parties could be governed by the 
1985 UNCITRAL model Law on Commercial Arbitration.33 
5) If the complaining party so requests, a decision to establish panel or 
a working party must be taken at the latest at the council meeting 
following that at which the request first appeared as an item on its 
regular agenda. The ministers did not give the contracting parties a 
legal right to a panel. 
Standard terms of reference are applicable unless the parties 
to the dispute agree otherwise. Panels shall be composed of well-
qualified governmental or non-governmental individuals or both. 
In principle, a panel is composed of three members, unless the 
parties to the dispute agree within ten days from the establishment 
of the panel, to a panel composed of five members. If there is no 
agreement on the members of the panel within 20 days of its 
establishment, each party may request the Director General in 
consultation with the Chairman of the coimcil to form the panel. 
Special procedures are adopted for multiple complaints. Thus, a 
single panel may be established to examine several complaints 
related to the same matter. 
Provision is also made for third party practice. Any third 
contracting party having a substantial interest in the matter before a 
panel and having notified this to council, shall have an opportunity 
to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to it. The 
33. (1979) 15 I.L.M., 701. 
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panel may also grant the third contracting party access to the 
written submissions to the panel by those parties to the dispute 
which have agreed to the disclosure of their respective submissions 
to the third contracting party. 
6) In order to provide sufficient time for the members of the council to 
consider panel reports, such reports shall not be considered for 
adoption until 30 days after they have been issued to the contracting 
parties. During that time the disputants may still be able to settle 
their differences. Contracting parties having objections to a panel 
report must give written reasons to explain their objections for 
circulation at least ten days prior to the council meeting where the 
report will be considered. 
However, the controversial question of consensus could not be 
settled. It was agreed that the panel reports were still to be adopted 
by consensus without prejudice to the GATT provisions on decision-
making, which remain applicable. But the parties to a dispute 
should not avoid delaying the process of dispute settlement. 
The period from the request vmder Article XXII. 1 or XXIII. 1 until 
the council makes a decision shall not, unless the parties agree 
otherwise, exceed 15 months. 
7) The technical assistance services of the GATT secretariat in respect 
of dispute settlement are made available to any contracting party 
requesting them. Legal advice and assistance by a qualified expert 
within the Technical Co-operation Division may also be obtained 
by any developing contracting party. Training courses for interested 
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contracting parties concerning the GATT dispute settlement 
procedures and practices will be conducted by the secretariat. 
8) Prompt compliance with recommendations and rulings of the 
contracting parties under Article XXIIL2 is declared to be essential 
in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes. There is an 
obligation on the part of the contracting party concerned to inform 
the council of its intention in respect of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings. If that party finds it impracticable to 
comply immediately with the recommendations or rulings, it shall 
have a reasonable period of time to do so. 
The council shall monitor the implementation of recommendations 
or rulings. Thus, unless the council decides otherwise, this issue 
shall be on the agenda of the council meeting after six months 
following the adoption of the recommendations or rulings and shall 
remain on the agenda until resolved. Also, at least ten days prior to 
each such council meeting, the contracting party concerned shall 
provide the council with a status report in writing of its progress in 
the implementation of panel recommendations or rulings. 
However, the ministers did not settle the issue of the definition, 
determination and types of compensation should the offending party fail 
to implement the recommendations or rulings, nor did they consider the 
moimt of impairment that could serve as a guide to negotiate 




(D) Comparison between Dispute Settlement System of GATT 
and the WTO 
> The WTO has introduced a more legalistic approach to trade dispute 
settlement than its predecessor GATT, because of the absence 
of proper machinery for dispute settlement, disputes took a 
long time to clear. This also meant that GATT required more 
diplomacy than law to settle disputes. Under the GATT dispute 
settlement machinery, there resulted a lot of delay and often 
non-implementation of the agreements reached .^ 4 
But, the WTO has changed all that. It has introduced a remarkably 
efficient and predictable legal system of dispute settlement with a built-in 
mechanism for sanctions and procedures for cross-sectoral retaliation. This 
is regarded generally as one of the more positive aspect of the WTO 
system. Disputes can, in theory, be brought to WTO panels for speedy 
dispensation of settlement. 
> Disputes under GATT 1947 system necessitated the panel preferring 
one party's interpretation of the WTO agreement over the others. At 
the same time, a strong party could block decisions because 
consensus was required for adoption. This led to a disproportionate 
number of decisions that were never adopted. Lacking a consensus, 
the legality or enforceability of a decision was questionable at best. 
In tern. Panels may have been influenced by the objective of 
reaching a mutually acceptable solution when drafting their 
rulings.35 
34. SEATINI Bulletin; "WTO's Dispute Settlement System and the proposed Centre on 
WTO Law", {Vol.2 No.7) 
35. A. Chua; "The Precedential Effect of WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports" (1998) 11 
L.J.I.L. pp.45, 46. 
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Instead of writing reports that are designed to achieve a consensus 
among WTO members. Panels are now liberated from the need to satisfy 
all parties and can concentrate on the merits of the dispute and the 
unencumbered application of the facts to the WTO law. This change is 
attributable to the negative consensus rule under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) where Panel and Appellate Body reports are 
automatically binding, subject to a negative Vote by the parties in the 
Dispute Settlement Body. By automatic adoption, the party has substituted 
'legal legitimacy' for 'political legitimacy' in the dispute settlement 
process. 
> Panels under GATT 1947 were established on an ad hoc basis, 
independent of any other Panels or disputes between contracting 
parties, there were no specific clauses under GATT 1947 providing 
for the establishment of dispute resolution Panels, although they 
were loosely authorised under Articles XXII and XXIII, which 
stipulated that the parties were to consult.^^ Dispute resolution 
evolved under GATT as a practical way to administer disputes as 
opposed to parties engaging in consultations. 
Alternatively, the WTO Dispute settlement system adopts a more 
permanent presence, lending new Status to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). Its raison d'etre is to specifically deal with trade disputes and 
elucidate the mutual obligations of members.^^ 
36. Eventually, GATT 1947 contracting parties adopted certain procedural rules and 
understandings in general dispute settlement. 
37. James, Cameron & K.R. Gray - "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body" -I & CLQ (2001) 50 (2)p.251. 
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> Unlike previous GATT Panels, the dispute settlement bodies under 
the WTO are explicitly required to invoke the rules of 
interpretation of treaties as a source to clarify WTO Agreements. 
Article 3:2 of the DSU states that WTO agreements are to be 
interpreted in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law.^s 
> From the inception of the WTO in January 1995, over 390 disputes 
had been initiated in the Dispute Settlement Body by the end of 
2008. This poses a marked contrast with the number of disputes 
heard under the GATT 1947 system. 
Hence confidence in the DSB is probably the WTO's greatest 
success. The creation of an Appellate Body has contributed to a further 
sophistication of International trade law. The international dispute 
settlement system has never seen such a high Volume of cases. 
The discussion carried out in this chapter makes it amply clear that 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism under General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade was a landmark event in the history of international relations in 
general and international trade law in particular. Never before in history 
did a mechanism to resolve trade disputes at the global level exist in a 
maimer provided under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Although the major focus of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
under GATT, 1947 was based on 'consultative process' which is one of the 
oldest methods of settling conflicts or disputes of any kind at the 
international level. But the manner in which the consultative process was 




well prepared. The panel system provided under the GATT 1947 was 
again an effective and unique method towards settlement of trade disputes 
among the contracting parties. 
Another point which comes out clearly from the discussion in this 
chapter is that Rules framed in 1966 and 1979 providing procedure to be 
followed for consultation and conciliation between developed and 
developing countries brought sufficient amount of cooperation between 
the developed countries of the North and the developing and least 
developed coimtries of the south. 
However, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism as provided under 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 was not free form defects, 
the prominent amongst which were - that there was no automatic access to 
Panel, delay was caused in appointing members of Panel, slow 
consideration and inadequate criteria for penal selection etc. These defects 
let to considerable amount of dissatisfaction amongst the contracting 
parties which made repeated demand for review and reforms in the 
Dispute Settlement system of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
A number of trade round talks were held form 1962 to 1994 of which 
the most pervasive and reform-oriented trade round talks was the 
Uruguay Round (1986 to 1994) which brought the element of 'Legalism', 
missing in the GATT, in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of World 
Trade Organisation, a considerable degree of automaticity in the Dispute 
Settlement System. The dispute settlement system of GATT 1947 was 
based on 'positive consensus' while the dispute settlement system of WTO 
is based on 'negative consensus' rule. The 'positive consensus' rule caused 
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weaknesses leading to failure in implementation of the finding whereas 
the 'negative consensus' rule is better and has been able to do away with 
the defects of 'positive consensus' rule to a large extent. 
The comparison between the dispute settlement system of GATT 
1947 and that of World Trade Organisation 1995 shows the importance of 
the establishment of an Appellate procedure in the WTO that did not exist 
under the dispute settlement system of General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade. In the same manner specified time frames for each stage is a strong 
tool to prevent delays in disposal of dispute which was a common thing 
under the dispute settlement of General Agreement on Tariffs on Trade. 
Lastly, the improved surveillance mechanism provided under 
dispute settlement understanding for the implementation of dispute 
settlement body decisions, that were virtually non-existent in the GATT 
1947, is providing continuous strength to the dispute settlement system of 





Prologue: One of the most significant achievements of Uruguay Round 
negotiation was the estabUshment of an effective dispute settlement under 
the umbrella of the WTO agreement. The World Trade Organization 
dispute settlement procedure (DSP) has been the most successful 
mechanism for peacefully settling trade disputes among nations in history. 
The procedures that apply to WTO dispute settlement are set out in 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of 
Dispute (DSU), which is one of the agreement negotiated during the 
Uruguay round. The DSU introduced important changes to the dispute 
settlement procedure that had developed under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1947, including the possibilities for the parties to appeal 
panel reports. 
The purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is to resolve 
specific disputes between WTO members; the DSU does not provide panel 
or appellate body to issue advisory opinions. This means that the panels 
do not make legal interpretations in the abstract. Rather, in determining 
whether a challenged measure is consistent with WTO law, a panel applies 
its legal interpretation of a particular WTO provision to the facts of the 
case at hand. 
Once any member of the commimity of Nations completes 
its accession process to the WTO, it is directed to confirm its "laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligation as provided 
in the annexed agreement." 
The Dispute Settlement Procedures of the World Trade Organisation 
allow counter measures to be imposed when a country fails to provide 
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to temporary trade compensation and at the same time is unwilling 
comply with the ruling and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSP). 
The DSU provides a very detailed and rules based procedures, 
which consists of several different phases, each of which is subject to 
mandatory time frames. In the realm of WTO, the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes forms the backbone 
of the WTO jurisprudence. 
When we analyse the DSU, it is found that the member involved in 
the dispute are supposed to enter into consultations which consist of 
legally not binding, diplomatic negotiation with a view to reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solutions. In case the consultations do not arrive at 
solution within fifty days, or in case the party complaint against refuses 
to engage in consultation in the first place, the complaining party may 
request the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body to establish a dispute 
settlement panel. The defendant may refuse to such a request once, but if 
the request is renewed, it may only be rejected through the DSB by 
unanimity. Contrary to panel, whose member are appointed on a case by 
case basis, the appellate body is standing organ whose task is limited to 
the review of legal issues. 
An attempt is made in this chapter to provide a broad out line of the 
dispute settlement mechanism in the beginning discussing in detail Article 
XXIII of the GATT/WTO. Article XXIII, indeed, is the foundation stone of 
dispute settlement mechanism as provided under the General Agreement 
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on Tariffs and Trade 1947 and later on under the new Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. 
The stage-by-stage movement of dispute settlement process is 
displayed with the help of two tables so as to make the entire process as 
clear as is possible. Then a detailed discussion is carried out with regard to 
proceedings before the dispute settlement panels giving specific reference 
to establishment of panel, forms and content of request and terms of 
reference with the help of some case law. Thereafter discussion is made 
with regard to proceeding before the Appellate Body on issues such as 
scope and power of the Appellate Body, subsidiary legal claim and 
arrangement for consultations with NGO's concerned, surveillance of 
implementation and compensation and suspension of concession. 
The discussion made in this chapter shows that the dispute 
settlement mechanism evolved under Dispute Settlement Understanding 
is far more better and effective then the one, which existed under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. The new dispute settlement 
process has given fruitful results due to its detailed treatment of dispute 
settlement amongst member countries. However, it has been observed that 
the provisions of Dispute Settlement Understanding relating to the 
developing countries has not been implemented in latter and spirit which 
needs to be taken care of in near future so as to provide the benefits of new 
process to all those concerned. 
New Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
WTO members commit themselves not to take unilateral action 
against perceived violations of the trade rules but to seek recourse in the 
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multilateral dispute settlement system and to abide by its rules and 
findings. Article III of the WTO Agreement, which illustrates the functions 
of the WTO states in paras (2) and (3) as underr^ 
(2) The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its members 
concerrung their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under 
the Agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also 
provide a forum for further negotiations among its members concerning 
their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation 
of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial 
Conference; 
(3) The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the Agreement. 
In fact, the aim of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is "to 
secure a positive solution to a dispute". Thus, finding a mutually 
acceptable solution to a problem between members consistent with WTO 
provisions is encouraged.2 
(A) Substantive Provisions Relating to Dispute Settlement: 
Articles XXII & XXIII of GATT/WTO 
International procedures for the settlement of disputes among 
GATT/WTO Contracting Parties are set out in Articles XXII and XXIII of 
GATT 1947 and in a few special GATT provisions, such as Article XVII:12, 
(disputes over balance of payments restrictions and Article XVIV:7, 
disputes over GATT consistency of interim agreements for a Customs 
1. The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Article. III. 
2. K.G. Gupta; World Trade Organisation and India p.31. 
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Union or free trade area), which do not exclude recourse to the general 
GATT dispute settlement procedures in Article XXIII.3 
In fact. Article XXII of the GATT/WTO provides for bilateral and 
multilateral consultations^ "regarding such representations as may be 
made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the 
Operation of this agreement." Article XXII, therefore, makes it crystal clear 
that the emphasis is placed on 'bilateral consultations' in the first instance 
and if that fails, one of the parties may seek multilateral consultations with 
the contracting parties as a whole under Article XXII: 2 of the GATT. 
The consultative process is outlined in Article XXII (mentioned in 
preceding paragraph) becomes more formal process of dispute settlement 
in Article XXIII where consultation is provided for in specific instances.^ 
The list is not limited to breaches of GATT but also includes claims that do 
not conflict with GATT, but lead to total or partial stoppage of benefits that 
may accrue under GATT (non-violation, nullification or impairment). 
If an agreement cannot be reached between the disputants, then 
Article XXIII provides a procedure for investigation and, recommendation 
or the possible authorisation of suspension of concessions or other 
obligatior\s by the complaining contracting party. 
B) Analysis of Article XXIII of GATTAVTO 
Article XXIII. 1 specifies six different kinds of "violation complaints" 
(Article XXIII.la), non-violation complaints (Article XXIIl. 1 (b) and 
3. E.U Petersmann; "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System International Law, 





"situation complaints (Article XXIII. 1, c).^ In fact, the focus in Article XXIII. 
1 is on the usual notions of "nullifications or impairment of any benefit 
accruing directly under this Agreement" and on the attainment of any 
objective of the Agreement being impeded rather than on the traditional 
legal concepts of legality of acts" (cf. Article. 173 of the EC treaty) and 
"state responsibility" for internationally wrongful acts, was inspired by 
earlier international trade agreements. There was also a widely felt need 
among the drafters of the GATT in 1947 for a sort of "equity law 
jurisdiction" (in Article XXIII: 1, b and c) which would enable collective 
decisions to deal with unforeseen new situations each as worldwide 
monetary crisis or a depression with widespread unemployment.'' 
Table-I8 
SIX KINDS OF COMPLAINTS UNDER GATT ARTICLE XXIII.l 
Article XXIII. 1: If any contracting party should consider that 





Any benefit accruing to 
it directly or indirectly 
under this agreement is 
being nullified or 
impaired or 
as a result of 
the attairiment of any 
objective if the agreement 
is being impeded 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry 
out its obligations under this Agreement, or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of 
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
provisions of this Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation 
6. Ibid. 
7. E.U. Petersmann;VioIation-complaints and Non-violation complaints in Public 
International Trade Law, in German Yearbook of International Law 34 (1991), 
pp.175-229. 
8. Supra noteS, p.73 
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It is, indeed, interesting to note that in GATT practice, only two of 
the six kinds (given in Table 1) of complaints under Article XXIIl have 
been actively used by GATT contracting parties; over 90 percent of the 
total of more than 250 disputes under Article XXIII have been "Violation 
complaints" over "nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under 
the GATT. Less than 200 complaints have been non-violation complaints 
over nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the GATT. 
In only four disputes under Article XXIII were references made to "other 
situations in terms of Articles XXIII.l, c and in only three complaints did 
the complainant contend that "the attainment of any objective of the 
Agreement" was being impeded. 
Interestingly enough, no GATT dispute settlement ruling had ever 
based their legal findings on Article XXIII.l(c) or on the impending of the 
"attainment of any objective of the Agreement". In view of the vague 
language and criteria for such situation complaints and complaints over 
impending of GATT Objectives, it is to be welcomed that these imprecise 
types of complaints seem to have fallen into disuse. 
On the other side. Article XXIII.2 of GATT provides for three kinds 
of remedies-
(i) rulings, 
(ii) recommendations, and 
(iii) Suspension of obligations. 
Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII of GATT states:-
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting 
parties concerned within a reasonable period of time, or if the difficulty is 
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of the type described in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be 
referred to the Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties shall promptly 
investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate 
recommendations to the contracting parties, which they consider to be 
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as foimd appropriate. If the 
Contracting Parties consider the circumstances are serious enough to 
justify such action, they may authorise a contracting party or parties to 
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such 
concessions or other obligations imder this Agreement as they determine 
to be appropriate in the circumstances.^ 
Table-IPo 
Three kinds of remedies Under GATT Article XXIII.2 





the matter may be referred to the 
Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties shall 
promptly investigate any matter so referred to 
them and 
shall make appropriate recommendations to the 
contracting parties which they consider to be 
concerned or 
give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate 
they may authorise a contracting party or parties 
to suspend the application to any other contracting 
party or parties of such concessions or other 
obligations under this Agreement as they 
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. 
In fact, prompt investigation and appropriate recommendations or, 
where there is a point of contention on law or fact, appropriate rulings, are 
obligatory. The authorization of counter-measures is optional and 
9. G. Mores & P. GUlies; International Trade & Business Law, Policy and Ethics, p. 518. 
10. E.U Petersmann ;,op.cit p. 75. 
53 
Chapter-II 
admissible only if the circumstances are serious enough to justify such 
action and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are 
appropriate in the circumstances (Article XXIII: 2). The power to give a 
ruling includes the power to decide on the GATT consistency of disputed 
trade and, in this context, to decide on the interpretation and application of 
GATT provisions that are relevant for the dispute settlement. It also 
includes the power to determine the legal responsibilities and secondary 
obhgations of a contracting party that has been found to have violated 
GATT law." 
The adoption by the contracting parties (usually acting through the 
GATT coimcil) of a dispute settlement report is regarded in GATT practice 
as a "ruling" and authoritative determination of the existing GATT rights 
and obligations of the disputants in the instant case. Such rulings can also 
constitute subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation in 
terms of Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
and have to be taken into account in the interpretation of GATT law. 
On the other hand, "recommendations" relate to the implementation 
of "rulings" and differ from them by their legally non-binding character. In 
order to be appropriate, recommendations must be consistent with GATT 
law and applicable to general international law. 
Like most other international agreements, neither GATT nor 1979 
Tokyo Round Agreements define the legal responsibilities of a contracting 
party that has violated its obligations. But it has long been recognised in 
11. Ibid. 
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first objective of Contracting Parties is usually to secure the withdrawal of 
the measures if these are found to be inconsistent with the General 
Agreement. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if 
the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a 
temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures, which are 
inconsistent with the General Agreement.^2 
It is, therefore, pertinent to note that the GATT law confirms with 
the general international law principle that the breach of an obligation 
entails the responsibility of the defaulting state and give rise to "secondary 
obligations". The different types of substantive consequences (remedies) 
recognised under general international law in respect of internationally 
wrongful acts - cessation of illegal acts, restitution and guarantees of non-
repetition-are applicable in the context of GATT law to the extent that 
GATT law does not provide otherwise. 
(i) Cessation of illegal measures: The withdrawal of illegal measures 
has long been recognised as the first objective of dispute settlement 
procedures under GATT Article XXIII. This is in line with the general 
international law obligations to perform international treaties in good 
faith, to withdraw illegal measures and to wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act. As the illegality of a trade measure may 
be removed not only by the withdrawal of the measure concerned but 
also by its justification through invocation of one of GATT's safeguard 
12. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance, adopted on 28 Nov. 1979, Annex para 4 in BISD 26 s/216. 
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clauses, the standard recommendation of panel reports is to request the 
defaulting country to bring its measure into conformity with the 
General Agreement. 
(ii) Restitution: The GATT law seems to recognise only a limited legal 
basis for an international right to reimbursement of certain illegal 
duties. It seems so because this remedy is neither specified in GATT 
Article XXIII nor in the "Agreed Description of the customary Practice 
of GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement" of 1979"" has multiple 
.. bases, such as the fact that reimbursement of illegal duties had never 
been requested in a GATT dispute settlement proceeding prior to 1985. 
It is, in fact, only in the field of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty law that five panel reports have recommended not only the 
revocation of illegal anti-dumping or countervailing duties but also their 
reimbursement. When the 1985 GATT panel report on New Zealand's anti-
dumping duties on imports of electrical transformers from Finland was 
adopted by the GATT coimcil in July 1985, New Zealand stated that it had 
already complied with the request to reimburse the illegal anti-dumping 
duties. 
In a subsequent dispute over US anti-dumping duties on Swedish 
stainless steel products, a similar recommendation to reimburse illegal 
anti-dumping duties was, however opposed by the defendant; USA has so 




illegal anti-dumping duties in view of the lack of a specific legal basis for 
such reimbursement in current US trade legislation, i^  
In the "Tmdheim Panel Report" adopted by the Government 
Procurement Committee in May 1992, the panel concluded that Norw^ay 
had not complied with its obligations under the Agreement on 
Government Procurement in its single tendering procedure for 
certain goverrmient procurement for the city of Trondheim.^^ in examining 
the request, by the US that the panel recommended, Norway to take the 
necessary measures to bring its practices into compliance with the 
Agreement with regard to Trondheim procurement. Thus, 
notwithstanding the US request for effective remedies because standard 
GATT recommendations would not constitute a sufficient remedy, the 
panel considered restitution in kind, by means annulling the contract 
given to the Norwegian firm and by recommending the procurement 
process, as disproportionate. It only requested Norway pro futuro to take 
the measures necessary to ensure that the entities listed in the Norwegian 
Annex to the Agreement conduct government procurement in accordance 
witii the above findings.^^ The panel noted in this respect that panel 
findings, once adopted by the committee, would constitute guidance for 
future implementation of the Agreement by the Parties.i^ 
14. E.U. Petersmann; Current Legal Problems in GATT Dispute Settlement. Proceedings in 
the Field of Ani- dumping Law in D. Friedmann/EJ. Mestmacker, Conflict Resolution 
in International Trade, 1993 pp. 167-200. 
15. BISD 39 s/400 and GATT document GPR.DS 2/R of 28 April 1992. 
16. Para 5.2 of the panel findings - GATT document GPR DS 2/R (1992). 
17. Ibid, para 4.24 
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The Trondheim Panel finding seems to be in accordance with past 
dispute settlement practice in GATT and with the recognition also in 
general international law that restitution in kind may not be required 
if it is materially or legally impossible or excessively onerous for the 
coimtry, which has violated its obligations. In GATT dispute settlement 
proceedings under Article XXIII, the claimant states have regularly 
requested only withdrawal of the illegal act ex nunc without demanding 
re-establishment of the status quo ante or of the situation that would have 
existed in the absence of the illegal act. The reason for this is that GATT 
rules (e.g. Articles. I, III & XIII) prescribe minimum standards for the non-
discriminatory treatment of traded goods and, in GATT jurisprudence, are 
construed to protect "expectations on the competitive relationship between 
imported and domestic products" rather than "expectations on export 
Volumes."i8 
Moreover, it is often impossible to recreate retroactively the "lost 
trade opportunities" or to calculate, and make good for, the "lost trade 
Volumes". Even the reimbursement of illegal customs duties or illegal 
internal taxes has never been requested in GATT dispute settlement 
practice since, inter alia, their repayment to individual importers would 
not re-establish the Competitive conditioris to which exporting countries 
had been entitled in the past under GATT law. 
However, the exact scope of restitution in kind in GATT law 
remains to be clarified and depends on the legal context of the illegal 
measures concerned. In the 1992 panel report on US anti-dumping duties 
18. U.S. Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Panel Report adopted on 17 
June 1987, in BISD 34 S/136, p.l58. 
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on cement clinker from Mexico,!^ the panel relied on the four provisions in 
the 1979 Anti-dumping Agreement explicitly requiring reimbursement of 
Anti-dumping duties (cf. Articles 8:3, 8:4,11:1,11:3) in concluding that "the 
existence of the obligation to reimburse duties imposed consistently with 
the agreement strongly suggested that the responsibility of a party having 
imposed a duty inconsistently with the agreement comprised the 
reimbursement of such duties". 
(iii) Reparation by equivalent: It refers to monetary or other 
compensation through alternative trade benefits. It has long been 
recognized in GATT practice that compensation is voluntary under GATT 
law. Article XXIII does not authorize the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
make legally binding recommendations on compensation. For instance, in 
the 1989 Chilean apple case, the GATT panel "noted that there was no 
provision in the General Agreement Obligating Contracting parties to 
provide compensation", and rejected a request by Chile that the panel 
recommend that the EEC accord compensatory trade benefits to Chile.20 
In fact, the proposals to introduce into the GATT system an 
obligation to grant monetary or other compensation were discussed and 
rejected in 1966 and, again, during the Uruguay Round Negotiations.^^ 
Compensation may, however, be voluntarily agreed so far to forestall a 
request for an authorization to suspend reciprocal trade concessions under 
19. BISD 39 S/391 and GATT document ADP/82. 
20. EEC Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples from Chile, Report of the Panel adopted 
on June 22,1989, in: BISD 36 s/93,134,135 
21. BISD 14 s/18, 139 and the Uruguay Round note by the GATT Secretariat on 
compensation in the context of GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures (MTN 
GNG/NG 13/W/13/32 of July 1989). 
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Article XXIII: 2 or XXVIII. Such compensation must be granted on a most-
favoured nation basis consistently with GATT Articles I & XIII. Rules and 
procedures for the determination of compensatory trade concessions were 
agreed upon in the Uruguay Round Negotiations. 
In GATT dispute settlement practice, the issue of compensation has 
been raised in the GATT Council only at the request of the complaining 
country. The 1979 Dispute settlement understanding and its "Agreed 
Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the field of dispute 
settlement" explicitly mentioned that the provision of compensation 
should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is 
impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the 
measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement.22 Panels 
have consistently construed GATT rules as rules protecting competitive 
conditions, and have regularly not addressed issues of "trade damage" and 
compensation. 
(iv) Satisfaction and guaranties of non-repetition: The remedies of 
satisfaction have been accorded in GATT dispute settlement practice 
through a number of rulings in disputed trade measures, which had 
already been withdrawn at the time of dispute settlement proceeding.23 
For example, in the dispute over Canada's complaint against a US 
prohibition of imports of tuna, this remedy was requested by Canada so as 
to obtain assurances against a repetition of similar import prohibitions by 
22. BISD 265 s/210,216 
23. Supra noteS, p.81 
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the USA; the dispute settlement ruhng accordingly confirmed the GATT 
inconsistency of the already eliminated import prohibition.^^ 
Suspension of obligations and retaliation under GATT Article 
XXIII: 2 
According to General international treaty law as codified in Article 
60 of the Vieima Convention on Law of treaties 1969, a material breach of a 
multilateral treaty entitles other contracting parties to suspend, in whole or 
in part, the application of the treaty to the offending Country, but Article 
XXIII: 2 of GATT excludes such a right of Unilateral-Suspension of GATT 
obligations unless it is authorised by the contracting Parties. Article XXIII: 
2 of GATT is as under: 
If the Contracting Parties consider that the Circumstances are 
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorise a contracting 
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party 
or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as 
they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to 
any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact 
suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty 
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Director 
General to the Contracting Parties of its intention to withdraw from this 
agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day 
following the day on which such notice is received by him. 
The Customary GATT dispute settlement practice in this respect 




The last resort, which Article XXIII provides to the country invoking 
this procedure, is the possibility of suspending the application of 
concessions or other obligations on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the 
other contracting party, subject to authorization by the Contracting Parties. 
Such action has only rarely been contemplated and cases taken under 
Article XXIII: 2 have led to such action in only one case.^s 
Moreover, the drafting history of Article XXIII: 2 confirms that it 
was designed to limit the customary law right of Unilateral reprisals, 
whose exercise had contributed so much to the "law of Jungle" in 
International economic affairs during the 1930s, and to introduce, as stated 
by one of the drafters, a new principle in international economic affairs. 
We have asked the nations of the world to confer upon an international 
organization the right to limit their power to retaliate. We have sought to 
tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep it within bounds. By subjecting it 
to the restraints of international control, we have endeavoured to check its 
spread and growth, to convert it from a weapon of economic warfare to an 
instrument of international order.26 
Operating on the above-mentioned rational foundations, the GATT 
law explicitly regulates problems of "blockage" of GATT dispute 
settlement procedures or of other GATT decisions (e.g. on reforms of 
GATT law) by enabling the GATT contracting parties to make dispute 
settlement rulings and other decisions by a majority of the votes cast. 
Lawful majority decisions and other GATT-consistent political pressures 
25. BISD26S /216 27. 
26. UN document EPCT/ A/ PV/ 6 (1947), p.4 
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are the legitimate means of settling disputes and promoting reforms in a 
legal system based on third-party adjudication; illegal aggressive 
unilateralism may quickly spill-over into a vicious circle of protectionist 
power politics and, for this reason, has been rightly outlawed by Article 
XXIII: 2 in favour of the possibihty of "aggressive multilateralism". 
The very broad "susperision power" and discretion of the 
contracting parties under Article XXIII: 2 to authorize the non-application 
of obligations to "any other contracting party or parties" as they determine 
to be "appropriate", has been used only once over the past five decades. In 
1952, the Netherlands was authorised to take retaliatory trade restrictions 
vis-^-vis the U.S. in response to a persistent infringement by that 
country of Article XL It is interesting to note that in this single case the 
authorization was not aimed at full reciprocity or withdrawal of 
"substantially equivalent concessions" (as provided for in Article XXVIIl), 
but was limited to what the contracting parties considered appropriate for 
achieving the removal of the illegal U.S. restrictions. Moreover, the 
Netherlands never made full use of the authorised countermeasures since 
enforcement of the authorised restrictions on imports of wheat flour from 
the U.S. would have hurt the Netherlands itself as much as the U.S.27 
(c) New Dispute Settlement System of the 1994 WTO Agreement 
According to Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, the 
"understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
27. R.E. Hudec;The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 1975, pp.165-184. 
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Disputes" in Annex 2 is an integral part of this Agreement, binding on all 
members.28 
Article 1:1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) specifies 
that it shall apply; 
(i) to disputes brought pursuant to the dispute settlement 
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements listed in 
Appendix 1 to the DSU; and to 
(ii) disputes between WTO members concerning their rights and 
obligations imder the WTO Agreement and under the DSU, such 
as disputes over compliance with the obligations under Article 
23 of the DSU that "Members shall have recourse to, and abide 
by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding and shall not 
make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, 
that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been 
impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in 
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding. 
Compared to the legally fragmented previous GATT system where 
the Contracting Parties could choose whether they wanted to 
adhere to the various Tokyo Round Agreements and to pursue disputes 
through the general GATT or special Tokyo Round dispute settlement 
mechanisms, the new WTO dispute settlement system is a unified system 
with much broader jurisdiction^^ and less scope for "rule shopping" and 
28. The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures. A collection of the Texts, WTO 1995. 
29. Supra note3, p. 178 
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"forum shopping" yet, many Multilateral Trade Agreements^o continue 
to include special dispute settlement rules and procedures. Those 
Agreements are as under: -
(a) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, 
(b) The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
(c) The Agreement on Technical Baniers to Trade, 
(d) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, 
(e) The Agreement on subsidies and countervailing Measures, 
(f) The GATS and certain Plurilateral Trade Agreement. 
In fact, the above-mentioned Agreements are listed in Appendix 2 to 
the DSU under the heading "Special or Additional Rules and Procedures 
contained in the Covered Agreements". In addition to these special or 
additional dispute settlement rules in the covered agreements, the DSU 
also confirms the continued applicability of the 1966 GATT Decision on 
Special Dispute settlement procedures for complaints by less-developed 
against developed countries (of Article 3:13 of the DSU) and sets out 
additional special procedures involving least developed country 
members^^ (Article,24). 
Article 3 of the DSU sets out a number of important general 
provisions for the dispute settlement system, just as the WTO itself shall be 
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by 
the Contracting Parties to the GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the 
framework of GATT 1947" (Article XVI: 1 WTO Agreement), the WTO 
30. Appendix 2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Aiuiex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, 1994. 
31. Article IV: 3 of the WTO Agreement. 
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members also affirm their adherence to the principles for the management 
of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 
1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified 
herein". The past GATT dispute settlement practice therefore remains 
relevant also for the WTO dispute settlement system. The DSU has to be 
construed in the light of the procedures previously adopted in 1966,1979, 
1982, 1984 and 1989. Article 3, indeed, emphasises the rule-oriented 
function and the legal primacy of the WTO dispute settlement. 
Moreover, authoritative interpretations^^ may be taken by consensus 
or majority decision (Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement), in view of the 
"quasi-automatic adoption" of panel reports and appellate body reports by 
the DSB, they may become an important tool for clarifying to what extent 
the legal interpretations in dispute settlement reports and rulings may 
evolve into generally applicable interpretation or not. 
Article 23 on "strengthening of the Multilateral System" emphasises 
the legal primacy and exclusive character of the WTO dispute settlement 
system vis-^-vis alternative dispute settlement systems outside the WTO. 
Article. 23:1 requires that when members seek the redress of a violation of 
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the 
covered agreements or an impediment to the attairmient of any objective of 
the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the 
rules and procedures of this Understanding. 
32. Article 3:9 of the DSU. 
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(i) Strengthening the Legalization Process of Panel Procedures 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding continues to make available 
both "political" as well as "legal" methods for the settlement of disputes 
under the WTO. The manifold interrelationships between those alternative 
methods of dispute settlement are further clarified in the DSU. The legal 
primacy of WTO law over bilaterally agreed dispute settlements is clearly 
emphasised in Article 3:5 of the DSU.33 
"All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and 
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements, including 
arbitration awards, shall be consistent with these agreements and shall not 
nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those 
agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those 
agreements." 
In fact, the compulsory jurisdiction and mandatory nature of WTO 
panel proceedings, and the exclusion of a unilateral right to reprisals (of 
Article 23 of the DSU), further limit the applicability of the general 
international law principles for the settlement of disputes, such as the 
principles of the free "choice of means" (of Article 33 of the U.N. charter) 
and the right to countermeasure in response to continuing violations of 
international obligations. The "judicialization" of panel procedures, and the 
possible recourse to national court and international arbitration 
procedures, has also been strengthened.3^ 
33. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. (Annex 2 
of the WTO Agreement). 
34. Supra note3, p. 182. 
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The procedures for consultations, (Article 4), which remain a 
mandatory first step in the dispute settlement process, and the procedures 
for good offices, conciliation and mediation (Article.5), which remain 
voluntary options if the parties to the dispute so agree, are codified in 
more details the "right to a panel", which had already been recognised in 
the 1989 Improvements to the GATT dispute settlement procedures, is 
cleanly provided for in Article 6:1; 
If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at 
the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first 
appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB 
decides by consensus not to establish a panel. 
The panel shall have standard terms of reference (Article 7:1) unless 
special terms of reference are agreed upon. The rules on composition of 
panels largely codify previous GATT practices (Article 8) and specify in 
more detail, inter alia, the obligations of the Director-General to determine, 
at the request of either party, the composition of the panel if the parties to 
the dispute do not agree on the panellists within 20 days from the date of 
establishment of the panel.^s The procedures for multiple complaints 
(Article 9) and for the frequent GATT practice of intervention by third 
parties (Article 10) likewise codify existing GATT practices and add a few 
improvements, such as the right of their parties to receive the submissions 
to the first meeting of the panel from the parties to the dispute. 
The panel procedures (of Article 12) confirm the existing tight time-




panel to the circulation of its report to the members) and regulate in more 
detail e.g. the right of panels to "seek information from any relevant source 
and "request an advisory report in writing from an export review group 
(Article 11). 
Table 336 
The integrated WTO dispute settlement system (Annex 2 to the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation) 
Political method of dispute 
settlement 
Consultations (Article 4) 
Good Office (Articles 5,24) 
Conciliation (Articles 5,24) 
Mediation (Articles 5,24) 
Recommendations by 
- Panels (Article 19) 
- Appellate Body (Article 19) 
- Dispute Settlement Body 
(Articles 16,17) 
Surveillance of Implementation of 
Recommendations and Rulings 
(Article 21) 
Compensation and Suspension of 
Concessions (Article 22) 
Legal methods of dispute settlement 
Panel Procedure (Articles 6-16,18,19) 
Appellate Review Procedure (Articles 
17-19) 
Rulings by Dispute Settlement Body 
on Panel and Appellate Reports 
(Articles 16,17) 
Arbitration among States (Articles 25) 
Private International Arbitration (e.g. 
Article 4 Agreement on Reshipment 
Inspection) 
Domestic Court Proceedings 
The important innovation of quasi-automatic decision-making in the 
DSB (except in the case of a "negative consensus") on the establishment of 




appellate reports (Article 17:4) and on the granting of requests for 
suspension of concessions in case of non-implementation of dispute 
settlement rulings (Article 22:6) is supplemented by new procedures for an 
"interim review" of panel reports (Article 15) and their legal review by a 
standing appellate body (Article 17). 
As the findings of the final report shall include a discussion of the 
arguments made at the interim "review stage" (Article 15:3), the drafters 
hoped that the "interim review" would ensure the consideration of all 
relevant a r^ments in the final report, enhance the legal quality of the 
panel reasoning and, similar to the "appellate review", reduce the risks of 
unpredictable panel findings and their quasi-automatic adoption. 
The latter is regulated in Article 16:43^ in the following terms; 
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the 
Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to 
the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If the party has notified its 
decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for 
adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal. This adoption 
procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their 
view on a panel report. 
Both panel reports and appellate body reports are thus deemed to 
be adopted unless there is a "negative consensus" not to adopt these 
reports or the panel report is appealed. Since the complainant will not join 
such a negative consensus unless the dispute is settled in accordance with 
37. DSU (Armex-2 to the WTO Agreement 1994). 
70 
Chapter-Il 
WTO law, this quasi-automatic adoption of the reports implies a 
significant "legalization" and, in view of the independence of members of 
panels and appellate body, a "quasi-judicialization" of the dispute 
settlement process in the WTO. 
The DSU provisions on mutually agreed arbitration "as an 
alternative means of dispute settlement" (Article 25), on compulsory 
arbitration on the "reasonable period of time" for the implementation of 
dispute settlement rulings (Article 21:3) and on disputes over the 
suspension of concessions (Article 22:6-6) reflect a further shift towards 
judicial methods of dispute settlement in the WTO. Moreover, the explicit 
right of third WTO members and of the DSB to challenge bilaterally agreed 
dispute settlements and arbitration awards (Article 3:6) under lines the 
multilateral nature and legal primary of the WTO Agreement vis-a-vis 
bilaterally agreed departures from WTO rules.^s 




WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE 
Consultations 
(Members may request panel if no solution found within 60 days) 
Optional use of good offices, conciliation or 
mediation by Director-General 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establishes panel 
(No later than at 2"'' DSB meeting) 
Terms of reference 
(Standard terms unless special terms agreed within 20 days) 
Composition 
(To be agreed within 20 days or decided by Director-General) 
I 
Panel examination 
(In general not to exceed 6 months, 3 months in case of urgency) 
Meetings Meeting 
with parties with 3"^ parties 
I 
Panel submits reports to parties 
Interim Review 
Panel circulates report to DSB 
DSB adopts panel report within 60 
days unless appealed 
Appellate Review 
(Not to exceed 60-90 days) 
DSB adopts Appellate Report 
(Within 30 days) 
DSB monitors implementation of adopted panel/Appellate Body Report 
(To be implemented within defined "reasonable period to time") 
In the event of non-implementation parties 
negotiate compensation 
If no compensation is agreed after expiry 
of "reasonable period to time", DSB 
authorizes retaliation pending full 
implementation 




(a) Establishment of Panel 
(b) Form and Content of Request 
(c) Terms of Reference 
Establishment of Panel 
Article 6^^ deals with the establishment of Panels. When 
consultations (under Article 5) a complaining party has a right to request 
.for the establishment of a Panel for the adjudication of its complaint. Upon 
request, a Panel should be established at the latest at the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) meeting following the meeting at which the request 
first appeared as an item on the DSB agenda. This will occur unless the 
DSB decides by consensus not to establish a Panel. If a complaining party 
so requests, a meeting of DSB shall be convened within 15 days of the 
request, provided that at least 10 days advance notice of the meeting is 
gives. It may be noted here that there was no prescribed requirement for 
the making of a Panel request prior to 1989.^ ° 
The Scenario prior to the Marrakech Agreement was that Article 10 
of the Tokyo Round Understanding alludes to the 'request' for the 
establishment of a Panel, but does not prescribe any content for Panel 
requests. The 1966 decision deviates slightly in the matter of establishment 
of Panels set out in Article 6 in that where parties fail to settle the dispute 
through the good offices of the Director-General, after a period of two 
39. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
40. Supra note, 3. 
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months; the Director-General shall submit a report to the contracting 
parties, or the council. In practice, this means WTO members, acting as 
DSB, will appoint a Panel to examine the matter, based on Director-
General's report, instead of being based on a request from the parties. 
Even so, the Panel members are to be appointed, in consultation with, and 
with the approval of, the contracting parties concerned .^ i 
Fonn and Content of Request 
Panels are established after a complainant's request. A formal 
request for a Panel serves a number of functions. It commences the dispute 
settlement process when the question of establishment of a Panel is to be 
considered. The important point here is for complainant to indicate the 
nature and ambit of the claim to the respondent. Article 6:2 inter alia 
requires that request for the establishment of the Panel shall be in writing. 
It shall indicate whether consultations were held. It should identify the 
specific measures at issue. It should provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. If, special 
reference is required (other than the standard forms of reference), the 
written request shall include the proposed test of special terms of 
reference. 
These particular, indeed, allow the respondent to determine 
whether the subject of the Panel request in the same as the subject of 
compulsory, consultations earlier. Further, this gives an indication to the 
Panel itself, apart from the specified details, which impose parameters on 
41. Mary E Footer; "Developing Country Practice and WTO dispute Settlement", Journal of 
World Trade, Vol. 35 (1), 2001, p. 62. 
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the jurisdiction of the Panel. Specificity of the details enables other 
members to decide whether they wish to take direct interest in the 
proceedings. 
With respect to identifying the measures, the Panels and the 
Appellate Body have developed a fairly permissive standard for satisfying 
Article 6:2 requirements. This standard provides that a Panel should 
include a measure within its items of reference if the measure:-
(i) Was expressly identified in the request for a Panel by the name 
of the measure, place of publication and date of publication. 
(ii) In subsidiary or flows from an identified measure that has a narrow 
focus and specific delegation of implementing measures or 
(iii) Is closely related to such a narrowly focused identified 
measure.42 
Measures have been excluded that were completely unrelated to the 
identified measures or that were subsidiary or closely related to a 
framework of broad scope. Panels and Appellate Body reasoned that the 
latter measures failed to fulfil the notice objective of Article 6:2 of the 
DSU.43 
In Korea- Definitive standard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy 
Products, the Appellate Body, referring to the decision of Appellate Body 
report in EC-LAN, observed that the jurisprudence suggested that if a 
42. Bananas III, Appellate Body Report, para 140; Panel Report in Japan- Film, paras 10.4-
10.19 and Panel report in Argentina- Footwear, paras 8.23-8.46. 
43. James Cameron and Stephen J. Orava; GATT/WTO Panels between Recording and 
Finding Facts, in Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, Issues and Lessons 
from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals (ed Fried Weiss) 
Cameron May Ltd., May 2000, p. 212. 
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party's ability to defend itself has been prejudiced by the lack of 
knowledge of the measures at issue, the would violate the specificity 
obligation. 
This, in fact, makes it difficult for a party to make a successful 
procedural complaint. Not only must it be shown that an express provision 
of the DSU has not been complied with but mist also deal with a due 
process onus on them to show prejudice. 
Reference to WTO agreement without mentioning any provisions or 
to unidentified 'Other' provisions are too vague to meet the standards of 
Article 6:2 of the DSU, for instance, to provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.^ Measures 
not included in the Panel request are not within the terms of reference and 
may not be considered by the Panel.'*^ 
Tenns of Reference 
Article 7 of the DSU deals with terms of reference, the Panel request 
and the terms of reference serve two objectives permanent for the effective 
working of the WTO dispute settlement system. They are the sources from 
which the dispute settlement proceedings flow. Where it appear that the 
Panel request and terms of reference are inadequate, respondents often 
challenge them by way of preliminary objection as a first time of defence in 
the proceedings.46 
44. EC-Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ R on Appeal, 
Appellate Body Report, 25 September 1997. 
45. Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R. 
46. Scott Little; "Preliminary, Objections to Panel Requests and Terms of Reference, Journal 
of World Trade", Vol. 35 (4) 2001, pp. 517-54,2001. 
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In Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation ^ar^ing'^ofttnnd-coh^ent 
4 ^ ^fS " from Mexico, the Appellate Body referring to Article!^i^;^ja»ct:^qb^rved: 
'Thus, the matter referred to the DSB for the purpose of Article 7 of the 
DSU must be the matter identified in the request for the establishment of 
Panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU... The matter referred, therefore, 
consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis 
of the complaints (or the claims).47 The Appellate Body clarified that the 
complaining party in an anti-dumping case identify a provisional measure, 
a price undertaking or the final measure levying definite anti-dumping 
duty as the 'measure in dispute' to challenge other aspects of the 
anti-dumping investigation. 
Further, the Appellate Body observed that identification of the 
treaty provisions claimed to have been violated in always necessary both 
for the purpose of defining the terms of reference of a Panel and for 
informing the respondent and the third parties of the claims made by the 
complainant. Mere listing of the articles of the treaty may or may not be 
sufficient. Therefore, one must see in the light of all the circumstances, the 
standard of clarity in the statement of the legal basis of the complaint. 
This may be the case where the article listed established not one single 
distinct, obligation, but rather multiple obligations. In such a situation, 
mere listing of articles may fall short of the standard of Article 6.2. 
In Korea-Dairy Products, the Appellate Body also stated that Article 9 
of GATT 1994 has three sections and five paragraphs, most of which have 
at least one distinct obligation. Article 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Agreement on 
47. AB Report WT/ DS60/ AB/ R, adopted 25 November 1998. 
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Safeguards also have multiple paragraphs, most of which have at least one 
distinct obligation. 
When Article 6.2 refers to identification of specific measures at issue, 
it refers not only to the specific measures but also to the claims relating to 
them, both of which must be properly identified. A claim cannot consist of 
a particular article. So an article alone can not (i) constitute a summary of 
the legal basis sufficient to present to problem clearly, (ii) accord the 
parties and third parties sufficient notice of the precise nature of the 
dispute, and (iii)s define with precision the jurisdiction of a Panel. A claim 
must be more than the identification of the legal obligation. It must also 
include some factual basis on which an alleged violation of such obligation 
is based.'*8 It should be so regardless of whether there is one or more 
distinct obligation. 
In Brazil-Desiccated Coconut,'^'^ the Appellate Body referred to 
'specific measures at issue' and 'the summary of the legal basis of the 
complaint cumulatively as 'claims' and observed that a complaint had to 
include a claim as part of the matter referred to the DSB or the claim 
would not fall within the Panel's terms of reference. 
Again the Appellate Body held in EC-Bananas^°: 
If a claim is not specified in the request for establishment of a 
Panel, a faulty request cannot be subsequently 'cured' by a 
complaining party's argumentation in its first written 
submission to the Panel or in any other submission or statement 
made later in the Panel proceedings. 
48. Supra note 5, p. 218. 




That is why prehminary objections to Panel requests and terms of 
reference have become such a common feature in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. 
The Panel in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages^'^ refused to entertain 
a US claim regarding the Japanese Taxation Special Measures Law as the 
'measure' was not identified in the Panel request and was not part of the 
terms of reference. 
When Article 6.2 refers to 'identify the specific measure at issue', the 
question arises as to whether it includes an unidentified but subsidiary 
measure or a closely related measures that has been identified. In the 
EC-Bananas Case^^, the question arose as to whether the EC regulation 
409/63, and the subsequent EC legislation, regulations and administrative 
measures, etc. identify the EC regulation at issue. The Panel was of the 
view that the above description was sufficient for the purpose of Article 6.2 
as the expression the 'subsequent EC legislation regulation's further refine 
and implement the basic regulation 409/63. 
In Japan-Film case^^, a Panel observed that, to fall within Article 6.2 it 
seems clear that a 'measure' not explicitly described in a Panel request 
must have a clear relationship to a measure that is specifically described 
therein, so that it can be said to be 'included' in the specified 'measure' 
specifically be found to have received adequate notice of the scope of the 
claims asserted by the complaining party. The two key elements- close 
51. WT/DS8/11 adopted on 1 November 1996. 
52. WT/DS54/R adopted on 23 July 1998. 
53. WTD/ DS44/ R adopted on 22 April 1998. 
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relationship and notice- are interrelated only if a 'measure' is a subsidiary 
or closely related to a specifically identified 'measure' will notice be 
adequate. The existence of a 'close relationship' between identified and 
imidentified measure and 'notice' allows the conclusion to be drawn that 
the measure has effectively been identified. 
Another question, which comes up for consideration, is: when 
Article 6.2 refers to 'specific measures at issue', does it include products as 
well to which measures relates? This question was considered in EC 
Computer Equipment (EC-LAN) where tariff reclassification by the EC 
and its member states of Local Area Networks (LAN) and Personal 
Computers (PCs) with multimedia capability was at issue with reference to 
separate headings from that of ADP machines. EC's contention was that 
the reclassification (all types of LAN equipment and PCs with multimedia 
capability) was too broad to provide a meaningful indication of the 
measure at issue. The US reply thereto was that LAN 'equipment' included 
all the LAN equipment in the US and this was brought to the attention of 
EC in the course of proceedings. 
The Panel found that the US did not add any new products to the 
scope of terms of reference and found the term PC's with multimedia 
capacity sufficiently specific. The EC submitted that the LAN equipment is 
not a single product but a collection of different products used in local area 
network. If submitted that like LAN equipment, PC's with multimedia 
capability do not belong to a single product category. The EC thus 
contended that Panel reference is not complied with by using such broad 
product categories. The EC also referred to a Panel allowing the US to 
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provide a definitive list of products and treating this list as an 'elucidation' 
and sufficient specification of the product. According to the EC the finding 
of the Panel amounted to an error of law. 
The Appellate Body, referring to the rival contentions and the 
Panel's acceptance of the US view observed that Article 6.2 when it refers 
to 'measures', refers not only to measures of general application, i.e. 
normative rules, but also to the application of tariffs by customs 
authorities and in this case, since the request by U.S. explicitly refers to the 
application of tariffs on LAN equipment and PCs with multimedia 
capabilities by customs authorities in the EC, it agreed with the Panel that 
the measures in the dispute were sufficiently identified in accordance with 
Article 6.2 of the DSU. The Appellate Body ruled that Article 6.2 does not 
explicitly require that the products to which the 'specific measures at issue' 
apply have to be identified. However in order to identify the 'specific 
measures' at issue, it may also be necessary to identify the products subject 
to measures in dispute. 
On the question whether the products were sufficiently identified in 
this case, the Appellate Body observed that the term 'LAN equipment' was 
used in the consultations between EC and the US prior to the submission 
of the request for the establishment of Panel and in particular, in an 
'Information Fiche' provided by the EC to the US during informal 
consultations in Geneva in March 1997. The Appellate Body consequently 
concluded that the EC is not prejudiced by a lack of knowing the measures 
at issue and there was no violation of the fundamental rule of due process 
by the Panel. The Appellate Body on appeal while upholding the above 
Chapter-II 
Panel's finding, observed that though Article 6.2 does not explicitly require 
a description of the products alleged to be affected by the 'specific 
measures at issue'. 
In the instant case, the Appellate Body found that the terms 
employed by the US were sufficiently specific to identify measures at 
issue. The Appellate Body also concluded that the ability of EC to defend 
itself was not prejudiced by lack of knowing the measures at issue that 
'LAN equipment' was a commercial term readily understood in the trade, 
and the parties used the term during consultations. 
The Appellate Body's decision establishes that tariff reclassification 
could only be identified through reference to the products to which it 
related and where the product has been described, the issue for 
determination is whether it has been described with precision sufficient to 
identify specific measures at issue under Article 6.2. It was also held that 
no prejudice was caused to the EC by not specifying the products at issue. 
Article 6.2 provides for the identity of measures at issue and also for 
the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint 
sufficient to present the problem clearly. Although elaboration of the 
complainant is legal argument is not required, a complaint should not only 
identify a measure but also specify the provision with which it is alleged to 
be inconsistent. References to WTO agreement without mentioning any 
provision or to unidentified 'other' provisions were held to be too vague to 
meet the standard of Article 6.2.54 
54. EC-Banana, WT/DS27/R. 
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Composition of Panels 
Article 8 deals with the composition of Panels. The Panel shall be 
composed of well-qualified government and/or non-governmental 
individuals, persons who have served as a representative of the WTO 
member or in the WTO secretariat, and individuals who have taught or 
published on international trade or policy etc. Panels shall normally be 
composed of three members, unless the parties agree otherwise, in which 
case the Panel will cor\sist of five members. The Secretariat will maintain 
an indicative list of Panellists from which Panellists may be drawn. The 
Panellists are to serve in their individual capacity and not as 
representatives of governments or organizations. If the parties do not 
agree on Panellists within 20 days of establishment of the Panel, the 
Director General may be requested by either party to name the panellist, 
who may do so in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the 
Chairman of the relevant Committee or Council. This was resorted to in 
the case of Argentina-Measures Affecting Textiles and Clothing and in the 
case of EC-Bananas, etc. 
Nationals of members whose government are in dispute are not to 
serve on the Panel, unless it is otherwise agreed. If there is a dispute 
between a developing country and a developed country, and if the 
developing country so requests, the Panel shall include at least one 
Panellist from, a developing country member. Panellist's expenses are to 
be met from the WTO budget. 
Panellists are usually required to be impartial, independent and 
neutral. Palmeter and Mavroidis suggest that the decisions are normally 
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taken by the Director of Legal Affairs Division in consultation with the 
Director of the Division of the Secretariat which has the primary 
responsibility for the particular matter in dispute.ss It is however seen that 
parties oppose Panellists for all types of reasons, such as whether the 
proposed Panellist is from a developing or a developed country, whether 
he has expressed preconceived views on certain substantive issues, 
whether he is from a common law or a civil law country, whether he is a 
free trader or a protectionist, etc. Because of these objections, the 
Secretariat is finding it increasingly difficult to find qualified Panellists. 
Moreover, the Secretariat is forced to propose Panellists riot on the 
indicative list and/ or Panellists that have little experience, given that such 
individuals have less history on which the parties can rely for objections.56 
This points out that all is not well with the selection of Panellists and only 
confirms the need for a standing Panel or some other structured body. 
Further, it is important that questions of impartiality are looked at in 
terms of substance over form. Too formalistic an approach would simply 
lead to diminution in the potential pool of Panellists. There should be no 
scope for broad rejection on the basis of the type of country or general 
professional expertise. Utilizing persons of clear expertise should enhance 
the quality of a Panel. Persons who accept appointment as Panellists ought 
to be able to apply their minds impartially and judicially to the evidence 
and legal argumentation presented before the Panel.^^ Panel members, 
should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of members, 
55. Palmeter and Mavroidis, 1999,op cit p. 69. 
56. Supra note 3, p. 224. 
57. Jeff Waincymer; WTO LiHgation, Cameron May, 2002, p. 263. 
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and should have a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of 
experience. 
Procedures for Multiple Complaints 
Article 9 deals with procedures for multiple complaints. Multiple 
complaints may be brought, provided they relate to the same subject 
matter. A single Panel would then be established, but the rights of 
respective parties are not thereby impaired. The single Panel will organize 
its examination so that the rights which the parties would have enjoyed 
had separate Panels been constituted and examined the separate 
complaints (para 2). Third parties may request to participate in 
corisultations requested by another party and, if permission is denied, 
may request consultations on their own. If more than one Panel is 
established to examine the complaints related to the same matter, to the 
extent possible, the same persons shall serve as Panellists on each of the 
separate Panels and the time table for the Panel process in such disputes 
shall be harmonized (para 3). The Panel may issue a single report unless 
one of the parties asks for a separate report. In the European Communities 
(EC) Banana's case, four separate reports were issued. The factual sections 
of the reports were the same, while the 'findings' were different, taking 
into the arguments advanced by the parties. 
Third Parties 
Article 10 deals with third parties. We have seen that under Article 
4(iii), a third state whose substantial trade interest has been affected may 
join the consultation process. It may make written submission to it and 
may be heard by the relevant Panel under Article 10(2). If a third party 
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considers that a measure already under submission to a Panel proceeding, 
nullifies and impairs benefits accruing to it, it may have recourse to normal 
dispute settlement procedure. Such a dispute shall be then referred to the 
original Panel wherever possible (para 4). Third parties receive the first 
written submission of the parties at the first meeting of the Panel, but no 
provision is made for them to receive the second or any subsequent 
submissions. We have already seen that third party complaints also shall 
be referred to the original Panel imder Article 9. 
It may be said that the procedures for multiple complaints (Article 
9) and for the frequent practice of intervention by third parties (Article 10) 
likewise codify existing GATT practices and add a few improvements, 
such as the right of third parties to receive the submissions at the first 
meeting of the Panel from the parties to the dispute.^s 
Functions of the Panel and Procedures: Objective Assessment 
Article 11 deals with the functions of Panels. It is to assist the DSB, 
by making an objective assessment of the facts of the case In the 
US-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man Made Fabric Underwear, the 
Appellate Body held that a Panel review of an impugned action is not a 
substitute for the proceedings conducted by national law authorities and it 
is not intended to see whether the action by the national law authorities is 
in consonance with its national law but to see whether such action 
is in consonance with the obligations undertaken under a covered 
agreement/international obligations. It held that the 'objective assessment' 
58. Ernst Ulrich Petersmann; "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System", Kluwer Law 
International, 1997, p. 183. 
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by a Panel under Article 11 or the appropriate standard of review of 
national law authorities' action as to factual issues includes an objective 
assessment of facts of the case.^^ Article 12 provides for Panel procedures. 
Where the parties to the dispute fail to arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
solution, the Panel affords the parties to the dispute enough opportunity, 
by setting up a suitable time table to make their submissions. The Panel 
produces a final report within six months of its establishment; and in cases 
requiring urgent consideration, including cases of perishable goods, makes 
a report within three months (para 8). Paragraph 9 provides the. outer time 
limit in making the report and it is nine months. Paragraph 10 inter alia 
provides that a developing country member be given sufficient time to 
prepare its argument. In the EC Bananas III case,^ the ACP third parties 
maintained that they had been given inadequate time to prepare and 
present their arguments and submissions, in breach of Articles 12.2 and 
12.4 of the DSU. They also contended that Article 12.10 was also not 
complied with. On the last point, the Panel did not address the issue and 
this is possibly explained by the fact that the language of Article 12.10 of 
the DSU speaks of 'a complaint against a developing cotmtry'. It therefore 
suggests that the addressee of the provision is the developing coimtry 
member, as respondent, whereas in this case, the ACP countries were only 
able to intervene as third parties.^^ 
59. EC-Hormones case,WT/ DS26/ AB/ R. 
60. WT/DS27/R/USA. 
61. Supra note 37. 
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Submission of Evidence 
Article 12 however does not contain any rules concerning 
procedures about production of evidence, etc. Appendix 3 inter alia 
provides for filing of written submissions before the first meeting of the 
Panel, which of course, should deal with the 'measures at issue' and the 
'legal basis for the complaint' as required under Article 6.2. It is pertinent 
to point out that no time limits are laid down for submission of evidence 
before the Panel. It would be open to the Panel to refuse admission of 
evidence before the second substantive meeting of the Panel. However, 
Argentina - Footivear,^'^ the Panel did not refuse admission of evidence. 
In fact in Australia-Salmon,^'^ a risk assessment report conducted by a 
third country was submitted by the complainant after the deadline set by 
the Panel, which was accepted because it was considered to be a reply to 
statements by experts advising the Panel who had referred to it. However, 
another exhibit submitted after the second substantive meeting of the 
Panel and after its meeting with the experts, was rejected.^ 
Authority to Seek Information 
Under Article 13, the Panels are given specific authority to seek 
information and expert opinion from any individual or body within the 
jurisdiction of a member state and such reports shall be in writing. The 
information sought for from the parties should be treated as confidential. It 






confidential but also the Panel proceedings under Article 14 are required 
to be confidential. However in Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry, it was ruled that a party to a dispute cannot avoid 
submission of positive evidence invoking confidentiality or use it as a basis 
for its failiure to submit positive evidence (para 2). However, before 
seeking such information or advice, it shall inform the member state of its 
intention to seek information (para 1). Appendix 4 sets forth rules for 
establishing an expert review group, and the procedures such groups 
should follow. While doing so, it is open either to the Panel to receive 
expert opinion from each expert individually or as a group. In the 
EC-Hormones case,^ the Panel sought individual opinion, which was 
affirmed by the Appellate Body. In Australia-Salmon case, the Panel on its 
own appointed four experts individually. In consultation with the parties, 
the Panel prepared a questionnaire and the experts were asked to give 
written opinions thereon taking into account the views of the parties. 
The expert's views were then communicated to the parties for their 
comments. Thereafter the experts met with the Panel and the parties to 
discuss their responses to the questions. Finally, in Argentina-Footwear,^ 
the Appellate Body held that the Panels have discretion whether to seek 
expert advice, and how to seek such advice giving the Panels wide latitude 
in their use of expert advice— whether to use individual experts, rather 
than an expert group, whenever it deems appropriate. In view thereof, it is 
now open for the Panels to consider any information from any person in 
65. WT/DS 26/AB/R. 
66. Supra note 42. 
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addition to the parties to the dispute— although they are under no 
obligation to do so and normally have no procedures for doing so. 
Analysis of Articles 11,12 and 13 
Article 11 provides that a Panel is to make an objective assessment 
of the facts of the case. To fulfil the, object and purpose in making the 
objective assessment, the Panel is to make a factual record; Article 12 
provides how to establish a factual record. Based on such record, the Panel 
is to arrive at its findings. Article 12 details how the Panel has to rely on 
the submissions of parties. Article 13.1 empowers the Panel to seek 
information to make the factual record complete. The fact-finding process 
by the Panel is beset with difficulties. Parties may not be forthcoming in 
laying all the evidence in their possession before the Panel. They have the 
discretion to keep back facts, which do not help their case by presenting 
only positive evidence in their favour. Of course. Panels have the power to 
ask for information from the parties and to draw adverse inferences, for 
failure to comply. Panels have the power under Article 13.1 to seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body, which it 
deems appropriate. However, one factor the Panels face is that they do not 
operate as a properly constituted court to sub poena witnesses and enforce 
information requests. It may not thus be able at times to get at the 
important evidence for proper resolution of the case. 
The Appellate Body in Indian Patents case said that all parties 
engaged in dispute settlement must be fully forthcoming from the 
beginning both as to the claims involved in the dispute and as to the facts 
relating to the claim. Facts must be stated clearly and must be disclosed 
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freely. This must be so in consultation as well as in the more formal setting 
of Panel proceedings. The attitude of Canada in Canada-Aircraft was 
admonished by the Appellate Body.^ ^ 
Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU accord to a Panel ample and extensive 
authority to ascertain the facts, and of the legal norms and principles 
applicable to such facts. Thus the DSU allows for a more inquisitorial style 
where the Panel itself can seek information. When it remains discretionary. 
Panels generally seek all relevant information by putting questions to the 
parties.^8 
While making an objective assessment of the facts as gathered under 
Articles 12 and 13, the question arises, in assessing the evidence, on which 
party lays the burden of proof in establishing facts. While DSU does not 
contain any express provisions in this context, the Appellate Body, by its 
various observations in several appeals, has formulated several guidelines. 
Other international tribunals, including the ICJ, broadly in conformity 
with most legal systems and those follow these formulations. 
Normally, it is expected that the Panel in discharge of its obligation 
consider the evidence presented and make factual findings on the basis of 
that evidence. According to the Appellate Body, the deliberate disregard 
of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a Panel is incompatible 
with the Panel's duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. 
The wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before the 
Panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment. 'Disregard', 
67. Para 199 of the report. 
68. Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation, Cameron May, 2002, pp 545-46. 
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'distortion' and 'misrepresentation' of evidence, imply not only an error of 
judgment in appreciation of evidence but also an egregious error that calls 
into question the good faith of a Panel^^ The Appellate Body^o considered 
such challenges as Very serious' and as 'going to the very core of the 
integrity of WTO dispute process itself. 
Confidentiality 
Article 14 inter alia provides that Panel deliberations are to be 
confidential and opinions expressed by individual Panellists are to be 
anonymous (para 3). 
Interim Report and Final Report 
Article 15 enjoins on the Panel to issue an interim report consisting 
of facts and arguments of the parties, for the consideration of the parties 
before a final report is finalized. While the first interim report consisting of 
facts and submissions of parties, including rebuttal submissions of the 
parties, is sent to the parties for their comments, the full interim report 
gives its findings and recommendations. Appendix 3 lays dovv^ n the time 
limits for the first interim and full interim report. After submission 
of the full interim report, it is open to the parties to ask for 
reconsideration/review of some of the recommendations. The parties may 
even ask for a further meeting to review the issues thereto Article 153 
requires that the final report shall include a discussion of the arguments 
the parties may make at the interim review stage. In the EC-Hormones 
69. Appellate Body decision in EC-Beef Hormones. 
70. EC-Poultry Products, WT/DS 69/AB/R, paras 133,1998. 
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case/''- it was observed that the main purpose of raising the issues by 
parties is to provide the other party with adequate notice of the issues so 
that it can prepare for a rebuttal. The Panel is empowered to consider in its 
full interim report all issues, even those not commented by the parties. 
Adoption of Panel Reports 
Article 16 deals with the adoption of Panel Reports. Members are to 
be provided with the report and be given twenty days time to consider the 
report. Members may raise their objections in writing. They have the right 
to participate fully in the consideration of the Panel Report by the DSB. 
The final report is to be adopted within sixty days of its issuance to the 
members at the DSB meeting (para 4). However, the final report will not be 
adopted, if one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its 
intention to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the 
report. 
We have so far considered the various articles in the Understanding 
leading to the conclusion of the Panel proceedings. The next step in 
dispute settlement, in case of appeal, is for the Appellate Body to review 
the Panel findings and it is for the Dispute Settlement Body to consider 
and adopt the Appellate Body conclusions and thereafter as a follow up, to 
keep surveillance on the implementation of the above conclusions in 




Appellate Procedure Rules: Particulars of Notice of Appeal 
According to rule XX(2), the following particulars shall form part of 
the notice of appeal: 
(i) the title of the Panel Report under appeal; 
(ii) the name of the party filing the notice of appeal; 
(iii) the service address, telephone and facsimile numbers of the 
party 
to the dispute; and 
(iv) a brief statement of the nature of appeal, including the 
allegations 
of errors in the issues of law covered in the Panel Report and in 
the legal interpretations developed by the Panel 
It was held in EC-Bananas'^'^ that failure to note a particular finding of 
a Panel in the claims of error set out in the notice of appeal will result in 
exclusion of the finding from the scope of appeal. We have already noticed 
that it is important to specify the 'measures at issue', and "legal issues 
involved in the request' for a Panel. Similarly, the details about errors in 
facts and the findings in the Panel Report are equally important in the 
notice of appeal 
Submission of the Appellant 
Further, under rule XXI of the Appellate Procedure Rules, the 
submissions filed by the party to appeal against the Panel Report should 
contain: 
a) the legal arguments in support of the appellant's position, including a 
precise statement of the grounds of appeal, including the specific 
72. WT/DS 27/AB/R, 9 September 1997, adopted 25 September 1997. 
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allegations of errors in the issues of law covered in the Panel Report, 
and in the legal interpretations developed by the Panel 
b) a precise statement of the provisions of the covered agreements and 
other legal sources relied on; and 
c) the nature of the decision or ruling sought. 
Submissions by any Party to the Dispute 
Similarly, any party to the dispute, in reply to the notice of appeal, 
by the appellant, may file a written submission and according to rule 
XXII(2) it should contain: 
(a) a precise statement on the grounds for opposing the specific 
allegations of errors in the issues of law covered in the Panel Report 
and in the legal interpretations developed by the Panel that have been 
raised in the appellant's submission and in the legal arguments raised 
by the appellant in support of its case; 
(b) an acceptance of, or opposition to, each ground set out in the 
appellant's submission; 
(c) a precise statement of the provisions of the covered agreements and 
their legal sources relied on; and 
(d) the nature of the decision or the ruling sought. 
Notice by Third Party with Substantial Interest 
Article 17.4 inter alia provides that only parties to the dispute, and 
not third parties, may appeal against a Panel decision. Third parties which 
have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter may make a 
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written submission to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the 
Appellate Body. 
Documents in support of the appeal should be filed with the 
Appellate Body within the time limits set out in the Appellate Procedure 
Rules and copies should be served on all other parties, including third 
parties in the appeal 
The original appellant, any party to the dispute filing an appeal, and 
any other party to the dispute that wishes to respond to a later appeal may 
do so by filing a written submission within 25 days after the date of filing 
of the notice to appeal Under rule XXVH(3), a third participant who has 
filed a written submission may appear and present oral arguments at the 
Appellate Body hearings. 
Standing Appellate Body 
Article 17.2 provides that the Appellate Body shall be composed of 
seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. The Appellate 
Body shall hear appeals from Panel case and its members shall serve by 
rotation. They shall be appointed for a four-year term and may be 
reappointed only once. In any one case, only three of them constitute the 
Appellate Body. The membership shall be broadly representative of the 
membership in the WTO and all persons serving on the Appellate Body 
shall be available at all times and on short notice. It means that they may 
not stay at Geneva all the time. The persons so appointed are of recognized 
authority, with demonstrable expertise in law, international trade and the 
subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall not be 
affiliated to any government and the Appellate Body membership shall be 
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broadly representative of the membership in the WTO. During their 
term of office, members shall not accept any employment nor pursue 
any professional activity that is inconsistent with their duties and 
responsibilities. 
Every year the Appellate Body members elect a chairman, who is 
responsible for the overall direction of the Appellate Body business; 
including supervision of the internal fimctioning of the Appellate Body, 
and any such other duties as the members may agree to entrust him. In 
order to ensure rotation of the chairmanship, a member may not serve for 
more than one term consecutively. 
CoUegialily Principle 
Article 17.1 also provides that persons serving on the Appellate 
Body shall serve by rotation and such rotation shall be determined in the 
working procedures. The working procedures inter alia provide for the 
'coUegiality principle' and the composition of 'divisions' of three Appellate 
Body members. The procedures provide for a three-member body to 
ensure consistency and coherence in the decision-making by the Appellate 
Body. Rule 4 (1) of the Procedure Rules provides for meetings of the entire 
body on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and 
procedure. Further, rule 4 (2) foresees that each member of the Appellate 
Body receives all documents filed in any appeal, in order to allow that the 
division responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with 
the other members before the division finalises the appellate report. Rules 
4 (3) and 4 (4) however, make it clear that earlier consultation, etc amongst 
members does not interfere with a division's full authority and freedom to 
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hear and decide the appeal assigned to it. Rule 6 inter alia provides for 
rotation taking into account the principles of random selection, 
unpredictability and opportunity for all members to serve regardless of 
their national origin Time limits set out in the working procedures are 
short due to the requirement that the appellate review proceedings shall 
not exceed 60 days, and in no case shall go beyond 90 days from the date 
of notification of the decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body 
circulates its report. It is said the above 'coUegiality principle' fills a major 
gap through creative interpretation of Article 17.^ 3 
The Appellate Body members are subject to the Rules of Conduct for 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes. A member there under shall disclose the existence or 
development of any interest relationship or matter that is likely to affect or 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her independence or impartiality 
and must not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would 
create a direct or indirect coriflict of interest. 
Scope of the Power of the Appellate Body 
Article 17(6) limits the power of the Appellate Body only to issues of 
law and legal interpretation developed by the Panel, while Article 17 (13) 
gives power to the Appellate Body to uphold, modify or reverse the legal 
findings and conclusions of the Panel. These two provisions, so to say, 
cover the Appellate Body's jurisdiction in dealing with the appeals. 
An appeal is limited to issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal 
73. Supra note 3, p 189. 
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interpretations developed by the Panel. Factual findings and conclusions 
of the Panels cannot be appealed. The question then arises: what is a 
question of fact and what is a question of law. It may be noted to start with 
that it is simply not possible to differentiate between questions of law and 
questions of fact with complete certainty. There will inevitably be some 
disputes on this. 
Hence, some aspects of this differentiation are phrased as mixed 
questions of law and fact. The simplest way to differentiate is by saying 
that a fact is a piece of data, an event or happeiung and a law is an 
authoritative rule. Determining whether an event did occur is a question of 
fact. Determining credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to 
evidence is an element of the fact-finding process. Whether identified facts 
fall within a statutory or treaty provision is a question of law, apart from 
interpretation of legal texts; whether a particular inference can be properly 
drawn from a fact is a question of law. However, whether any injury has 
taken place in an anti-dumping agreement requires an identification of 
facts and interpretation of legal provisions. This is a case of mixed question 
of law and fact. 
The Appellate Body had gone into this aspect in EC-Hormones and 
observed that appreciation of a given piece of evidence is part and parcel 
of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a 
Panel as the trier of facts. The consistency or inconsistency of a given fact 
or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty provision is, 
however, a legal characterization issue. It is a legal question. Pursuant to 
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Article 11 of the DSU, however, the question whether the Par\el has made 
an objective assessment of the matter is a legal question.^* 
In Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body viewed that 'Credibility and 
Weight' ascribed to certain facts is the province of the Panel, it is not 
normally for the Appellate Body to intervene in that process or 'second 
guess' the Panel's conclusions. The view of the Appellate Body is that it 
will intervene in a factual assessment only if the Panel's consideration of 
facts was so flawed as to amount to a failure to conduct an objective 
assessment of facts. A trade analyst^s points out that the Appellate Body 
should not let a manifest error of fact stand where that error was critical to 
the resolution of the dispute at hand. Such an error ought to be reviewable 
under Article 11. However, the manner in which the Appellate Body had 
circumscribed its power of review under Article 11 makes such a review 
very difficult to carry out. That is unfortunate. To let a clear error stand 
tmdermines the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Taking paragraph 6, i.e the first provision, the question for 
consideration is the appropriate degree of scrutiny and consequent 
standard of review by the Appellate Body. Can the Appellate Body clearly 
correct erroneous factual finding by Panels or conclusions on exercise of 
discretion by the administrative authorities in the Panel Reports? 
74. WT/DS/26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R adopted 13 February 1998, para 132, 
75. Macro Bronkers and Natalie Mc. Nelis; Fact and Law in Pleadings Before the WTO 
Appellate Body, in Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, Cameron May 
2002, pp. 321-33. 
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Subsidiary Legal Claims 
The further question that arises in this context is whether the 
Appellate Body can examine subsidiary legal claims that were not 
addressed in the Panel findings, especially when another covered 
agreement is also involved. In any case, it would not be consistent with the 
dispute settlement function of the Panel and appellate proceedings to 
conclude the appellate review without examining all the legal claims 
raised in the Panel proceedings, if in any given case, there is no cross 
appeal against the Panel decision. It should be remembered that the 
Appellate Body in all cases is not bound to complete the analysis, 
especially when the factual record is not complete. However, it can't leave 
the appellant in such a case without a remedy. The party in such a case 
may not be able to even restart the process. If on the other hand the 
Appellate Body seeks to make factual findings from its legal conclusions, it 
is going beyond its express mandate in Article 17.6 to the effect that an 
appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel Report and 
legal interpretations developed by the Panel and Article 17.1 itself 7^ 
Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals 
We may now consider the Canada-Periodicals case" where the 
Appellate Body is handicapped because of a lack of remand powers. 
The question for consideration before the Panel was whether imported 
split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals can be called a 
like product. 
76. Ibid. 
71. WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 June 1997 
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As the Panel recognized, the proper test is that a determination of 
'like product' for the purposes of Article 111:2, first sentence, must be 
construed. Narrowly, on a case-by-case basis, by examining relevant 
factors including the product's end-uses in a given market consumers' 
tastes and habits, and the product's properties, nature and quality. 
However, the Panel failed to analyze these criteria in relation to imported 
split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals. It did not 
base its conclusions on the exhibit and evidence before it, in particular the 
copies of TIME, TIME Canada and Maclean's magazines, presented by 
Canada, and the magazines. Pulp & Paper and Pulp k: Paper Canada, 
presented by the united states, or the Report of the Task Force on the 
Canadian Magazine Industry. The Appellate Body in appeal observed that 
the Panel could not arrive at the conclusion that they were like products, 
as a result of lack of proper legal reasoning based on inadequate factual 
analysis. It held that the Panel could not logically arrive at the conclusion it 
did and such a conclusion was invalid. 
It then went on an appraisal of the facts of the case and commented 
that 'Imported split non-periodicals contain advertisements targeted 
specifically at the Canadian market while imported non-split non-
periodicals do not carry such advertisements'. 
It may be pointed out that the Panel based its decision on the first 
sentence of Article 111:2 of GATT1994 and concluded that it need not 
consider the second sentence and this aspect of the decision was not 
appealed. Canada, as appellant successfully appealed against the Panel's 
decision [on the first sentence of Article 111:2] and argued that the 
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Appellate Body lacked the jurisdiction to consider the un-appealed second 
sentence. The Appellate Body disagreed holding that the first and second 
sentences are two closely related steps. As the Appellate Body did not 
agree with the Panel's findings, it needs to develop its analysis based on 
the Panel Report in order to issue legal conclusions with respect to Article 
111:2, second sentence of GATT adding that it would be remiss in not 
completing the analysis begun by the panel. 
It was however pointed out that the practice adopted by the 
Appellate Body 'tantamount to de novo review and de novo decisions of 
the Appellate Body do not themselves benefit from appeal. They are 
effectively un-reviewed and un-reviewable, lacking the second look 
normal appellate review provides. The Appellate Body may become 
reluctant to make such determinations since for all practical purposes their 
decisions are final.^^ 
Non-Governmental Interests^Amicus Curiae Briefs 
Article V(2) of the Agreement establishing the WTO inter alia 
provides that the General Council may make appropriate arrangements 
for consultations and cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. Earlier 
the relationship between the international trading system and non-
governmental organizations was not an issue. It was really after the GATT 
Panel's observations in the Tuna Dolphin case^^ that environmentalists took 
notice and a plea was made that GATT could enhance its transparency by 
78. Palmeter and Mavroidis;" Dispute Settlement in the WTO", Kluwer Law, 1999, p.l50 




allowing NGOs and other inter- governmental organizations to gain some 
participation in the GATT processes. Jackson pleaded that a way might be 
foimd for interested groups to transmit arguments, information and 
evidence.80 
It was only in July 1996, the WTO General Council approved 
guidelines, which inter alia provided that the chairpersons of WTO 
Councils and committees could meet with NGOs in personal capacity but 
that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work 
of the WTO or its meetings. 
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Sharing and Sharing 
Products 
In the first case of Shrimp-Turtle^^, two NGOs took substantive 
interest and submitted amicus curiae briefs to the WTO Panel. The Panel 
informed them that it would not consider the briefs because it did not have 
the authority to do so under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. At the 
same time, the Panel noted that a government could append whatever it 
wanted of the same (MOO'S briefs) to its submission. Thereafter, the US 
government attached a portion of one of the NGOs briefs to its submission. 
Again, in its appeal against the Panel decision, the US attached NGOs 
briefs to the US submission. 
It may be added that the US point of view is that there should be 
transparency through open and equitable procedures in trade matters by 
80. John H Jackson; "World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Convergence or 
Conflict", 49, Wash & Lee L Rev, 1992,1227-55. 
81. WT/DS 58/AB/R, 15 May 1998. 
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the WTO Ministerial Conference and the General Council, and the Dispute 
Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body.*^ 
Representation by Private Attorney 
As far as representation by the WTO members who are parties 
before the Appellate Body, are concerned, it was held in EC-Bananas^a that 
it is for the member to decide who should represent it as members of its 
delegation in an oral hearing of the Appellate Body, and that this 
delegation may include private lawyers. The Appellate Body has endorsed 
this practice: 'Given the Appellate Body's mandate to review only issues of 
law or legal interpretation in Panel Reports, it is particularly important 
that governments be represented by qualified counsel in Appellate Body 
proceedings'. 
Having noticed the Appellate Body's powers, we may continue with 
other articles of DSU. Article 18 requires that all communications 
addressed to the Panel or the Appellate Body should be treated as 
confidential but should be communicated to the other side. This is to 
ensure transparency in the proceedings. Article 19 inter alia provides that if 
either of the above bodies concludes that any measure taken by a member 
is not consistent with the agreement, it shall recommend to the member to 
bring it in conformity with that agreement. In doing so, it may also 
suggest ways in which the member concerned shall implement the 
82. Uruguay Round Trade Agreements/ sub-chapter I -Approval of, and General 
Provisions to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Part C-Uruguay Round of 
Implementation and Dispute Settlement, 19 USC, 352b (2000) 
83. WT/ DS27/ AB/ R, 9 September 1997 
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recommendations. By doing so, it shall not add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided in the covered agreement.^^ 
Time Limits 
The time frame for the decisions of the DSB is not to exceed nine 
months as a general rule (Article 20). Under Article 16.4, Panel Reports are 
to be adopted within sixty days unless a party notifies of its intention to 
appeal. An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and 
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute within thirty days of 
its circulation, unless DSB by consensus decides not to adopt it. If the 
report is adopted, its recommendations and rulings become those of the 
DSB itself. When there is no scheduled meeting of the DSB, within thirty 
days, a special meeting is to be called either to adopt the report or to hear a 
member regarding its intentions. 
Surveillance of Implementation 
There is no power in the DSU to require specific action by a member 
to implement a DSB recommendation or ruling; members always retain the 
right to shape their policies and regulations as long as they are in 
conformity with its obligations under the covered agreements. The only 
exception concerning implementation of the rulings is to be in Article 4.7 
of the Subsidies Agreement, which inter alia provides that where a measure 
is foimd to be a prohibited subsidy, the Panel shall recommend that the 
subsidising member withdraw the subsidy without delay. 
84. Article 19.2 of the DSU. 
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Article 21 deals with surveillance of implementation of 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB; paragraph 1 inter alia states that 
prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is 
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of the disputes among 
members. Paragraph 2 requires that attention be paid to matters affecting 
the interests of a developing country member with respect to measures, 
which have been subject to dispute settlement. Paragraph 3 requires that 
the member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, within 
thirty days of the adoption of the Panel or the Appellate Body report. 
Members are to be given a reasonable time to do so. Reasonable time shall 
be the time -
(i) proposed by the member and approved by DSB; failing which 
(ii) the parties are to agree amongst themselves as to what is reasonable, 
within forty-five days of adoption of the recommendations and 
rulings. Even if this fails, 
(iii) a period of time as is determined through binding arbitration 
preferably by the same Panel that originally had gone into the case, 
within ninety days following the adoption of the recommendation 
and rulings, which should not in any case exceed fifteen months 
from the adoption of Panel Report or the Appellate Body report. 




In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,^^ the arbitrators had been 
requested more than forty-five days after adoption of the report: the 
parties therein however agreed and the arbitrator as well, that the period 
be extended by two weeks. The parties have given a written assurance that 
despite the departure from the ninety days' limit, they would be boimd by 
the arbitrator's award. The arbitrator held that the fifteen month deadline 
under Article 23(1) (c) is a reasonable period of time. 
In Indonesia-Automobiles, the arbitrator, while holding that 'structural 
adjustment of the domestic industry' is not a 'particular circumstance' that 
can be taken into account in determining the reasonable period of time 
under Article 213, nevertheless, noting that Indonesia is a developing 
country, allowed an additional period of six months over and above the 
six-month period required for the completion of Indonesia's rule-making 
process. 
Compensation and Suspension of Concessions 
The WTO does not have any enforcement mechanism of its own. 
It cannot tell the sovereign member states what policies they have to 
follow or to implement the rulings of the DSB. Enforcement can thus be 
only in the form of authorised actions between the parties. Under Article 
21.5, if there is disagreement, DSB may reactivate the disputes procedure 
with a second Panel to develop a recommendation on implementing 
measures. It however, says nothing about the terms of reference or about 
the right of parties to object to its decisions or appeal them if they are 
85 WT/ DS 54/R, WT/DS 64/R and WT/DS 59/R, complaints by EC, Japan and the US 
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legally unsound. Questions also have risen about its relationship with 
Article 22. 
Article 22 deals with compensation and suspension of concessions. 
If the recommendations or rulings are not implemented, a member may 
receive compensation and/or suspended concessions or other obligations 
in relation to the other member. However, these are temporary measures 
available in the event of non- implementation of the recommendations 
and rulings as arrived at earlier within a reasonable time and not 
to be taken as a substitute. Compensation is voluntary and if granted, 
in the form of improved market access, etc shall be consistent with the 
covered agreements .^ ^ Where a member fails to negotiate an acceptable 
compensation, then the member may invite the DSB to authorise the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreement as a retaliation, if such a course is not prohibited in that covered 
agreement. The suspended concessions will be equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment suffered by the party seeking compensation. 
The complairung party may seek suspension of concessions with respect to 
the same sector as that in which the Panel or the Appellate Body has found 
a violation or other nullification or impairment of its rights. If that is not 
practicable or effective, it may seek suspension in other sectors under the 
same agreement (cross sector retaliation), failing which, it may seek 
suspension under another covered agreement. Clause (f) defines the scope 
of the term 'sector', and clause (g) defines the term 'agreement'. Under 
paragraph 6, DSB, upon request of the member seeking compensation, 
86 Article 22.1 of the DSU. 
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(under paragraph 2 thereof), shall authorise suspension of concessions or 
other obligations, unless the DSB rejects the request by consensus. 
However, if the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations is in 
dispute, the matter may be referred to arbitration. It may be noted that the 
procedure for deciding on appropriate compensation or retaliation, 
potentially involving still further arbitration on the level of compensation 
is very complex, and at the same time not very well defined in Article 22, 
and is a source of controversy. 
Analysis of Articles 19, 21 and 22 
Article 19 deals with Panel and Appellate Body recommendations. 
Article 21 provides for Surveillance of Implementation of the 
Recommendations and Rulings under Article 19. Article 22 deals with 
the award of compensation to the affected party in the dispute and 
the suspension of concessions by that party. These provisions are 
very important in settling disputes amongst member countries. As the 
Appellate Body observed in US-Shirts and Blouses from India,^^ dispute 
settlement is not about "making law' but rather about addressing 'the 
claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in 
dispute'. We have earlier seen that subsequent Panels/the Appellate Body 
are not bound by the doctrine of 'stare decisis', but where the rules are not 
specific, it is for the adjudicators to wade through the rules to make 
normative rulings,^^ gy doing so, they make way for resolving disputes. 
87 WT/DS 33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997. 
88 Jeffrey Waineymer; "Settlement of Disputes under the WTO', World Economy", Vol. 
24(9), 2001,pl270, wherein the Ld Commentator refers to Hudec (1978, p 8) citing the 
reasonable expectation test applied in Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Phosphate., 
11 BISD 1960, p 188 and West German Duties on Sardines, HI SI) 1st Suppl, 1953, p 53. 
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where rules don't signal specific remedies and there is no direct 
enforcement mechanism of the decisions of the adjudicatory bodies in 
place. 
Here in this context refer to Article 19.2 needs to be mentioned 
which inter alia provides for Panels/the Appellate Body to give their 
findings and recommendations and also suggest ways in which the 
member could implement the recommendations. In practice however, the 
Appellate Body reports usually contain one general recommendation to 
bring the measure into conformity with the covered agreements; while 
there is no suggestion as to how to implement the recommendation. 
The discretion given to Panels/the Appellate Body to suggest ways of 
implementing the recommendation, has not been exercised by the 
adjudicatory bodies, perhaps because if there is more than one way to 
implement the recommendation, it is for the member to decide which way 
to implement the recommendation and bring the impugned measure in 
conformity with the covered agreement Still, as Article 19.2 provides that 
they may give suggestions of implementation, they can evaluate as to 
which of the suggestions would be acceptable to the parties and make such 
a way to implement the path of resolution so as to resolve the dispute. 
It has been seen earlier that under the GATT dispute settlement 
practice, in the context of anti-dumping and countervailing duties or grant 
of subsidies in contravention of the agreement, GATT Panels authorised 
reimbursement of the amount collected in contravention. It had also 
been noticed that the US was against a grant of such reimbursement. 
In US-Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Stainless Steel 
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Hollow Products from Sweden, the Panel recommended the 
reimbursement of anti-dumping duties paid^^ but the US did not accept 
the Panel Report Similarly in US-Grey Portland Cement^ EC also 
was opposed to the reimbursement of anti-dumping duties though in 
the EC Antidumping Duties on Milk Products, if originally asked 
for reimbursement but later withdrew its request. In the context of 
DSU provisions, the question arises whether such authorisation of 
reimbursement is legally allowed. It is a different matter that no 
authorisation is made in actual practice. 
Two articles of DSU in this context require consideration: (i) Articles 
3.7 and 19.1. Article 3.7 inter alia provides that compensation should be 
resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is 
impracticable and a temporary measure. It is therefore dear that the 
withdrawal of the measure is the primary aim while reimbursement is a 
temporary measure. It does not imply that compensation is seen as an 
equivalent to or as an alternative to withdrawal. 
Article 19.1 however only refers to bringing the impugned measure 
into conformity with that agreement. It does not refer to compensation at 
all. On the other hand, it gives power to the Panel or the Appellate Body to 
suggest ways in which the member concerned could implement the 
recommendations as it is for the member concerned to decide as to how to 
implement it. 
89. ADP/47, Panel Report of 20 August 1990 
90. ADP/82, Panel Report of 7 September 1992. 
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In Guatemala-Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement 
from Mexico,9i the Panel while declining to recommend refund of duties 
paid, nevertheless ruled that revocation of duties collected/d was the only 
appropriate way to implement the recommendation, as an anti-dumping 
investigation should never have been initiated on insufficient ground. In 
appeal, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel Report on other grounds. 
The question then arises: if the anti-dumping duty is initially 
imposed on illegal grounds, can it not be treated as non est ? If so, won't 
the principle of restitution apply? It is true that Article 19.1 is silent on 
reimbursement. Then what about the general provisions in Article 3 and 
the duty under paragraph 7 thereof about the provision of compensation, 
if immediate withdrawal of the impugned measure is impracticable? While 
the position under the WTO code is not very clear on this issue, can be 
possibly no objection to initiate action imder the national law to recover 
the illegal levy as damages on the ground that anti-dumping duties were 
imlawfuUy imposed. In this context, reference may be made to views of 
trade expert on the recovery of anti-dumping duties under the EC enabling 
regulations.^2 
Retroactive or Prospective 
The next question for consideration is whether in making 
recommendations, the Panel or the Appellate Body can make 
recommendations, which are retroactive or only prospective in nature. 
Firstly, Article 19.1 inter provides that the Panel or Appellate Body shall 
91. WT/DS 60 AB/R. 
92. Geert A Zonnekeyn, 'The Bed Linen Case and its Aftermath', Journal of World Trade, 
Vol 36(5), pp 1002-03 
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recommend that the impugned measure be brought into conformity with 
the covered agreement Secondly, Article 3.7 indicates that in the absence of 
any mutually agreed solution, the first objective is usually to secure the 
withdrawal of the measure concerned if they are found to be inconsistent. 
These provisions point to a prospective nature of the ruling. Besides, rights 
to compensation or suspension of concessions under Article 22 arise only 
on failure to bring the impugned measure in conformity. But it should be 
realised that benefits would be lost if you wait till the measure is brought 
into conformity; Article 3.2 refers to preservation of the existing rights and 
obligations under the covered agreements. 
The implementation Panel under Article 21.5, in the context of SCM 
Agreement in Australia-Leather61 observed that there is. no meaningful 
distinction between repayment of the prospective and retrospective 
portions of past subsidies and ordered the retrospective reimbursement of 
the illegally received subsidy. It resolved that withdrawal of a subsidy 
contemplates repayment of the subsidy amount. The Appellate Body did 
not go into this question and the parties agreed in advance not to appeal 
the Panel findings. Earlier the GAIT Panels in the New Zealand-
Transformers easels and the Softwood Lumber case called for repayment 
in anti-dumping or countervailing duties; though in some other cases 
involving Articles II and III, they have not recommended repayments. 
The incidental question that arises in this context is, what the 
position is if the measure is no longer in existence. The Appellate Body 
disagreed with the Panel recommendation in US-Certain Import 
93. BISD (32S/25) 
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Measures^'* to bring the measure in conformity when the challenged 
measure was no longer in existence. 
However if the measure complained of was 3 per cent statistical tax 
on the date of the establishment of the Panel, which went down to .3 per 
cent at the time of hearing of the Appellate Body, the Appellate Body said 
that the measure complained of being 3 per cent tax, that alone should be 
the measure to be considered and examined like in Argentina-Textiles.'^^ 
Otherwise, the complainant could not ask for compensation for the 
measure then in existence, which led to its complaint. Also it might not be 
able to sustain even its claim for damages in national courts. That will also 
allow members anxious to protect its local industry to escape from the 
consequences of payment of due compensation by resorting to changing 
the measure at issue or even withdrawing the measure at the time of Panel 
proceedings. 
The pros and cons of the question of retrospective operation lead to 
different interpretations and the Uruguay round of negotiations had not 
left us with any definite clue in this regard. 
Enforcement Provisions 
Article 21.1 calls for prompt compliance with the recommendations 
of the rulings of the DSB as essential in the resolution of disputes. Article 
21.3 provides for reasonable time for implementation of the 





measures to comply with the recommendations and rulings; preferably by 
the original Panel, wherever possible. 
Scope of Article 21.5: Implementation Panel Reference 
The scope of Article 21.5 needs to be examined here. Does the Panel 
set up to go into the disagreement to be called 'implementation Panel' over 
compliance of the recommendations, limit itself to the legal claims and the 
product scope in original terms of reference? In Australia-Salmon'^ the 
implementation Panel observed that when it is called to find out the 
compliance, it can examine the consistency with a covered agreement with 
any of the provisions of the covered agreements. When one measure was 
explicitly identified, with the knowledge, however, that further measures 
might be taken, to exclude such further measures from our mandate once 
we have foimd that they axe measures taken to comply' would go against 
the objective of 'prompt compliance' set out in Articles 3.3 and 221 of the 
DSU. Besides there is a possibility that a member in seeking to comply 
with the DSB recommendations under a covered agreement is breaching 
inadvertently or not, its obligations under other provisions of the covered 
agreements. The Panel viewed that compliance is an ongoing process and 
any measure taken to comply including any subsidiary or closely related 
measures, can be presumed to fall within the Panel's mandate. 
In EC-Bananas III, where recourse to Article 21.5 was taken by 
Ecuador, the Panel also considered that it could make recommendations 
pursuant to Articles 19.1 and 21.5 proceedings. While noting that Panels 




appropriate where one implementation attempt had been partially 
unsuccessful for our Article 21.5 Panel to make suggestions with a view 
towards promptly ending the dispute. 
Finally, Article 21.5 explicitly provides that where there is 
disagreement on the compatibility of the implementation measure, i.e, 
where the measures taken in pursuance of the recommendations are in 
conformity with the covered agreement, such a disagreement shall only be 
decided through recourse to the dispute settlement measures. The Panel in 
US-Certain Measures^'^ held that the obligation to use the WTO multilateral 
dispute settlement mechanism is a fundamental obligation, not a 
procedural but a substantive obligation. The Appellate Body confirmed the 
Panel's views. 
RetaliatioiVCross Sector Retaliation 
Article 22.2 calls for entering into negotiations for mutually 
acceptable compensation. Failing such negotiations, the complaining party 
to the dispute may request the DSB to authorise suspension of concessions 
or other obligations. Under Article 22.6, the DSB grants authorisation. 
If however the responding member objects to the quantum of 
authorisation, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The DSU does not 
deal with the issue of third party participation in Article 22 arbitration 
proceedings. While in bilateral determination of compensation or 
concessions, third parties may have no scope, in the case of multiple 
complaiutsi third parties' interests may be involved. In Erazil-Aircraft, the 
97. Panel Report on US-Import Measures on Certain Products from the EC, WT/DS 165/R 
of 17 July 2000. 
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arbitrators declined a request by Australia for third party rights, after 
hearing parties on the ground that DSU does not provide for it and in its 
view that AustraUa's rights would not be affected. However, a third party 
right had been granted in EC-Hormones but was rejected in EC-Bananas. It 
is submitted that the third parties should have the right to participate. This 
calls for amendments by the DSU Review Body. 
Under Article 22.7, the arbitrator shall only determine whether the 
level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment, and whether the proposed suspension is allowed under the 
covered agreement two issues arise in this connection: (i) the level of 
compliance under Article 21.5 and (ii) the level of nullification and 
impairment. If the respondent has failed to fulfil the measure fully, the 
arbitrator must also assess the residual level of nullification or impairment. 
Article 22.8 explicitly provides that the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations are orJy temporary; the aim being to ensure that the 
measure complained of is brought into conformity with the covered 
agreement. DSB is to keep its surveillance till it is done. 
Article 22.3 inter alia provides as to how to proceed in suspending 
the concessions or other obligations against the respondent member. First, 
in principle, the concessions on other obligations should be with respect to 
the same sector in respect of which the violation or other nullification or 
impairment, and if this is ineffective or impracticable, concessions may be 
suspended under other sectors, of the same agreement, failing which, 
imder other agreements. In other words, bring in the principle of cross 
retaliation. In EC-Bananas III, Ecuador requested cross-retaliation under the 
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TRIPS Agreement, though implementing the EC-Banana regime was found 
to be inconsistent with certain provisions of GATT and the GATS. The 
arbitrators concluded that at least part of the concessions suspended by 
Ecuador should fall iinder the GATT1994 not including investment, 
primary goods, imder GATS with respect to all principal service sectors 
other than distribution services and under TRIPS in a number of sectors of 
that agreement. The arbitrators concluded that retaliation would not be 
practicable or effective for Ecuador, because of the inequalities in 
development between Ecuador and the EC. It may be added that a small 
economy is unlikely to carry any weight against a large economy, like that 
of EC, which has a wide range of alternative market opportunities. 
Further, the economy of a small complaining country is likely to face more 
harmful effects in the long run. Besides, in the present day world of trade 
relations, based on the principle of reciprocity, in trade negotiations, 
ultimately, it may turn out that the gains in compensation, in real terms, 
would turn out to be of limited value. 
With respect to any measure taken by regional or local 
governments, or authorities within the territory of any member which 
affects the observance of any provision of the covered agreements, the 
dispute settlement procedure may similarly be invoked, and the member 
concerned shall take reasonable measures to ensure the observance of the 
covered agreement (by regional or local governments, or authorities).^8 
Article 23 aims at strengthening the multilateral system. It provides 
that members shall have recourse to and abide by the rules and procedures 
98. Article 22.9 
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of the Understanding when they seek redressal of violation of 
obligations, or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the 
covered agreements. In other words, the institutional framework (dispute 
settlement procedures) under the Understanding is to be resorted to by 
any member who feels that its benefits are being nullified or impaired. 
They cannot make determinations of violations of their rights unilaterally 
and have to seek recourse to the mechanism under the Understanding. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 23 provides for what the members need to 
do, in case their benefits are nullified or impaired. They are to resort to 
dispute settlement procedures follow the procedures set out in Article 21 
and Article 22 of the Understanding and obtain the authorisation of the 
DSB. 
Referring to the above provision, a Commentator has expressed the view: 
This is a measure that brings the use of unilateral measures deployed by 
states, such as section 301 of the US Trade Law, under the framework of 
Understanding. It is clearly stipulated that the WTO authorisation must 
be sought before the suspension of other obligations.^^ 
However, the US government has imilaterally imposed sanctions 
and suspended all contracts with more than 200 Indian entities, including 
private sector companies unilaterally, following the Indian nuclear tests. 
The sanctions include the suspension of all contracts including banking, 
finance, transfer of technology and all businesses. The Indian Commerce 
Minister is reported to have said that India will contest the imposition of 
these unilateral measures with the WTO. However, the only action 
99 Asif H Qureshi; The World Trade Organisation - Implementing International Trade 
Norms, Manchester University Press, 1996, p 97. 
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initiated in this regard is to make a statement drawing the attention to this 
unilateral action before the WTO. No action thereon is requested. It may be 
that sanctions are imposed not tmder section 301 of the US Trade Act but 
under another US law. But the effect seems to be the same: unilateral 
action. What has nuclear tests to do with private international trade 
between private parties? Still in EC-US sections 301-10,^ 0° the Panel ruled 
that the US sections 301 -10 are not inconsistent with Article 23 of the DSU. 
Is it therefore wishful thinking that the institutional WTO framework has 
to be used in all cases before suspension of any rights or obligations? 
Article 24 inter alia provides that particular consideration shall be 
given to the special situation of least developed country members. It calls 
upon the developed country members to exercise due restraint in asking 
for compensation or seeking authorisation to suspend the application of 
concessions or other obligations pursuant to these procedures. 
Article 25 deals with arbitration. Resort to arbitration shall be 
subject to mutual agreement of parties which shall agree on procedures to 
be followed. Other members may become party to an arbitration 
proceeding only upon the agreement of the parties concerned. The parties 
to the proceeding shall agree to abide by the arbitration award, which shall 
be notified to the DSB. 
Article 26 deals with non-violation complaints. It has been observed 
while considering Article 5 of the Understanding seen that an application 
by another contracting party (a non-violation complaint) may be initiated 




not directly violated. While Article 26.1 deals with complaints under 
Article XXIII:1 (b) of GATT, Article 26.2 deals with complaints under 
Article XXIII:l(c) of GATT {situation complaints). 
In respect of complaints under Article XXIII:l(c) (situation 
complaints). Article 26.2 inter alia provides that in so far as the automatic 
adoption of a Panel Report or an Appellate Report is concerned, the right 
of veto of the parties to the dispute to the adoption of the report is not 
undermined by the Understanding. 
Finally, Article 27 deals with the responsibilities of the Secretariat. 
It shall assist the Panels and provide secretarial assistance. It may also 
provide legal advice and assistance to developing country members in 
respect of dispute settlement. It may provide legal experts as part of 
techrucal assistance at the request of a developing country member. It shall 
also conduct special training courses for interested members concerning 




MECHANISM OF WTO vis-a-vis 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Chapter-in 
Prologue: International and National relations have become increasingly 
dominated by economic factors. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
system has moved away from its former, more 'power oriented 
diplomatic' approach to trade relations, and embraced 'rule oriented 
diplomatic' approach to trade relations, and embraced riile oriented and 
impartial dispute settlement. Addressing the need for fairness in 
international economic relations, dispute panels provide a forum for the 
airing of dispute regardless of a party's economic power or influence. 
Developing countries are given an opportunity to challenge the trade 
measures of economically strong states that normally dominate 
international negotiations and multilateral decision making. Installing an 
equitable dispute resolution mechanism with the trading regime 
entrenches the legitimacy to regime itself and provides a better incentive to 
comply with international trading obligations. 
The global acceptance of a compulsory dispute settlement system as 
part of WTO Agreements lends credence to developments in international 
trade law and elevates the importance of public International Law 
generally. The advent of WTO dispute resolution system suggests that the 
process of settling trade disputes has become judicialised. Yet, there is still 
a significant role for diplomacy and non-legal arguments in this system. 
Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation 
(Marrakech Agreement) covers a much wider range of trade. It extends 
beyond goods embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, 
investment and agriculture. 
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Since the WTO is in operation from last one and half decades and 
functions as judicialised institution at global level, it is bound to come 
across the question of applicability or non applicability of various 
principles of customary International Law while making interpretation of 
various Covered Agreements. Probably the most fimdamental issue for the 
Dispute Settlement Body is how to interpret WTO agreement. Often the 
crux of a dispute is rooted in conflicting understandings of certain 
provisions. Panels have incorporated the appreciation of Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),1969 in GATT law as a guide 
for interpretation. 
The WTO Agreement ushers in a new era in decision making by the 
parties and in the resolution of disputes. Under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)i a Dispute Settlement Body consisting of dispute 
panels and an Appellate Body now adjudicates trade disputes between the 
parties. A WTO member may invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Dispute Settlement Body by requesting the establishment of a panel to 
settle a dispute.^ There is then a right to appeal the Panel's decision.^ 
Cases, which go to the Appellate Body involve legal questions arising out 
of the WTO agreements, and some raise important International Law 
issues. 
In fact, the global acceptance of a compulsory dispute settlement 
system as part of the WTO agreements lends credence to developments in 
international trade law and elevates the importance of public International 
1. WTO Agreement (1994), Annex 2, 33m I.L.M. 1226 




Law generally. The DSU furthers the role of legal adjudication in 
international trade law by creating a permanent appellate tribunal. 
This reflects the need to create a neutral arbiter of trade disputes, primarily 
based on legal interpretation of the WTO Agreements. 
The WTO case law covers not only matters of interpretation and the 
function of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), but also includes aspects of 
customary International Law, as well as general legal principles. Issues 
such as the burden of proof and judicial economy as well as the procedural 
fairness, have entered the discourse, enabling the DSB to develop a body of 
law, rather than simply act as an ad hoc arbitrator. Interpreting WTO law 
consistently with International Law and other general legal principles 
enhances legal security and consistency in the WTO legal system as well as 
the parties' tacit acceptance of third party adjudication."* 
This chapter examines how Dispute Settlement Body's decisions 
have made use of the general jurisprudence of international law, how far 
the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 is applicable to WTO 
agreements? What is the role of different legal principles in the operation 
of dispute settlement process of the WTO? 
(I) Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, 1969 and the Dispute 
Settlement 
There was a lot of uncertainty with regard to the application of 
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 1969 in case of GATT whose 
character as a binding treaty was doubted by some experts.^ By contract, 
4. E.U. Petersmann; "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System" (Kluwer Law 
International, London, 1997,p 17. 




the WTO agreements are treated as any other treaties in international law, 
having major implications in determiiung its relationship with other 
international agreements and International Law in general. 
Unlike previous GATT panels. Dispute Settlement body under WTO 
is explicitly required to invoke the rules of interpretation of treaties as a 
source to clarify WTO agreements. Article 3.2 of the DSU states that WTO 
agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public International law.^ On one occasion, it has been 
referred to as providing the only rules of interpretation of the WTO 
Agreement.^ There may have been tacit acceptance of the application of the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 under the GATT 1947 regime. 
In looking for sources of interpretation of the GATT 1947, Panels often 
attached undue importance to drafting history of the agreement or they 
would look to other material beyond the text of the GATT.^ 
Under the Dispute, Settlement Body system, it is imperative that the 
ground work for interpretation and application of GATT rules laid down 
so as to guide negotiator, decision makers and future Panels. By outlying 
this principle, the dispute resolution process is perceived to be more 
efficient and WTO Agreements are more clearly understood. This can lead 
to the speedier resolution of disputes and indeed dispute avoidance, 
because a correct interpretation can be determinative of future issues. 
6. This interpretative Requirement Extend Beyond GATT 1994 and includes other 
Agreement such as TRIPS (India - patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural products, WT/DS/50/AB/R, Dec. 1997) and the Agreement on Textile and 
Clothing (US) Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man Made Fiber Underwear 
Adopted on 25 Feb. 1997, WT/DS/24/R. 
7. James Cameron and Kevin R. Gray; "Principles of International Law in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 252 
8. P. Nicholus, op. cit, p.430. 
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Consistent, coherent and authoritative interpretation aids the development 
of trade regime, connecting adjudication with the constitutional function of 
the WTO and providing interested parties with grounds for trust. 
What constitute customary International Law in the interpretation 
of treaties is generally taken to be expressed in Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties? The Appellate Body noted that 
there was a need to achieve classification of the WTO Agreements by 
reference to the fundamental rule of treaty interpretation in Article 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. The universal application of 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 to 
international trade law is problematic, as some WTO members, including 
the United States, are not parties. However the Appellate Body in japan-
Taxes implicitly resolved any uncertainty about its application to non-
parties by declaring that the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 
represents a codification of customary International Law and is therefore 
binding on all states.^ 
In fact, paragraph 1 of Article 31 provides that the treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning and in 
the light of its object and purpose. Paragraph 2 of Article 31 provides that 
in addition to text, including its Preamble and annexes, agreements 
concluded in connection with the treaty between all the parties, any 
agreement between one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by other parties, as an instrument related to the 
treaty, is relevant. Paragraph 3 inter alia provides that any subsequent 
9. Id, p. 429. 
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agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty, 
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, and any relevant 
rules of International Law applicable, between the parties, shall be taken 
into account. 
Under the supplementary rules to Article 32, the preparatory word 
to the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion may also be looked 
into to resolve the meaning of ambigious or obscured words etc. 
This provision, when taken together, leaves discretion to the 
Panels/Appellate Body under DSU leading to different approaches by 
Panels/Appellate Body leading to inconsistencies. While the most 
common approach is to see text, context, object, and purpose. Some times, 
the context and object and purpose may confirm the textual meaning, 
while at other times, it may be impossible to even identify that ordinary 
meaning without looking at the context and/or object and purpose.^o 
While the object and purpose of the treaty may, in some cases, be 
ascertained from the plain meaning of the word thereof. Others in 
interpreting may also consider the broad range of potential meaning and 
ancillary documents in support of another approach to interpretation. 
In Reformulated Gasoline^''^ both Venezuela and Brazil brought a 
complaint concerning the effect of rules prescribed under the US Clean Air 
Act to foreign exported Gasoline. Before the Panel, the US attempted to 
justify its measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994, because it related to 
conserving natural resources pursuant to Article 20 (g). The Panel was 
10. Rao, M.B. & Guru Manjula; WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, Lexis 




criticized by the Appellate Body for not giving full effect to Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties in interpreting the crucial phase 
in Article 20(g) of the GATT 1994, whether the rule constituted a measure 
'relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources'. Relying on 
GATT 1947 jurisprudence, the Panel interpreted the terms 'relating to' as 
meaiung 'primarily aimed at.' 
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panels finding that the 
calculation of base line level of clean Gasoline quality, applicable to foreign 
producers, could be isolated from the overall policy objective of the 
legislation, so that the measure was not, on its own, 'primarily aimed at' 
conservation. 
It is submitted here that it was erroneous to conclude that base line 
rule in the context of lawmaker were not measure relating to the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. 
In fact. Article 31(1) of the Vierma Convention on Law of Treaties 
states that treaty's are to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning given to the terms of treaty in their context and in 
the light of the treaty's object and purpose. A tribunal began with the word 
as agreed and looked for meaning there. Particular attention is to be paid 
to the context of the treaties since a provision should not be interpreted in 
isolation but in its context, in that part of agreement and then in relation to 
entire Agreement. In the Undenoear Panel decision, the entire text of the 
agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)i2 was deemed relevant in order 
to interpret Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the ATC. The cross reference and 
12. WT/DS6, United States - Measures affecting Imports of Women Wool Shirts and 
Blouses from India (Complainant India), 14* March 1996. 
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inter-relationship between all of the WTO Agreements open up the 
possibility of considering them when interpreting a particular agreement. 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies 
another fundamental rule of treaty interpretation applicable to WTO 
Agreements. In fact, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is to be resorted to only when Article 31 fails to resolve a problem 
of interpretation. Article 32 was applied in the E. C. Bananas case^^ in order 
to confirm the Panel's conclusion following from the application of Article 
31. The ordinary meaning of the word affecting in the general agreement 
on trade and services was employed by applying the text in Article 31 of 
the Vieima Convention on the Law of Treaties, but the Appellate Body is 
still looked at the preparatory work of the treaties to confirm this 
interpretation. 
In fact, the link between Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and the 
interpretation requirements stated in Article 3.2 of the DSU is now 
entrenched in WTO law. This connection has emerged into a legal test 
from which Panels cannot deviate when reviewing provisions in the WTO 
Agreements. Failing to apply this test or using alternative methods of 
treaty interpretation can result in overturned rulings.^ "* In the Shrimp-Turtle 
dispute, the Panel was criticised by the Appellate Body for not following all 
13. WT/DS364, European Communities - Regime for the Importation of Bananas 
(Complainant Panama), 22 June 2007. 
14. The Panel in LAN Computers dispute was overruled by the Appellate Body, for its 
failure to examine the context of a tariff schedule or the object and purpose of the WTO 
Agreement and the GATT 1994, before resorting to an examination of the legitimate 
expectations of the parties. 
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the steps in applying the customary rules of interpretation of Public 
International Law.^s 
Moreover, the rules of treaty interpretation under International Law 
are not limited to what is expressed in VCLT. The principle of effectiveness 
(Ut res magis valeat quatn pereat) is a fundamental tenet of treaty 
interpretation, flowing from the contextual analysis required under Article 
31 of the VCLT. If, a treaty is open to two interpretations with one of them 
disabling the treaty from having the appropriate effects, good faith and the 
objects and purpose of the treaty demand that the effective interpretation 
should be adopted.^^ 
The interrelationship of the WTO Agreements constitutes a 
comprehensive legal system governing international trade. A contextual 
analysis of a specific article mandates an understanding of how the 
agreements function together. Applying the principle of effectiveness 
challenges the notion of lex specialis, where each agreement would operate 
in isolation from each other. The Panel in the Canadian Periodicals endorsed 
this approach, ruling that the ordinary meaning of the texts of GATT 1994 
and GATS as well as Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, taken together, 
indicate that Obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS Co-exist and that 
one does not override the other.^^ The finding was consistent with the 
15. WT/DS58/AB/R, US - Import Prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products 
(1998). 
16. (1966) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol.11, p.219. as 
referred to by the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes. 
17. Section V.C (i), para 5.17. This was confirmed by the Appellate Body in other disputes: 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, p. 12: Canada: Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and Exportation of Dairy Products. WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R. 
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rulings by the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC Bananas where in 
accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties 1969, the GATS was not limited to measures that directly govern 
or affect the supply of the servicers 
It, therefore, becomes evident that reading agreements together is 
the preferred approach by the Appellate Body. It is so because there are 
potential conflicts between the provisions of the various agreements. 
In, Guatemala-Anti Dumping^^ the appellants argued that the 
dispute settlement provisions under the Anti-Dumping Agreement took 
precedence over the general dispute settlement rules in the DSU. The 
Appellate Body noted that although the former provides for special rules 
and procedures, they only prevail over the DSU where there is a 
divergence between the provisions. It is only in situation of a conflict 
where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other 
that the Anti-Dumping Agreement provision would prevail.^o Where there 
is no difference, the rules of the procedures of the DSU apply together with 
the special provisions of the covered agreement.^^ 
It is now Crystal clear that the need for flexibility in interpreting 
WTO Agreements has been recognised by the ruling of Panel and 
18. European communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 
WT/DS 27/AB/R. 
19. Guatemala - Anti Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico 
(WT/DS 60/AB/R). 
20. Ibid. 
21. A difference was found by the Appellate Body in Brazil - Export Financing Programme 
for Aircraft (WT/DS46/AB/R) para 132, with respect to the provisions governing the 
implementation of the recommendations and ruhngs of the DSB in a dispute pursuant 
to Article 4 of the SCM Agreement. 
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Appellate Body. The Appellate Body in the Japan-Taxes case appreciated 
the need for having definitive interpretations of GATT 1994. WTO rules 
were needed to be reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. However, the 
Appellate Body added that interpretation is not to be as rigid or inflexible 
as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless 
and ever changing ebb and flow of real facts in the real cases in the real 
world .22 
Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969 
allows the Appellate Body to refer to subsequent practice when 
interpreting a treaty as well as subsequent decisions of the parties. The 
Desiccated Coconut Panel discussed the difference between the two.23 In that 
case, the Panel dealt with the relationship between GATT 1947, the 1979 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code (CMC) and GATT 1994. 
While in the practice of SCM Code, it was clearly not relevant to be the 
interpretation of Article VI of GATT 1994. Practice in this context relates 
only to agreements regarding interpretation. 
Prior to that the Panel while adopting a narrow View of what 
comprises subsequent practice, held that only practice under Article VI 
GATT 1947 was legally relevant for the interpretation of Article VI of 
GATT 1994. According to Article 11:4 of the WTO Agreement, GATT 1994 
was not a "subsequent agreement" of GATT 1947, pursuant to Article 31:3 
(a) of the VCLT, but was legally distinct. The 1979 SCM code was not a 
22. Japan-Taxes, Section G,H (1) (2) (c). 




decision, illustrating subsequent practice, by the contracting parties to 
GATT 1947, but an agreement subsequent to GATT 1947. Therefore, it did 
not qualify as subsequent practice for the purpose of interpreting GATT 
1947 in light of Article 31:3 (b) of the VCLT.24 
Rules of Interpretation: 
a) Doctrine of In Dubio Mitius 
It is an important rule of interpretation widely recognized as a 
supplementary means of interpretation whereby difference is accorded to 
the sovereignty of states. The Permanent Court of International Justice in a 
case called Frontier between Turky and Iraq^ identified the principle of In 
Dubio Mitius as meaning that if the wording of a treaty provision is not 
clear, in choosing between several admissible interpretation, the one which 
involves the minimum of obligation for the parties should be adopted. In 
other words, the doctiine seeks to deal with situation in which ambiguity 
crops in because of a term. In such situation, the meaning to be preferred is 
the one that is less onerous on the party assuming an obligation; least 
interferes with territorial and personal supremacy, or imposes fewer 
general restrictions.^^ In Beef Hormones, the Penal ruled that the measures 
taken by EC must be 'based on' international standard under Article 3:1 of 
the SPS Agreement meaning that they must 'confirm to' international 
standard as required under Article 3:2 of the SPS Agreement. This 
interpretation was rejected by the Appellate Body which referred to 
24. This was in contradiction to an earlier GATT Panel ruling in US -Countervailing 
Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen from Canada (July 1991), BISD 385/30. 
25. (1925) Series B, No. 12 at 25. 




Oxford Dictionary to explain that these terms are defined differently, 
pointed out that the terms are used in different articles and stated that the 
harmonisation of a member's SPS measures on the basis of international 
standards is projected in agreement as a goal to be realised in the future 
and not a current requirement. 
The Appellate Body concluded that in applying the principle In 
Dubio Mitius that it was wrong to assume that sovereign states intended to 
impose upon them the more onerous obligation, rather than less burden 
sum obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with standards, 
guidelines and recommendations.27 
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969, 
allows the Appellate Body to refer to subsequent practice when 
interpreting a treaty as well as subsequent decision of the parties, 
hi Desiccated Coconut, the Panel discussed the difference between the 
two....28 In this case the Panel dealt with the relationship between the 
GATT 1947, the 1979 Subsidies and Coimtervailing Measure Code (SCM) 
and the GATT 1994. It was observed by the panel that the subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Code (SCM) was a subsequent agreement but 
not customary practice of the GATT 1947. While the practice of SCM codes 
signatories might provide some interpretative value regarding the 
interpretation of the SCM code, it was clearly not relevant to the 
interpretation of Article VI of GATT 1994. Practice in this context relates 
only to agreement regarding interpretation. The panel adopted a narrow 
view as to what comprises subsequent practice and held that only practice 
27. Supra Note 7, p. 259. 
28. Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (1997), WT/DS 22/R 
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under Article VI of GAIT 1947 was legally relevant for the interpretation 
of Article VI of GATT1994. 
(b) Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation 
The doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' has been applied in many 
cases. Its foundation rests in International Law representing an underlying 
treaty interpretation. However, it is probably derived from German Law 
and is general principle of interpretation applied by European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)29 developed in the context of something that traders can rely 
on, it is something held by reasonable person as to matters likely to occur 
in the normal course of his affairs.^ o There are certain other international 
legal principles that are related to the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, 
such as pacta sunt servanda, estopple and the abuse of rights doctrine. 
In the well known Lotus Case,^ ^ the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) held that conduct not explicitly prohibited by 
international law remained lawful, similarly lawful, measure adopted by 
some states easily frustrated the intention of GATT 1947 parties. In 
response, it became a well established GATT principle that the legitimate 
expectations of member regarding the conditions of competition were to 
be protected in order to inject security and predictability into the 
multilateral trading system. The need for the protection of legislative 
expectation is bolstered by the dispute settlement provisions found in 
Article XXIII of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that allows an 
29. Germany vs. Council (Re-Banana Regime) - Case 280/93, (1998), ECR, 1019. 
30. J. Steiner and L. Woods, Text Book on EC Law, (London) Black Stone Press Ltd, 1998, p. 
105 
31. S.S. Lotus, Judgment No. 9, (P.C.I.J.), Ser. A. No,. 10 (1927) 
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avenue for redress to non-violation complaints, this offers an effective 
mechanism affording protection to the parties who have not suffered 
direct injury arising from a specific treaty violation. 
The application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation can 
preclude or limit the use of exceptions in the WTO Agreement. In the 
Underwear dispute the panel offer reviewing the wording, the context and 
the overall purpose of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
concluded that exporting members could legitimately expect that 
transitional safeguard adopted under Article VI of the Agreement on 
Textiles and clothing will be exercised sparingly. Members could 
legitimately expect that importer would not frustrate market access and 
investment. As a result, the panel ruled that resort to transitional 
safeguard was permitted on an exception basis by virtue of the need to 
protect legitimate expectation of the par ties.3^ 
The questions of 'legitimate expectation' re-appeared in the LAN 
Computers Panel Report, concerning the interpretation of a tariff schedule. 
The Panel asserted that the protection of legitimate expectation of the tariff 
treatment of a bound item is one of the GATT 1994, tariff concessions that 
the price effects of the tariff concession will not be systematically offset. 
The panel concluded that despite the re-classification by the EC, the 
prevailing practices of the EC during the Uruguay Round formed a 
legitimate expectation that LAN equipment would continue to be given 
the same tariff treatment accorded to ADP machine. The security and 
predictability agreement directed to the substantial reduction of tariff and 
32. James Cameron and Kevin R. Gray; op. cit, p. 261. 
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other barriers to trade could r\ot be maintained without respect for 
legitimate expectation. This was held to be consistent with the principle of 
good faith as codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties, 1969. 
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's ruling that the 
meaning of tariff concession can be determined in the light of 'legitimate 
expectation' of the exporting member. Interpreting a concession in the 
light of the legitimate expectation of an exporter was not consistent with 
the principle of good faith under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969, since it applied the concept to the treaty that 
were not intended by the parties. The Appellate Body held that the 
purpose of treaty interpretation was to ascertain the common intentions of 
the parties, which cannot be understood on the basis of subjective and 
unilaterally determined expectation of one of the parties to the WTO 
Agreement. 
C. Doctrine of Stare Decisis: The Question of its applicability 
The Doctrine of 'Stare Decisis' has established its authority in 
municipal legal systems operating in different parts of the world. But the 
question of its applicability in international sphere in general and in WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in particular, is still uncertain and 
controversial.33 i^ fact, in the functioning of the International Court of 
Justice, the doctrine of Stare Decisis has no application. Article 50 of the 
Statute of International Court of Justice expressly states that 'the decision' 
33. Id. p. 274. 
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of the court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect 
of the particular case. 
The role of GATT Panel decision in interpreting WTO Agreement 
received some attention by the Appellate Body in japan-Taxes dispute.^ 
The Appellate Body interpreted Article XVIT of the WTO Agreement's and 
paragraph 1 (b){IV) of Annex 1 incorporating GATT 1994 into the WTO 
Agreement as bringing the legal history and experience imder the GATT 
1947 into the new realm of WTO to ensure continuity and consistency in a 
smooth transition. The experience acquired by the parties to the GATT 
1947 was deemed relevant to the experience of the new trading system 
under the WTO. Following from that experience, are Panel reports that 
became an important part of that system, often considered by future panel. 
The Appellate Body refused to accord any binding effect to the 
previous panel report of GATT 1947. Panel reports required an adoption 
by the contracting parties in order to have effect. Lack of adoption under 
the GATT 1947 regime can lessen the weight given to a panel's decisions. 
Where the decision to adopt a panel report is made, it still cannot 
constitute an agreement by contracting parties on the legal reasoning 
contained in panel report. The decision to adopt a report by the parties did 
not constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant provision of GATT 
1947 for the future. 
34. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Complaint European Communities) WT DS 8, 
1995 Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Complaint Canada DS!), 1995. Japan Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages (Complainant U.S.) WT DS 11,1995. 
35. Except as otherwise provide under this Agreement or multilateral Agreements the 
WTO shall be guided by the contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies 
established in the framework of GATT 1947. 
139 
Chapter-in 
Under the WTO system, exclusive authority in interpreting GATT 
1994 is conferred on the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, 
which have the sole power to adopt interpretation, with decision taken by 
a three quarters majority of the members.^^ The Dispute Settlement Body 
can issue recommendation and adopt rulings but they are prohibited from 
adding or diminishing the parties' rights and obligations. This effectively 
prevents the incorporation of other interpretations into the WTO 
Agreements. By referring to the legislative branch of WTO, the Appellate 
Body in Japan Taxes limited the role of the Dispute Settlement Body to 
merely clarifying and not making WTO law.^^ 
In fact, the Appellate Body in Japan Taxes concluded that the Panel 
decisions were not binding except with respect to resolving that particular 
dispute between the parties. Panels are not bound by the details and 
legal reasoning of prior panel reports, since there are other factors to be 
considered including other GATT practices and the particular 
circumstances of the complaint. Decisions are deemed to be isolated acts 
that are generally not sufficient to establish subsequent practice, since they 
do not form a sequence of acts establishing an agreement of party. 
However, there are prominent experts like E.U. Petersmann and 
Prof. John Jackson who are critical of Appellate Body reasoning and 
approach as mentioned above. E.U. Petersmann challenges the Appellate 
Body approach on the ground that it neglects the contextual difference 
between a judgment by the International Court of Justice and a GATT 
36. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding sand XIX:2 of the WTO Agreement. 
37. James Cameron and Kelvin R. Gray, op. cit., p. 274. 
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Panel Report, whose subsequent deliberation and adoption by both the 
council and Annual Conference of the GATT contracting parties could 
make such report more than an isolated act.^s 
Prof. John Jackson criticises the Appellate Body's ruling in Japan-
Taxes whereby a comparison was made between Dispute Settlement Body 
of WTO with that of International Court of Justices^ because the ICJ is 
governed explicitly by Article 59 of the Statute of International Court of 
Justice which negates any Stare desisis in the ICJ jurisprudence^^ Prof. 
Jackson says that the approach adopted by the Appellate Body is not well 
founded because the development by the ICJ of a body of a case law points 
out that a considerable reliance is placed on the value of previous decisions 
of the International Court of Justice. 
In the new era of dispute settlement, it appears that the development of 
case law under the Dispute Settlement Body may provide guidance for 
subsequent decisions. Experience shows that the Panel and Appellate Body, 
through its decisions, have applied legal tests established in earlier decisions. It 
appears that as the number of panel decision increases in future; there wiU be a 
growing reliance on them to substantiate a party's position. The reasoning of 
panek, indeed, can provide useful guidance for future decisions, even to the 
38. E.U. Petersmann; International Trade Law and The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, 1948 to 1996: An Introduction, p. 37. 
39. J. Jackson; The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations (Second Ed.) M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 32. 
40. It is generally considered that the previous decision by International Tribunal lack 
formal precedential effect: I. Brownlie: Principle of Public International Law 5* ed., p. 
21, New York, Clavendon Press, 1998. 
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point of being persuasive in a more formal sense. This is a concept familiar 
to common law lawyers.^^ 
d) Burden of Proof in Dispute Settlement Proceeding 
The burden of proof is an evidentiary rule, fundamental to legal 
system. In World Trade Organisation Law, the burden is normally 
allocated to the complainant to establish that a violation of GATT 1994, as 
well as other WTO Agreements, has occurred. The burden of proof, in 
fact, rests with the party, which asserts the affirmative of a particular claim 
or defence. 
In Shirts and Blouses dispute,^^ the panel found that the burden of 
proof rested with India to prove that there was a violation of the 
Agreement on Textile and Clothing due to US safeguards measures. It was 
for India to advance factual and legal arguments in order to establish that 
the import restriction was inconsistent with Article 2 of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing's and that the US determination results in serious 
damage or actual threat, pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing, was not evident. 
When the dispute came before the Appellate Body was brought, 
discussion was made on the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of 
International Law by the Appellate Body. In rejecting India's contention 
that the burden of proof was initially on the US, the Appellate Body 
41. Desiccated Coconut, Panel Report (WT)/DS22/R at Section VI A, 1 B III para 258. 
42. United State Measures Affecting Imports Woven and Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India WT/DS 33, (1« April 1996)- http//www.wto.org. 
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questioned how any system of judicial settlement could function where a 
mere assertion of the claim amounts to proof .^ 3 
It is generally accepted principle of Law applicable in most 
jurisdictions that the burden of proof rests upon the party who raised a 
particular claim or defence. This was generally accepted cannon of 
evidence in civil law. Common Law and in most other legal systems. How 
much and what kind of evidence is required to establish the presumption 
will, however, vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and 
case to case. The burden of proof, indeed, serves as a benchmark for any 
effective dispute resolution system. It maintains fairness and order by 
presuming that WTO members are in compliance with their obligation 
until proven otherwise.^^ 
A dispute settlement mechanism operating under such a principle 
assures members that the benefit accruing directly or indirectly to them 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 will be 
protected. If a member feels that its benefits are nullified or impaired, 
dispute settlement is available.^^ x^g complainant is initially required to 
demonstrate a prima facie case of nullification or impairment. The 
complaint party establishes this in the absence of effective refutation by the 
defendant. Where there is an infringement of the obligations under one of 
the WTO Agreements, the action constitute a prima facie case of 
nullification or impairment of benefits.'^ 
43. J. Camaron and K.R. Gray: Op. cit., p.277. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Article XXIII (a) of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing WTO, allows a party to Bring 
forward a complaint when any provision of the WTO Agreement is violated. 
46. Article 3:8 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
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There is presumption that a breach of WTO rule produces an 
adverse impact on other members thereby compelhng a member, against 
whom the complaint is brought, to rebut the charge. In the Foot Wear case, 
the Panel attempted to define what a presumption is. It held that in 
cor\formity with the ordinary meaning of the words, as spell out in the 
Black's Law Dictionary,^^ (Lexique de termers juridiques) and other similar 
dictionaries, a presumption constitute an inference in favour of a particular 
fact. It would also refer to a conclusion reached in the absence of direct 
evidence. Setting out the violation of a WTO Agreement activates the 
presumption that a member's benefits have been, or will potentially be, 
nullified or impaired. 
The burden of proving a violation is not insurmountably onerous. 
In international dispute, tribunals are given considerable flexibility in 
evaluating claims before it. A common problem is that a party cannot 
obtain access to specific evidence to proof a prima facie violation where a 
non-violation complaint is asserted, the rule on the burden of proof is 
modified. Non violation complaint places the onus on the complainant to 
provide a detailed justification of its claim. This is a practice in the WTO 
recognised in 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, consultation. 
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. Article 26(1) (a) of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding deals with non-violation claims, proving that 
the claiming party must present a detailed justification to support their 
claim.^8 
47. 6* Edition, West Publishing (1991) 
48. J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, op. cit., p. 278. 
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A prima facie case is established if in the absence of effective 
refutation by the defending party, a Panel is required as a matter of law, to 
rule in favour of prima facie case. Once the prima facie case is sufficiently 
demonstrated the burden shifts to the other party to adduce to rebut 
presumption. Where a party attempts to invoke an exception under the 
GATT1994 or other WTO Agreements the burden is shifted to that party.^^ 
The Appellate Body in reformulated Gasoline Dispute held that a 
party claiming an exception under Article XX carries a heavier burden 
than simply showing that the measure is categorically within the 
boundaries of the permitted action. The party invoking the general 
exception under Article XX should demonstrate that its measure does not 
constitute abuse of the exception under that provision. 
The burden of proof issue was given a procedural context by the 
Appellate Body in the Korea Milk Dispute^. In this dispute, the appellant 
argued that the respondent did not meet its burden of showing prima facie 
violation of Article 4 of Agreement on safeguards. 
Hence the doctrine of burden of proof has been taken into 
consideration both by the Penal and Appellate Body and applied to 
different disputes in somewhat modified manner as compared to its 
application in different municipal law systems. 
49. In Shirts and Blouses Dispute, India was required to put forward evidence and legal 
arguments sufficient to demonstrate the safeguard by the US was inconsistent with 
obligations assumed by the US under Article 2 and 6 of Agreements on Textiles and 
Clothing. The Onus then shifted to US to bring forward evidence and disprove the 
claim. 
50. Korea-Safeguard Measures on Dairy Product: WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 25* 
September 1997, posted on official WTO website http./ /www.wto.org 
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e) Judicial Economy in Dispute Settlement 
Judicial economy is succinctly defined as an 'attempt to settle as 
many issues as possible in a single proceeding.'^^ The panel members of 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947, in the context of hearing two 
separate proceedings that involve similar parties and/or similar trade 
measures, made discussion on judicial economy in dispute settlement. 
Panel constituted under GATT 1947 usually conducted dispute in a 
restrictive maimer addressing the issues framed only in the terms of 
reference, and would not examine exceptions under the GATT 1947 unless 
the parties raised them.52 
The Penal members under GATT 1947, in most of the disputes gave 
priority to the principle of judicial economy in dispute settlement. 
Meaning thereby the penal members after determining that a GATT 1947 
violation existed, would refrain from discussing whether other GATT 1947 
provisions were violated. Applying judicial economy resulted in forgoing 
an Article XX analysis when no violation of GATT 1947 was found. 
Article 9(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding has codified 
the practice of joining dispute, giving a panel full discreation to do this 
when it is requested by more than one WTO member.^^ Where a party 
would refuse to have their complaints combined, GATT 1947 panels would 
accede to this and two separate proceeding would result. The concept of 
judicial economy evolved in WTO jurisprudence to outline the penal's 
51. P. Nicholas, op. cit., p. 403. 
52. Tuna- Dolphin I, Section 337 of Tariff Act of 1930,1989,36 Supp. BISD, 345. 
53. Annex two the WTO Agreement Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the 
Settlement of Dispute. 
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freedom to determine to what issues it will respond to. The need for 
judicial economy is greater under WTO because each particular argument 
advanced by the parties is much broader in scope. Responding to all of 
them undermines the effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement Body to 
respond expeditiously to complaints made by the parties. 
The WTO Agreement has ushered in new era of International Law 
that is more complicated than pre-existing GATT Law. Panels are asked to 
rule on the provision of the various agreements and the intricate 
relationship existing between them. There are numerous references to 
other international agreement as well as customary rules of interpretation 
of public International law.54 
The Appellate Body in Shirt and Blouses dispute ruled that nothing 
in Article II of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or previous GATT 
practice, mandated an examination of all legal claims made by the 
complaining party. It was conceded that some panel do take the liberty of 
deciding issues that are not necessary to the disposition of the particular 
dispute. 
It may be submitted here that the above-mentioned decision of 
Appellate Body is quite appreciative because it will go a long way in 
avoiding delays in the dispute settlement and would consequently 
establish the roots of judicial economy in the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the World Trade Organisation. 
Another feature of judicial economy is of procedural nature. In 
Reformulated Gasoline dispute, the Appellate Body denied attempts by 
54. J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, op. cit., p. 282. 
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Venezuela and Brazil to raise arguments on a matter that was not 
appealed. Venezuela and Brazil had failed to fill appellant's submission, 
pursuant to Rules 23(1) nor separate appeal under 23(4) of the working 
procedures, but made new arguments on their submissions filing them 
under Rule 22. To permit Venezuela and Brazil to advance position not 
mentioned in their initial submission would force the Appellate Body to 
disregard its own procedure, which it would not do in the absence of a 
compelling reason based on grounds such as fundamental fairness or force 
majeure. 
The inverse of judicial economy occurs where a Penal or Appellate 
Body rules on issues that are not within the parameters of the case before 
it. Although this is common practice for tribunal and courts empowered to 
rule on the law within their jurisdiction, it might be expected from the 
members of the WTO system that the Dispute Settlement Body is limited 
to addressing the question before it. It is not surprising that the Appellate 
Body would be willing to rule on matters outside the scope of the dispute 
as presented to it, so that ambiguities in the WTO Agreement can be 
clarified. In one sense, such 'judicial activism' can prevent future dispute 
over dubious terms.^^ 
f. Other Principles 
There are certain other general principles of International Law 
which sometimes are taken into consideration by the panels or Appellate 
Body while deciding disputes between the members of World Trade 
Organisation the most prominent amongst them are: 
55. J.P. Gaffney; "Due Process in the World Trade Organisation: The need for Procedural 
Justice in tf\e Dispute Settiement System" 14 (99) Am. Univ. Int. L. Rev. 1173, p. 1192. 
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The principle of State responsibility, doctrine of estopple and abus de 
droit which are discussed in brief herein under: 
(i) State Responsibility: An indirect reference was made to the 
principle of state responsibility by the Appellate Body in Shrimp-
Turtle, where the U.S. was held to be responsible for acts of its 
departments and branches including its judiciary. The relevance of 
state responsibility is apparent when determining whether certain 
measures can be impugned as attributable to a Member State. It was 
implicitly applied in a few GATT1947 disputes.^^ 
Another dimension of state responsibility is the relationship 
between domestic and International law. The Panel in Footioear 
dispute discussed the use of national law to excuse an international 
trade obligation. Argentina argued that they were not in violation of 
Article II since their legal system afforded an adequate judicial 
remedy to correct an apparent breach. The Argentine constitution 
provided that International Law would take precedence over 
national legislation and all Argentine Judges were obligated to 
recognise the supremacy of WTO rules over inconsistent Argentine 
measures. The panel rejected this argument. Although Argentine 
Judges were required to recognise the supremacy of WTO rules over 
an inconsistent Argentine measure, a party can still be in violation 
regardless of any available judicial remedy. 
56. C. Tiete, "Voluntary Eco-Labelling Programmes and Questions of State Responsibility 
in the WTO/GATT Legal System" (1995) 28 (5) Journal of World Trade Law, 123 p. 148. 
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Hence, a WTO member camiot assert that its internal system 
provides for a remedy to certain individuals, either national or 
foreign, so that it could never be in violation of a WTO agreement. 
(ii) Estoppel: Another principle of International Law considered by 
Panels is Estoppel. Originating in both Civil and common law, 
Estoppel prevents a state from denying a clear and unequivocal 
representation made with intention that it should be relied on 
Estoppel is applied where the other party, relying on the 
representation, changes its position to its detriment or suffers some 
prejudice.57 It has been explicitly recognised in Trade disputes. 
In the German Starch Case,^^ Benelux government complained that 
Germany had not acted on its promise to reduce its tariffs immediately on 
varieties of starch. Germany's promises were manifest in the form of 
general assurance made during the negotiations that their duties would be 
reduced as soon as possible and that Germany would commence 
negotiations of the tariffs in 1952. Detrimental reliance was evidenced by 
the Benelux government's unreciprocated tariffs concessions, given during 
the negotiations, which were based on the promise of future German 
tariffs reductions. The ruling was not determinative in the dispute as the 
Panel recommended that the parties find an acceptable resolution of the 
problem. 
57. Claims based on acquiescence and estopple were accepted in GATT 1947 arbitration 
award on Canada/EC Article XXVIII Rights (BATT BISD 375/80). 
58. (1950) BISD 35/77- German Import duties on Starch. EEC- Members Import Regimes 
for Banas, 1993. 
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Therefore, in what can be considered as obiter dicta, the Panel noted 
that the subsequent agreement by Germany to grant tariff concessions 
implied that Germany would have been stopped from refusing to provide 
the expected tariff concessions. 
Then there is 'abus de droit' (abuse of rights), which is rooted in the 
principles of good faith and equity .59 The basic purpose of this doctrine is 
to prohibit action which, while not contrary to the letter of law or 
agreement, deviates from their purpose and frustrates legitimate 
expectations relating to the exercise of the corresponding obligations. 
The doctrine was applied in trade context in the Ammonium Sulphate 
Case.^ In this case, Chile and Australia negotiated for mutual tariff 
concessions on ammonium sulphate fertilisers. Australia discontinued its 
system of subsidies for Chilean fertiliser that was in place at the time of 
negotiations. Chile complained that its expected benefits under the GATT 
1947 were impaired by the withdrawal. During negotiations, Chile's 
concession was reasonably based on the assumption that the subsidies 
would continue, as they had existed for years. Australia replied that it 
had no obligation under GATT 1947 to continue subsidising foreign 
production. 
The Panel conceded that the removal of a subsidy did not result in 
nullification or impairment of benefits. However, the situation at the time 
of negotiations was such that Chile relied on the subsidy of which the 
removal created an imbalance in trading relations. Chile was ruled to have 
59. A. Kiss, L; Abus de Droit en Droit International, (1953), Recueil des courts. 
60. The Australian Susidy on Ammonium Sulphate, 3 April, 1950, BISD 11/188. 
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a legitimate expectation of the subsidy not being revoked, basing their own 
concessions on the availability of the subsidy. 
The discussion carried out in this chapter makes it crystal clear that 
no dispute settlement system could operate without the help of the 
principles of customary International Law, which are rooted deeply not 
only in different Municipal Law systems the world over but are also firmly 
ingrained into the International Law system operative under the statute of 
International Court of Justice in particular and United Nations in general. 
Again the provisions of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 1969, 
particularly Articles 31 and 32 have influenced both Panel members and 
Appellate Body in determination of various trade disputes brought before 
them by member countries. 
So far as the applicability of doctrine of stare Decisis is concerned, it 
has no pervasive role to play in the dispute settlement process of World 
Trade Organisation. One reason for the weak position of this doctrine in 
dispute settlement process is that Article 59 of the Statute of International 
Court of Justice expressly negates its application in relation to its decisions. 
It is indeed, true that the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in 
resolution of international trade disputes cannot be applied given the 
present structure of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
Then there is doctrine of burden of proof and its application in the 
dispute settlement proceeding. The doctrine of burden of proof which is an 
evidentiary rule fundamental to all legal systems, has got clear and fine 
application in the dispute settlement mechanism of World Trade 
Organisation. In fact, the doctrine of burden of proof is so omnipresent 
that the Panel members and Appellate Body can't escape this basic 
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evidentiary rule and the same is evident in prominent cases mentioned in 
this chapter such as Shirt and Blouses dispute. Beef Hormones case and Korea 
Milk case. 
Expeditious disposal of cases is fundamental to the basic principle 
of natural justice ingrained in the concept of "Justice Delayed is Justice 
Denied". No judicial institution can ever escape from the concept of 
speedy trail or speedy disposal of disputes and dispute settlement 
mechanism of World Trade Organisation stands, no exception to 
this general principle of law. The concept of judicial economy in the 
dispute settlement system under the World Trade Organisation is the 
incorporation of speedy disposal in a different shape and size. Article 9 (1) 
of Dispute Settlement Understanding incorporates this principle in its own 
manner. 
Then there are certain other principles of International Law, which 
are often considered by the Panel, and Appellate Body while determining 
trade disputes amongst member countries. These principles are state 
responsibility, estopple and abuse de droit, which are firmly rooted in the 
concept of good faith and equity. 
It, therefore, becomes crystal clear from discussion carried out in 
this chapter that the principles of customary International Law have not 
only largely influenced the dispute settlement mechanism of World Trade 
Organisation but has also introduced more element of legalism in the 
functioning of Dispute Settlement Body jurisprudence. At the institutional 
level, the global community becomes more secure with the knowledge that 
an international dispute resolution regime can function in a mutually 
satisfactory, principled and efficient way. 
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IMPACT OF NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
Chapter-IV 
Prologue: The North-South system of relations refers to the international 
economic interaction among the developed market economies and 
developing economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The North-South 
system is one of disparity and inequality between the north and the south 
in gross-national product and per capita income. 
In fact, the major problem in north-south relations is the economic 
dependence of the south on the north. This dependence is manifested in 
many forms, trade being one of them. A majority of the southern countries 
earn a large percentage of their national income by means of trade with the 
countries of the north. Thus the countries of south are highly sensitive to 
both market and political factors, which shape the northern demand and 
hence influence its trade. 
There are many forms where the north-south issues are being 
discussed. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT/WTO) 
are two such prominent forums witnessing the north-south divide. WTO is 
preferred negotiating forum for the north and one which would allow the 
north to separate energy and other commodity issues. 
Although GATT, later renamed and reshaped as WTO, was created 
on the plea of equal status of contracting parties, the ugly shadow of north-
south controversy overshadowed the 'equality principle and equal 
bargaining powers' resulting into a lot of dissatisfaction among the poor 
south. Far greater dissatisfaction for the south was the gradual evolution of 
discriminatory attitude of Panels and Appellate body operating under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
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In this chapter the researcher initiate the discussion by explaining 
the position of developing countries under the erstwhile General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 which shows that the participation 
of developing countries was less then the expectations. Then an analysis 
of the participation of developing countries in the new WTO Dispute 
Settlement system is made with the help of tables and analysis thereof, and 
then discussion is made regarding the major problems faced by the 
developing countries during the course of proceedings before the Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
1. Position of Developing Countries in GATT Dispute 
Settlement, 1947 
Developing countries had relatively little recourse to GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism, 1947. There might have been several reasons for 
this but lack of trust in the system was by far the most important factor. 
It was so because the developing countries considered the GATT, 1947 
dispute settlement mechanism to be flawed, as it did not serve their 
interest.^ 
It may be noted here that at the time of formation of GATT, most of 
today's developing countries were under colonial rule and did not have 
the experienced personnel needed to deal with GATT 1947 matters or 
conduct disputes. Thus, the cost of bringing a dispute before GATT was 
high.2 
1. Rao, M.B. and Guru Manjula; WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2004, p. 10. 
2 . Ibid., p. 11. 
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Moreover, formation of par\els and Panel proceedings, were taking a 
long time and the impugned violations continued, no one was sure about 
the end result. Besides, any claim against a developed country could lead 
to a reduction of their benefits either under the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) or through any retaUatory action by the developed 
country. If the findings went against the developed country, it could 
effectively obstruct Panel proceedings in the interregnum and block 
eventual findings as well.^ 
A developing country complainant could not retaliate and there was 
no guarantee of any real success through litigation. Further, developing 
countries suffered from division amongst themselves because of 
underlying philosophies that they pursued a fact prevalent even today. 
Finally, because of their experience before attainment of 
independence, developing countries tried to be self reliant, closing off their 
economies to foreign trade interests. India is a prime example of a socialist 
philosophy discouraging foreign direct investment and import of 
technology, prior to the liberalisation of its economy in 1990-91. 
In 1950s, developing countries such as Pakistan, Cuba, Chile, Haiti 
and India actively used the nascent GATT dispute settlement mechanism 
to pursue their national interests. However, developing countries 
gradually lost interest in the system because in the eyes of the developing 
countries, it largely failed to deliver the desired results. This was amply 
demonstrated by the 1961 Uruguayan complaint, when Uruguay filed a 
3 . Kofi Otang Kufuor; "GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of 
the Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Dispute", Journal of World 
Trade, Vol. 31, October 1997, pp. 117-145. 
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case under GATT Article XXIII against fifteen developed coiintries, listing 
576 trade restrictive measures.^ 
While the Uruguayan Complaint might have been successful in 
highlighting what it considered to be commercial barriers, legal or 
otherwise, to developing countries exports, it failed to achieve any 
significant reduction in these barriers through its legal action. Robert 
Hudec concludes: "At the conclusion of the proceedings, Uruguay noted 
the removal of certain restrictions, but said that others have been added in 
the meanwhile and that consequently Uruguay's overall position was no 
better than before. The lesson to be drawn from the case, according to 
Uruguay, was that GATT law did not protect developing countries.^ 
The developing countries had less recourse to the GATT dispute 
settlement system after this turn of events, yet they still tried to improve 
the system in their favour by introducing formal changes to it. In 1985, 
Brazil and Uruguay tabled a proposal for amending Article XXIII of the 
GATT.6 Their proposal had the following four elements: 
1. The present arrangement for action under para 2 of Article XXIII 
should be elaborated in a way which would give developing 
countries invoking the Article option of employing certain additional 
measures; 
2. Where it has been established that measures complained have 
adversely affected the trade and economic prospects of developing 
countries and it has not been possible to eliminate the measure or 
4 . Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, BISD 11 / 95. 
5 . Hudec Robert Emil; Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Geneva, 1987, p 
49. 
6 . BISD 14 S/139. 
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obtain adequate commercial remedy, compensation in the form of an 
indemnity of a financial character would be in order; 
3. In case where the import capacity of a developing country has been 
impaired by the maintenance of measures by a developed country 
contrary to the provisions of the GATT, the developing country 
concerned shall be automatically released from its obligations under 
the General Agreement towards the developed country complained 
of pending examination of the matter in GATT; and 
4. In the event that a recommendation by the contracting parties to a 
developed country is not carried out within a given time limit, the 
contracting parties shall consider what collective action they would 
take to obtain compliance with their recommendations. 
The above mentioned proposal was not accepted by the contracting 
parties to GATT 1947. However, it led to a modest change in GATT 
dispute settlement procedure providing for a shorter time frame for 
complaints initiated by developing coimtries, known as the 1966 Decision, 
which is still in effect (DSU, Article 3.12) though rarely used. The 
developing countries remained disillusioned about the efficacy of the 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism.'' 
The 1965 efforts of Brazil and Uruguay did produce some fruitful 
results in the form of 1966 Decision on 'Procedures under Article XXIIT 
applying to disputes between a developing contracting party and a 
developed contracting party.^ 
7. Rao, M.B.; WTO and International Trade, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 2001, p. 69. 
8 . Rao, M.B. and Guru Manjula, op. cit., p. 04. 
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In fact, the 1966 Rules affirm the resolve to safeguard both the present 
and potential trade of Leased Developed Countries (LDC) contracting 
parties and provide that if there is no satisfactory settlement with regard to 
any matter falling under Article XXIII.l, the LDC complaining party may 
refer the matter to the Director General (DC) who shall use his good offices 
to facilitate a solution. 
If no satisfactory solution is found within a period of two months, the 
Director-General may bring the matter to the attention of contracting 
parties or the Council. The contracting parties may then appoint a penal of 
experts to recommend appropriate solution. Within sixty days, the Panel 
shall submit a report for consideration and decision and within ninety 
days thereafter, the contracting party to whom recommendations are 
directed, shall report the action taken thereon. If the party fails to comply 
with the recommendations, the contracting parties may authorise 
suspei\sion of any concession. 
However, the 1966 procedures were not put to extensive use by the 
developing countries, as, during the period 1968-78, the number of cases 
declined - perhaps, the developed countries felt that it was far better to 
resolve differences through negotiations. Later, the 1979 Rules recognised 
that developing countries should be given special attention during 
consultations. The Rules sought to create fears that if developing countries 
instituted complaints against the developed country members, it would 
result in hostile reactions by the latter.^ 
9. Id., p. 11. 
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The 1982,1984 and 1989 Decisions have further facilitated developing 
countries concerns in expeditious formation of Panels, findings of panels, 
third party interventions etc. and thereby avoid delay in dispute 
settlement. 
Brazil continued its activist role and made another attempt during the 
early phase of Uruguay round dispute settlement negotiations when it put 
forward formal proposals to give more favourable treatment to developing 
countries, arguing that their limited power of retaliation, as well as Part IV 
of the GATT and earlier decisions in their favour, required that they be 
provided with a "higher level of equality".^o The rationale behind the new 
Brazilian proposal was the same as its 1965 proposal, and again it was not 
accepted. 
2. Position of Developing Countries under the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism of WTO 
It is interesting to note that in the maze of the WTO Code 
(Agreements and Rules), there is no definition of a 'developing country'. 
There is however a sub-classification of a developing country and a least 
developed country. The United Nations definition of a least developed 
country has been adopted. Annexure VII to the 'Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures' inter alia provides for developing countries: 
(i) LDCs designated as such by the UN that are members of the WTO 
and 
(ii) Developing countries named therein (including India) whose GNP 
per capita has not reached $ 1000 per annum. 
10. Croome John; Reshaping the World Trade System, Geneva, 1995, p. 150. 
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Different transitional provisions are provided for certain purposes 
to developing countries and LDCs separately, with LDCs given larger 
transitional period." 
Further there is reference in the preamble to the Agreement 
establishing the WTO for the need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that the developing countries, and especially the least developed among 
them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development. 
In fact, the Dispute Settlement Understanding has established the 
following provisions related to differential treatment^^; 
(a) Invocation of the 1966 Rules under Article 3.12 DSU. 
(b) All members during consultations should give special attention to the 
particular problems and interests of the developing countries.^^ 
(c) The Peinels shall include at least one Panellist from a developing 
country.^4 
(d) Special time frames during consultations and sufficient time be given 
by the Panel to prepare and present its arguments.^^ 
(e) The Panel Report shall explicitly indicate the form in which the 
differential and more favourable treatment have been raised.^^ 
11 . Rao, M.B. and Guru Manjula; op.cit, p. 208. 
12 . Id., pp. 207-208. 
13. Article 4.10 of the DSU. 
14. Article 8.10 of the DSU. 
15. Article 12.10 of the DSU. 
16. Article 12.11 of the DSU. 
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(f) Particular attention to be paid to matters affecting the interests of 
developing countries with regard to surveillance of the DSB 
recommendations.^'' 
(g) DSB to consider what further action would be appropriate for matters 
raised by the developing country.^s 
(h) Impact on the economy of a developing country in a case brought by 
a developing country .^ ^ 
(i) Secretariat to provide additional legal advice and assistance to the 
member of developing country member.^o 
In fact, the above provisions look impressive and many of which 
find their echo even under GATT Rules, yet the question remains as to 
how far they have been implemented and benefit actually derived by the 
developing countries as a result of these special and differential rules. 
Developing countries from the beginning were placed in a no win 
situation. If they contest the developed countries actions, they bear the loss 
of the General system of preferences. Even if they succeed in a dispute 
settlement action, there is no way they can retaliate against the developed 
countries.2^ 
While the provisions in the DSU contain positive language for 
provisions of special and differential treatment in favour of developing 
17. Article 21.2 of the DSU. 
18. Article 21.7of the DSU. 
19. Article 21.8 of the DSU. 
20. Article 27.2 of the DSU. 
21. Jose Luis Perez GabUondo; "Developing Countries in the WTO, Dispute Settlement 
Procedures - Improving their Participation", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35(4), 489-15, 
2001, p. 487. 
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countries but it may be noted that there was uneasiness amongst the 
developing countries as to how far actual implementation thereof goes. 
If may be noted that much depends upon the credibility of the 
developed countries in seeking to give effect to the provisions, in the spirit 
they were written into the covered agreements and DSU. It is a matter of 
regret that promises had been at variance with actual practice. 
Another point that should be noted in this context is that some of the 
provisions requiring special and differential treatment are vague on the 
one hand and left to the Dispute Settlement Body to consider what further 
action is needed to be taken. For example, under Article 21.7, it is for the 
DSB to consider what further action it might take when a developing 
country member raises a matter relating to implementation. 
Similarly, Article 1.8 requires the Dispute Settlement Body to take into 
account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also 
their impact on the economy of the developing country concerned, when 
considering the appropriate action to be taken. 
These provisions are simple on paper and do not appear to have been 
put into use. As these Articles are not articulated in specific terms, there is 
no way to ensure that such treatment is accorded to developing countries, 
despite the prescriptive language of the use of the word "shall" therein.22 
Further, as these Articles require action by Dispute Settlement Body, 
there is no way they can be easily implemented, as it requires consensus of 
22. 'General comments with Respect to Dispute Settlement Understanding', cited in 
Secretariat Note 2000. 
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all the members. The 'lack of clarity' in the matter of implementation was 
voiced by India in its communication to the General Council.23 
It is, in fact, the general feeling that the system of dispute settlement 
should work more on the basis of objective assessment of the dispute 
rather than on the basis of subjective assessment. It is only then that the 
role of the DSB would be regarded as effective, efficient, and founded on 
the rule-based multilateral trading system. 
However the reports of the Panels or Appellate Body in many cases 
do not solve the problems. For example, in the US dispute regarding import 
prohibition of certain shrimp products (complaints of India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Thailand), the Appellate Body reversed the findings and held 
that the US action was within the scope of measures permitted under 
Article XX of GATT 1994, but concluded that the US measure, while 
qualifying the provisional justification under Article XX(g), failed to meet 
the requirement of Article XX. This finding of the DSB is not capable of a 
precise interpretation and, was alleged to have been given under US 
pressure.24 
In practice, in fact, the WTO dispute settlement with its larger 
emphasis on 'rule-oriented' mechanism has experienced two major 
problems during its actual operation from January 1995 to January 2009. 
One is in relation to disputes between parties of equal or almost equal 
23. 'Concerns Regarding Implementation of Provisions to Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment of Developing and Least Developed Countries in Various WTO 
Agreements', Communication from India to the General Council, WTO Document 
WT/GC/W/108 November, 1998. 
24. Asthana, B.N; "Working of Dispute Settlement in the WTO", Chartered Secretary 
January 2002, pp. 28-31. 
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strength. The second is in relation to weaker or poorer members of the 
organisation, especially the developing countries (DCs) and the economies 
in transition (ETs). 
Since the first problem is not relevant here, only the second one is 
taken for some detailed discussion. For the developing countries, the WTO 
dispute settlement system has worsened matters for them because of the 
following two reasons^S; 
Firstly, the developing countries can not afford the high cost of 
litigation. International Law Firms charge anything from US $ 250 to S 
1,000 per hour in fees for WTO cases. Unfortunately, only a few 
developing countries (DCs) and economies in transition (ETs) can afford 
the fees. The result is that while there are potentially hundreds of cases 
that they could bring to the WTO on non-implementation by the 
developed coimtries of their obligations to the dispute settlement system 
of WTO. Thus the rich get off the hook simply because the poor can not 
afford the cost of litigation. 
Secondly, the system has become more onerous and iniquitous for the 
weaker members of the WTO than imder GATT in the sense that they are 
now subject to a legalistic system to which they are a party and from 
which they can not escape. Under GATT, they could escape sanctions 
because of the laxity of its system. But now they are bound by the 
decisions of the WTO dispute settlement panels. If the system is unfair to 
them, they have no "escape route" because they are the signatories of the 
treaty. They have, therefore, become the authors of their own misery. 
25 . SEATINI bulletin; "WTO Dispute Settlement System and the Proposed Centre on WTO 
Law", Director's Comment, Vol. 2, No. 7. 
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Given that the dispute settlement is becoming increasingly legalistic, the 
WTO dispute settlement is becoming a milestone for them.26 
The above mentioned points including the low level participation by 
the developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement process may be 
better explained with the help of following tables which is based on certain 
data released by some of the institutes and by the WTO Secretariat: 
Table l^ 
Position of Developed Countries vis-^-vis Developing Countries in the 


























































































26. Chakarvarti Raghavan; "A Millstone for Developing World, a Milestone for US" 
[South-North Development Monitor (SUNS, 1999)]. 




Comparison of Participation by Developed Countries and Developing 
Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Process 
(DSP) upto ZS^ d June 2009 






















A careful analysis of Table I shows that the disputes brought before 
the Dispute Settlement Body of WTO by developing countries has been 
lesser as compared to the developed countries except for the years 2001, 
2002, 2005 and 2008. Another point which comes out from the analysis of 
Table I is that the participation of developing countries gradually 
increased from the year 1998. However, no clear line of participation could 
be ascertained on the basis of Table I. 
It is quite evident that more than 390 disputes were brought before 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of WTO by its member countries 
during last 15 years. On an average, more than 25 disputes were brought 
before the DSB annually by member countries which is a good number of 
participation showing satisfactory confidence of member countries in the 
DSB of WTO. 
In fact, the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has been in place since January 1, 1995. High hopes 
have been attached to the system, in particular with regard to the 
28. http://www.wto.org; based on chronological list of disputes cases posted on official 
website of WTO. 
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protection it has been expected to afford so the interests of the smaller 
member countries of the organisation.^^ For instance, according to the 
WTO's Director General, Renato Ruggiero: 
"the Dispute Settlement system is in many ways the central pillar of the 
multilateral trading system and the WTO's most individual contribution 
to the stability of the global economy. By reducing the scope for unilateral 
actions, it is also an important guarantee of fair trade for less powerful 
countries" .^ 
However, the data available seems to speak a different language. 
Developed countries have by far been the most active users of the DS 
system, with G-4 countries - Canada, European Union, Japan and U.S. 
accounting for over 60% of all complaints.^^ Three-quarters of the 
membership has not used the system at all since its inception, and in this 
group one finds most developing and all the least developed countries. 
The limited use of DS system by non-industrialised countiies has 
prompted a debate about whether the DS system is biased against smaller 
and poorer countries. One such reflection was the statement by the WTO 
Ambassador of Ecuador, who contrasted the way the EU was flouting its 
WTO obligations, the failure to implement the ruling in Banana dispute 
with the pressure being put on poorer nations to implement burdensome 
WTO agreements such as the one on protecting intellectual property. This 
discussion is part of the broader tensions between North and South within 
29. Henrik Horn, Petros C Mavroidis & Hakan Nordstrom; "Is the Use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System Biased"? Discussion Paper No. 2340, December 1999 Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London. 
30 . http://wto.org; WTO official website, May 1999 
31. Hudec, Robert (1999); "The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of 
the First Three Years, 1995-1998", Mimeograph, University of Minnesota. 
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the WTO, tensions that have come to the forefront in the preparations for a 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
From a formal point of view, the right to bring complaints is firmly 
laid down in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Moreover, 
while the rulings of the first legal instance - the panel inquiry - can be 
appealed, the review of the Appellate Body is the final word and can not 
be blocked by the respondent. Thus, it appears as if the issue is not so 
much whether there is unequal right to adjudication, as whether there are 
other impediments that hold back developing countries from using the 
system to root out illegal trade barriers that they may face. Several 
arguments to this effect have indeed been suggested.^2 For instance, it is 
commonly held that less developed countries lack the necessary legal 
resources to bring complaints to WTO. Another claim is that power based 
factors enter the litigation decision. For instance, small countries may be 
discouraged from bringing complaints if their prospects of enforcing 
rulings in their favour are bleak because of limited retaliatory power. Or, 
small developing countries may exercise self-constraint in picking their 
rights in order not to jeopardise privileges they depend on, for example, 
development aid and unilateral trade preferences. 
On the formal side of WTO, it makes decisions through consensus 
and a one country, one vote system. Yet actual decision making is done 
with a great deal of informality, and largely behind closed door between 
only about 25-30 members. The 'consensus' arrived at is then imposed on 
the rest of the members as a take-it or leave-it package. In such a system. 
32. Supra note 25, p. 1. 
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the majority of developing countries are reduced to damage control and 
scrabbling to secure negligible benefits. Most receive nothing, and silently 
acquiesce against their better judgement, condemning themselves to a 
system that has so far proved highly unbalanced and detrimental to their 
interests. They do this to avoid, the political and economic repercussions 
of displeasing the powerful members.33 
The result is, indeed, highly inequitable trade rules that favour the 
interests of the powerful. The poor and weak are going to the wall. 
And precisely because of the WTO and its rules. The marginalization of the 
majority is a serious concern since the WTO's 23 agreements have 
sweeping social, economic and political implications on all its members.34 
Developing country negotiators are the ones that bear testimony to the 
decision-making and process problems at the heart of the trading system. 
Ambassador Nathan Irumba, Representative of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDC) at the WTO says -
"We are simply asking for fair and equitable rules that would take into 
account our development needs and allow us to participate fully in the 
trade system. But instead we risk being pressurised once again into 
accepting rules we don't need and can not afford". 
The marginalization of south in the WTO is a serious concern. 
The WTO now wields executive power over 23 separate agreements, from 
trade related measures (TRIMS), to intellectual property rights, agriculture 
and industrial goods. The Fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha in 
November 2001 put more agreements on the table. Member states are 
33. http://www.focusweb.org; Aileen Kwa; "Power and Politics in the WTO" Austrahan 




required to change their national laws to ensure compliance with WTO 
agreements. Non-compliance can result in a country being hauled before 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
It would not be out of place here to mention the disputes relating to 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural and industrial products by Indians 
where US followed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland and 
EC complained against quantitative restrictions on several agricultural and 
industrial products as inconsistent with India's obligations under Article 
XI:1, XVII:II of the GATT 1994 read with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and Article 3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. India referred to its balance of payments situation and one of 
its contentions was that in view of the existence of a principle of 
institutional balance that envisages Panels to refrain from reviewing the 
justification of balance of payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B, the 
Panel rejected India's contention and ruled that it is within its competence 
imder DSU to go into the question. It may be added that IMF reviews the 
balance of payments position of each member. 
According to a Ld Commentator, in their reports, both the Panel and 
the Appellate Body subjected the justification of balance of payments 
issues to a hard law analysis which has led some developing country 
members and a commentator^^ to question the merits of making 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality justiciable within the 
35 . WT/DS90, WT/DS91, WT/DS92, WT/DS93, WT/DS94. 
36. Qureshi, A.H.; "Challenging Quantitative Restrictions for Balance of Payments under 
WTO", International Trade Law Reporter, pp. 28,31. 
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context of the WTO framework whereas it would not normally be 
considered justifiable within the IMF apparatus .^ ^ 
It is submitted that there is a need to demonstrate the jurisdictional 
coverage when different evaluative bodies exercise their jurisdiction. In 
relation to customs unions, balance of payments measures and textile 
issues, there are specialist committees given some authoritative power. 
The question is whether Panels or the Appellate Body are really more 
competent to go into technical issues when they are not properly manned 
to do so. However in the above case, both Panel and the Appellate Body 
found that such committees should not be given exclusive jurisdiction so 
as to exclude the dispute settlement process. This question raises issues as 
to the status of provisions and adjudicatory bodies outside the WTO 
framework. 
But in another case called Brail Aircraft^^ which was related to SCM 
Agreement, Brazil contended that Canada, the complainant, bears the 
burden of proof in showing, pursuant to Article 27.43^ that Brazil had 
increased its level of subsidies and in trying to shift the burden of proof on 
it, Canada is attempting to negate the special and differential treatment 
provisions for which Brazil and other developing countries specifically 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round. Brail also contended that special 
and differential treatment provision of Article 27 of the SCM reflected a 
37. Mary E. Footer; "Developing Country Practice in the matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 35(1), 2001, pp. 84-85. 
38. WT/DS46/R. 
39. Article 27.4 of DSU, Working Procedures states that "before the first substantive 
meeting of the Panel witti the parties, the parties to the dispute shall transmit to the 




balance of rights and obligations. The Panel found that Brazil failed to 
comply with certain conditions in Article 27.4 of that Agreement relating 
to the phasing out of its export subsidies. While doing so, the Panel ruled 
that Canada bore the burden of proof that Brazil violated Article 27.4 of the 
Agreement. The Appellate Body, in appeal, upheld the Overall conclusions 
of the Panel including the recognition that Article 27 is intended to provide 
special and differential treatment for developing country members. 
Another point that should be noted in this context is some of the 
-provisions requiring special and differential treatment are vague on the 
one hand and left to the DSB to consider what further action need to be 
taken. For example, under Article 21.7, it is for the DSB to consider what 
further action it might take when a developing country member raises a 
matter relating to implementation. Similarly, Article 21.8 requires the DSB 
to take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained 
of, but also their impact on the economy of the developing country 
concerned, when considering the appropriate action to be taken. These 
provisions are simple on paper and do not appear to have been put into 
use. As these articles are not articulated in specific terms, there is no way 
to ensure that such treatment is accorded to developing countries, despite 
the prescriptive language of the use of the word 'shall' therein.^o Further, 
as these articles require action by DSB, there is no way they can be easily 
implemented, as it requires consensus of all the members. The Tack of 
40. General comments with Respect to Dispute Settlement Understanding cited in 
Secretariat Note 2000. 
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clarity' in the matter of implementation was voiced by India in its 
communication to the General Council.'*^ 
In the Lis dispute regarding import prohibition of certain shrimp products 
(complaints of India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand), the Appellate 
Body reversed the findings and held that the U.S. action was within the 
scope of measures permitted under Article XX of GATT 1994, but 
concluded that the US measure, while qualifying for provisional 
justification under Article XX(g), failed to meet the requirement of Article 
XX. This finding of the DSB is not capable if a precise interpretation and, 
was alleged to have been given under U.S. pressure.^^ 
3. Settlement of Disputes and the Problems of Developing 
Countries 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) has been the flagship 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), proclaimed as the most 
important pillar of the 'rules based' WTO system. The developing 
countries, in particular, had expected that the new dispute settlement 
process would help the weaker trading partners in enforcing the rights and 
obligations under various WTO Agreements. 
In fact, the supposed benefits of such an effective dispute settlement 
system were one of the main persuasive factors for several developing 
countries to agree to the Uruguay Round agreement. Though the DSU has 
brought about some degree of predictability and efficiency in the 
41 . Concerns Regarding Implementation of Provisions of Differential and More Favourable 
treatment of Developing and Least Developed Countries in Various WTO Agreements, 
Communication from India to the General Council, WTO Document WT/GC/W/108, 
13 November, 1998. 
42. Asthana, B.N.; "Working of Dispute Settlement in the WTO" Chartered Secretary, 
January 2002, pp. 28-31. 
174 
Chapter-IV 
resolution of disputes, the utility of the system in actual operation has 
fallen far short of the initial expectations and euphoria. Furthermore, in 
some respects, it has operated against the interests of the developing 
countries. 
The major problems'*^ faced by the developing countries in the 
process of dispute settlement imder the WTO may be enumerated as 
under: 
1. The Dispute Settlement process is very costly for developing 
countries. Most of the time, they have to call upon the assistance of 
law firms of major developed countries, which charge heavy fees. 
Given the extreme technicalities of each case and the some of 
jurisprudence that have accumulated over the years, specialised legal 
knowledge is essential for effective participation.'*^ However, 
indigenous legal expertise on the WTO is scarce, and the costs of 
hiring private lawyers are prohibitatively high. Shaffer, for instance, 
records that even for a relatively small case; a law firm cited a fee of £ 
200,000 for representing a developing country until the panel stage. In 
high profile cases, such as Kodak versus Fuji of Japan Photographic 
film case, lawyers charged each of the clients a sum of over $ 10 
million. It is difficult, if not impossible, for developing countries to 
produce comparable financial resources.'^^ Yhe developing countries 
43. C. Raghavan; "The World Trade Organisation and its Dispute Settlement System", 
Tilting the balance against the South (South-North Development Monitor, Trade and 
Development Series No. 9). 
44. Narhkar Amrita; The World Trade Organisation - A Very Short Introduction 2005, 




are, and would therefore be, not as prompt and willing to initiate the 
dispute settlement process for exercise of their rights, as would a 
developed country. Hence there is a basic imbalance in the rights and 
obligations between a developing country and a developed country, 
because of a vast differential between the capacities of these two sets 
of countries to invoke the enforcement process. 
2. The relief granted by the system is generally very much delayed; as it 
may take up to about 30 months from the time the dispute settlement 
process was started.- And this delay is quite detrimental to the 
interests of developing countries. With weak trade linkages in their 
external economy; they are likely to suffer irreparable damage by the 
time they get full remedy. And in really difficult cases, the only 
remedy they get is in the form of permission to retaliate agair\st the 
erring country. Obviously, such a remedy is impracticable, because a 
developing country will naturally hesitate to take retaliatory action 
agaiiist a developed country in view of the economic and political 
costs involved.46 
3. When developing countries do get involved in certain cases that are 
of critical and unavoidable importance to them, they enter the dispute 
settlement process as 'one off, players rather than 'repeat players'. 
These one off initiatives, Shaffer points out, tend to be financed by 
industry or developed countries and usually address the particular 
cases rather than the long term, systemic interests of the country. 
Herein also lies a vicious circle; lack of participation on a sustained 
46 . Supra Note 38, p. 6. 
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basis and without an eye on systemic concerns renders the cost of 
one-off participation even higher, increasing thereby the reluctance of 
developing countries to bring their grievances to the DSB. 
4. Given the member driven character of the WTO, the onus of 
presenting a case lies on members themselves. This is difficult, not 
only in terms of the costs involved and locking in of resources until a 
ruling is made, but also the risk that the stronger party might decide 
to retaliate against the weaker complainant through imilateral 
punitive actions outside the WTO. Few developing countries can 
afford to take on such a risk. 
5. The various provisions regarding 'special and differential treatment' 
in DSU have not been implemented with equal effectiveness. The 
implementation of certain provisions has not been effective due either 
to the fact that such provisions are of a declaratory nature and have 
no implementation modalities or to the fact that developing countries 
have failed to use them. 'Special and differential treatment' had been 
provided in order to facilitate equal participation by developing 
countries in the dispute settlement process. In spite of the 
improvement in the recent past, participation by developing countries 
in dispute settlement is still far from being equal to that of the 
developed countries.^'' 
6. Even in those instances wherein developing countries decide to 
launch a complaint and win, enforcement of the rulings of the WTO 
relies on trade retaliation rather than monetary compensation. Small, 
47 . Supra Note 38, p. 6. 
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developing economies seldom have the means to enforce compliance 
through trade sanctions due to their smaller shares in world trade. To 
take a hypothetical example, assume that weak country A were to win 
a case against a QUAD country B, and were allowed to impose higher 
tariffs on certain sectors of imports from coiu\try B. But such tariffs 
would scarcely make a dent on country B's economy, given that the 
market of country A might incur large costs, especially if it is the 
primary supplier of a particular product. Knowledge of the costs of 
retaliation would make country A reluctant to file a dispute in the 
WTO, even if it would be very likely to win; rather, it would prefer to 
settle the matter outside the institution. This reluctcince of the weaker 
countries is borne out empirically: no LDC has been involved as 
either a complainant or a defendant in a dispute to the date.*^ 
It is the general feeling that the system of dispute settlement should 
work more on the basis of objective assessment of the dispute rather than 
on the basis of subjective assessment. It is only then that the role of the 
Dispute Settlement Body would be regarded as effective, efficient, and 
foimded on the rule based multilateral trading system.'*^ 
As a result of these imbalances within the dispute settlement 
system, important in terms of individual cases but also because of the 
long-term implications of particular rulings on WTO jurisprudence, some 
steps have been taken. An important step is the establishment of WTO 
Advisory centre on WTO law, which has been set up precisely to provide 
affordable advice to developing countries. In addition to this several 
48 . Supra Note, 39, p. 97. 
49. Supra Note 15, p. 218. 
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proposals for reforms have been put forward. The agenda for re-examining 
the dispute settlement process formed part of the Doha Development 
Agenda Reform proposals have shown a divide between developed and 
developing countries. Developing countries have, in general, called for 
longer time periods. Consultations in the capitals of Leased Developed 
Countries to cut costs of travel to Geneva, greater role for WTO Advisory 
centre, and the right of collective retaliation and trade compensation. 
Developed countries, on the other hand, have shown a preference for 
shorter time periods, greater public access, stronger surveillance 
mechanisms, and weaker retaliation process. The debates, however, have 
shown little sign of resolution so far. This is partly because there is little 
agreement in the research or policy communities on what prompts 
compliance in the first place. While some scholars have emphasised the 
importance of retaliation or at least the credible threat of retaliation, others 
have pointed out that compliance with any norms or rules in international 
institutions is a product of socialization, learning and reputation. In the 
meantime, the agenda of the WTO and the reach of its dispute settlement 
mechanism continue to expand in several inchoate directions. 
It is unequivocally clear that the Agreements or Understandings or 
Rules contain numerous gaps and ambiguities, lacunae and even 
contradictory language are the result of basic policy differences. The 
language is used in such cases to overcome basic policy differences. The 
two major trading entities in the field, the US and the EU had fought and 
taken advantage of the lacunae in the Rules the Beef Hormones case and the 
FSC cases. The EU even went to the extent of paying damages in two cases 
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- Bananas case and Beef Hormones case by refusing to abide by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body rulings. Fundamentally, the issues in these cases 
stem from differing national approaches and the need to pay to the gallery 
before the national lobbies. 
Of course the Panels and the Appellate Body were faced with 
situations where rules are ambiguous or are forced to fill in the lacunae. In 
several cases they were forced to deal with complex substantive cases for 
which, according to observers, they were not fully qualified or even 
competent. But then DSU can not be amended easily, political will is 
necessary. The post Doha meetings do not permit the drawing of positive 





Prologue: The efficiency and effectiveness of any Organisation depends 
upon the strength and weakness of its judicial or adjudicatory wing. Since 
Dispute Settlement Body is the Adjudicatory branch of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), its attitude towards developing countries by way of 
rulings in different dispute settlements is to be considered in this chapter. 
There is not an iota of doubt that Dispute Settlement Process (DSP) 
of World Trade Organisation has worker more successfully during last one 
and half decades than any other dispute resolution system in the history of 
international dispute resolution. Most of the commentators agree that the 
WTO's Dispute Settlement Process (DSP) has recorded an unforgettable 
success in various fields. Statistics may also prove such success, as until 
June 2009, 395 disputes in 228 different subject matters from 47 distinct 
WTO members have been brought under the system, which shows how 
confident they are about the system. 
Notwithstanding the success of Dispute Settlement mechanism of 
WTO, the system has numerous shortcomings. Most observers have 
emphasised the fact that the various GATT reforms were intended to help 
developing countries to insulate them from 'power politics' of the system. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) introduces greater 
'legalism's and provides a more 'rules-oriented' system relative 
to the 'power-oriented' one of the GATT. Although such system should 
encourage more participation by developing countries and establish 
harmonised and equitable relationships between member states, the 




Principles of natural justice require that all judicial. Quasi-judicial 
and adjudicatory bodies must be free from all kinds of biases. Presence of 
bias in any institutional mechanism eats away its strength and gradually 
makes the institution Vulnerable. Unfortunately, there are many instances 
showing same kind of bias on the part of Panel members or Appellate 
Body members in cases involving developing countries, which is not a 
healthy sign for the Dispute Settlement System of World Trade 
Organisation. 
In fact, a number of cases involving developing countries are 
discussed in the present chapter so as to point out bias in the dispute 
resolution. An analysis of rulings in different disputes is made to point out 
the role played by multi-national grants like Chiquita and Noboa so as to 
show how they have influenced United States to more in a particular 
direction which is ultimately favourable to such big corporations. 
1. Attitude of Panellists towards Developing Countries 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides an enforcement 
mechanism, with the aim of guarantee that the WTO members follow the 
trade rules agreed upon. Since 1995 numerous cases, in which 
industrialised and developing countries have presented their cases to 
protect their respective interest, have been treated by the DSU.^  
Even though the developing countries have initiated a considerable 
number of cases in DSU, the question remains whether the system is 
1. Pilav Zejan and Frank L. Barteles; "B. Nice and Get Your Money, An Empirical 
Analysis of world Trade Dispute and Aids", Journal of World Trade, 40 (6): pp. 1021-
1047, (2006), Kluwer Law International. 
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working efficiently. The fact that the poor countries seem to have great 
difficulty getting industrialised countries to implement the ruling of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) when these are in favour of former, 
suggest that the system is not working well. Due to their limited market 
power, developing countries find themselves in a weak position in a WTO 
dispute relative to industrialised member; this asymmetry plays a crucial 
role in the outcomes of the implementation of policies in the multilateral 
trading system. 
In fact/ that the actual position of the developing countries 
vis-cl-vis developed coimtries in dispute settlement cannot be properly 
discussed unless and until some important cases involving, the developing 
countries as either complainants or respondents are mentioned. 
Initially, one of the first cases that came up for interpretation of 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements in which 
the complainants were US & EC against India.2 Since this case involved 
one of the covered Agreements (TRIPS Agreements) Article 3.2 of the DSU 
becomes relevant here because it provides that the existing provisions of 
the covered agreement be interpreted in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. Articles 31 & 32 of the Vienna 
Convention are the relevant provisions in this context. Article 31.1 
provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty and in the lights of its 




The Panel in above case has observed that in good faith 
interpretation required the protection of 'legitimate expectations' derived 
from the protection of TRIPS provided for in the agreement. In doing so, 
the Panel took into consideration the earlier Panel views in US restrictions 
on the imports of cotton and men made fibre undenvear} Another member 
taking improper recourse should not frustrate that legitimate expectation 
on market access. The Panel also referred to the Appellate Body decision in 
the Japan Alcoholic Beverages case^ that adopted Panel reports create 
legitimate expectations among WTO members and therefore should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. The Panel also 
referred to other decisions under GATT and observed that the protection 
of legitimate expectations of members regarding the competition is a well-
established GATT principle and is central to creating security and 
predictability in multilateral trading system.^ 
On this interpretation, the Appellate Body, in appeal, disagreed, 
while acknowledging that in Japan Alcoholic Beverages case^, it held that 
adopted Panel reports are an important part of the GATT regime. But went 
on to hold that the protection of the expectations of the contracting parties 
as to the competitive relationship between products, is developed in the 
context of non violation complaints under Article XXIII(l)(b) to the GATT, 
after the Panel found a prime facie case of nullification or impairment and a 
3. WT\DS24/R/ post on official website of WTO-HTTP:// www.wto.org 
4. WT/DS8/AB/R 
5. Rao M.B. and Guru Manjula; WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, Lexis 




violation thereof, e.g.. Article IIP or Article XP. However under Article 
XXIII(l)(b), a member can bring a 'non violation' complaint when the 
negotiated balance of concessions between members is upset by the 
application of measure, whether or not the measure is consistent with the 
provisior\s of covered agreement. Referring to the provisions of Article 
64.2^ of TRIPS, the Appellate Body observed that the Panel's invocation of 
the 'legitimate expectations' of members relating to conditions of 
competition needs the legally distinct basis for 'violation' and 'non-
violation' complaints under Article XXIII of GATT 1994 into one uniform 
cause of action which is not consistent with either Article XXIII of GATT or 
Article 64 of the TRIPS. 
As this case involves a violation complaint, the Appellate Body 
ruled that the invocation of the doctrine of protection of 'legitimate 
expectations' developed in the context of non-violation complaints 
brought under Article XXIII(l)(b), would not be applicable. 
The Appellate Body observed that the Panel misunderstood the 
concept of 'legitimate expectations' in the context of customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law, that the 'legitimate 
expectations' of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the 
7. Article III.l of the DSU states that 'members affirm there adherence to the principles for 
the management of disputes heretofore applied under Article XXII and XXIII of GATT 
1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein'. 
8. Article XI of the DSU states that 'the function of Panels is to assist DSB in discharging its 
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly a 
Panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case an the applicability of and conformity with the relevant 
covered agreements, and makes such other findings as will assist the DSB in making 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels 
should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate 
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution'. 
9. Article 64.2 of TRIPS Agreement provides that Article XXIII(l) (b) and (1) (c) shall not 
apply for a period of five years. 
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treaty itself. Moreover, the 'condition of competition' argument taken from 
the GATT jurisprudence apphed only to 'non-violation' complaint. 
In this connection, it is submitted that the Appellate Body reading to 
'legitimate expectations' in the context of non-violation complaints seems 
to ignore the type of cases, that were considered under GATT law, that in 
such case the most important criteria of all is a connection between tariff 
concessions and an expectation there from. 
The next important case, which needs to be mentioned here relates 
to the countervailing duty in Argentina Foot Wear Safeguard^'^ and Korea 
Dairy safeguard}^ In these cases, the Appellate Body interpreted 
'unforeseen development' as developments which leads to products being 
imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers which 
must have been unexpected. 
The Appellate Body laid down that unexpected circumstance must 
be demonstrated. The competent authority report must give a finding on 
this. The Appellate Body ruled in these cases that the expression 'as a 
result of unforeseen development in the first clause in Article XlX.l(a) 
must be demonstrated before the safeguard measure is applied as such, the 
USITC report must contain a 'finding' or 'reasoned conclusion', 'on 
unforeseen development'. The Appellate Body held that the USITC report 
in that case does not contain any indication on the issue of unforeseen 
development. 
10. AB1998-1,27 March 1998, adopted 2 April 1998. 
11. WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 25 Sept. 1997. 
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Then there is much talked about EC Bananas case^^ in which the time 
limits were not adhered to. This case illustrates how in a complaint even 
eventual success in a dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
has become meaning less for developing countries, when the parties on the 
other side are powerful and developed countries. The former European 
colonies in the Caribbean/Latin America and the poor farmers are not 
really the beneficiaries in this long drawn out battle. Even though the US 
sided with these former colonies in the battle against the EC, it is the big 
marketing companies like Chiquita of U.S.A. and Noboa of Ecuadour, who 
will be ultimate beneficiaries, by virtue of licences to export bananas to 
Europe. 
In the first Bananas case, Columbia, Costarica, Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Venezuela brought dispute under GATT procedure against the 
EC over its bananas regime." The peculiarity in this case is that the 
complaint invoked the good offices of the GATT Director- General to 
pursue informal concentration in their dispute, subject to the consultations 
provisions of Article XXII.I of the GATT. Eventually, the consultation 
process failed and the first Panel on Bananas was established.^^ 
Then there was Bananas 11 in which the complaint was made by 
Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the U.S. The complainant 
alleged that the EC's regime for implementation, sale and distribution of 
bananas is inconsistent with the GATT Article I, II, III, X, XI and XIII as 
well as provisions of Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on 
12. WT/DS27/AB/R. 
13 . WT/ DS32/R., 3'^ June 1993, Unadopted. 
14 . Rao M.B. and Guru Manjula, op cit,pl98. 
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Agriculture, the Trade Related Investment Majors (TRIMS), and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The Panel, v^hich was composed on 7 June 1996, found that the EC's 
banana regime, and the licensing procedures for the importation of 
bananas in this regime, is inconsistent with the GATT Article XIII, but not 
incoiisistent arising from the licensing system. On appeal by the EC, the 
Appellate Body mostly upheld the Panel's findings, but reversed the 
Panel's findings that the Lone Waire waives the inconsistency with the 
GATT Article XIII and the certain aspect of the licensing regime violated 
Article X of the GATT and the Import Licensing Agreement. 
The Dispute Settlement Body on 25'*^  September 1997 adopted the 
Appellate Body report. The EC on 15* December 1998 requested the 
establishment to determine that its implementation of the above DSB 
decisions is in order. On 18* December 1998, Equador requested the 
reestablishment of the original Panel (Bananas III) to examine whether the 
EC measures pursuant to the DSB decision are consistent with WTO. Both 
the requests were then referred to compliance panels on 18* Jan. 1999. The 
Penal requested by Equador, under Article 21.5, found that the EC had not 
fully complied with the above DSB decisions. The DSB adopted the above 
compliance report on 6* May 1999. 
In fact, a critical analysis of the Bananas case shows that Chiquita, the 
U.S. exporting agency which export bananas after buying bananas cheap 
from poor farmers in Africa or Latin America and reap huge profit selling 
them in European markets. 
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The United States, indeed, acted at the behest of Chiquita Brand 
International. At one stage in the dispute, Chiquita sued the EC for $ 525 
million as damages; it claimed to have suffered as a result of the EU import 
restrictions. This case brings forth into prominence the lobbying power 
held by the intermediates involved in the export of bananas to the EU. The 
United States has not acted in its national interest, as it does not produce 
bananas rather it simply acted at the behest of Chiquita. 
This case also reveals that in spite of sanctions authorized by DSB, 
Equador had ultimately to sign an unfavourable agreement, because of its 
status as a small developing country; because it ultimately turns out that it 
is Equador, which will be the ultimate loser because European markets are 
vital for Equador's Exporters. 
In fact, sanctions have little chance of bringing about the desired 
change in trade policy. This imbalance means that winning disputes before 
the Dispute Settlement Body can be meaningless for developing countries, 
leaving them unable to defend their trade rights.i^ 
The systemic issues concerning the relationship of Article 21.5 and 
22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) need to be resolved 
expeditiously and the general council as well as the DSB should address 
this as a priority issue. 
This procedural wrangling regarding implementation of DSB 
recommendations in the Bananas case is due to an ambiguity in the DSU 
which has been exploited by the two major trading powers-the United 
15 . Pradeep S. Mehta, Pranav Kumar and Olivia Gensen; "Who own the Banana Dispute," 
Financial Express, 26 May 2001, p. 7. 
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States and the European Union. While Article 21.5 provides for recovering 
of the original Panel to determining, the conformity of the measure 
adopted by the losing party with the DSB recommendations and Article 
22.6 allows the complainant to seek authorization for retaliation, which 
can't be denied by the DSB. 
Moreover, the losing party unrest seeks this authorization within a 
period of 30 days after the adoption of measures. There is no link or order 
established in the DSU in respect of these two provisions? At a more 
fundamental level, the DSU is not very clear as to when, how and by 
whom the conformity of measures adopted by the losing party with the 
DSB recommendation is to be decided.^^ 
The saga of Bananas III, without a prejudice to its outcome, has 
raised some important questions for the consideration of developing 
countries, which are as under: 
(i) Is there a need to define clearly, which WTO members have the 
right to bring the dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body? It is a 
fact that the United States is not a major exporter of banana. 
Admittedly, the U.S. is defending the rights of its multinational 
companies engaged in the production of bananas in Latin American 
countries and their export to the EC. But allowing the U.S. to bring 
this case also opens the door for disputes in future that are filed not 
in the defence of countries own export but in order to open market 
for the export of its multinational corporations, no matter where 
these have been produced. 
16. B.L. Das; "WTO Defective Dispute Settlement," The Hindu, 1999, p. 15 
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(ii) Who has the right to decide whether the measures adopted by the 
losing party are in conformity with the DSB recommendations? 
If this is the right of complainant, as the U.S. seems to employ, this 
may lead to retaliation against developing coimtries even when 
they claim to have complied with the DSB recommendations. 
(iii) Is retaliation really an option for developing countries? All the 
co-complaints in Banana dispute were developing countries. 
Nevertheless, no matter how frustrated they feel with the EC 
implementation of DSB recommendations, no one of them have opted for 
retaliation like the U.S. The fact is that hardly any developing country can 
afford to seek, or effectively employ, retaliation against major developed 
countries. Retaliation is an instrument in the multilateral trading system 
that is more likely to be used against them than by them. 
Another important case involving developing countries on one side 
and the developed EC and Japan on the other side is Indonesia certain 
measure Affecting Automobile Industry^'^, which concerns Indonesia's 
national car programme. The facts are that under Presidential Decree 
issued in Feb. 1996 only one company was designated( a pioneer 
company) and the national cars manufactured by this company only were 
made eligible for special fax breaks imder certain requirement including 
the local content requirement. 
The complaining parties alleged that the measures in question were 
in violation of the WTO rules. A single Panel was established in June 1997 
17. http://www.wto.org; WT/DS54/R., adopted on 23 July 1998 posted on official WTO 
website 
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to hear all such complaints. The Panel report, which was circulated in July 
1998, found that the contested measure was in violation of Indonesia's 
obligations under GATT Articles 1,111:2,111:4 and Article X:3A as well as 
Article 2 of the TRIM agreements and Article 5-C of the SCM agreements. 
While the Panel procedure going on, due to the changed economic 
environment in Asia, Indonesia's economy slid into a critical condition, 
necessitating emergency assistant from the International Monitory Fund. 
As a part of the deal with the IMF, the Indonesian Government announced 
the termination of national cars programme. In the light of these 
developments, Indonesia did not appeal the Panel's finding, and Dispute 
Settlement Body adopted the Panel report in July 1998. 
The next case in the list is EC Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton yam from Brazil^^, where the Panel noted that the 
application of Anti-Dumping measures would affect the essential interests 
of developing countries, the obligation that arose then was to explore the 
possibilities of constructive remedies. 
It was clear from the word 'possibilities' and 'explored' that the 
investigating authorities were not required to adopt constructive remedies 
merely because they were proposed. It does, however, impose an 
obhgation to actively consider, with an open mind possibility of such 
remedy prior to imposition of Anti-Dumping measure that would affect 
the essential interest of developing countries. The Panel's interpretation of 
the second sentence of Article XV tantamount to an obligation practically 
of means and not of a result.^^ 
18 . ADP/137, adopted 30th Oct. 1995, para 584. 
19 . Rao M.B and Guru Manjula, op cit,p210. 
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Besides the cases discussed above in some detail, there are a number 
of other cases, which highlight the actual operation of Dispute Settlement 
process under the WTO and the transgression made by the Panel and 
Appellate Body in the course of its proceedings. Mr. Chakarvari Raghvan 
has amply brought out the facts that the Panel/Appeal findings have been 
tilting the balance of rights and obligations in the WTO through 
substantive interpretation.20 His analysis of the issue suggests urgency in 
bringing about improvements in the Dispute Settlement system so as to 
make it equitable. 
In fact, a critical analysis of the findings of the Panels and Appellate 
Body in various cases discussed above shows that the Penal/Appellate 
Body often engage in substantial interpretation of the provisions of WTO 
Agreements which is not the function of Panel/Appellate Body because 
such a function belongs to General Council. By co-incidence or otherwise, 
it has so happened that in a large number of cases these interpretations 
have enhanced the obligations which are mostly of those of the developing 
countries and enhance the rights which are mostly exercised by the 
developed countries. In some cases, the Panel and Appellate Body have 
gone to the extent of adjudicating as between two cor\flicting provisions of 
agreements. The Panel/Appellate Body has not even hesitated in 
pronouncing which one should be operative in preference to the other.21 
One important case in point is the Indonesia Car Subsidy case. 
Another strange ruling is the U.S. section 301 case where the Panel found 
20 . C. Raghvan; "The world Trade Organisation and its Dispute Settlement System: Tilting 
the Balance against the South', http//:www.twn.in (Trade and Development Series 
No. 9). 
21. Supra note 3. 
193 
Chapter -V 
that this provision of the US trade law was not in accordance with the 
WTO agreement. Yet it did not suggest any corrective measures because it 
took note of the fact that the U.S. administration had given an undertaking 
that it would not use this provision of law in contravention of obligations 
under the WTO. 
Ironically enough, the Panel either failed to consider or intentionally 
disabled it from considering Article XVI.4 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
which clearly lays down that each member shall ensure the conformity of 
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as 
provided in the annexed agreements. 
The above ruling raises a number of questions regarding the actual 
working of the Panels and Appellate Body. Why did Panel give such 
relaxations to one of the disputants? Why did Panel fail to consider Article 
XVI of the Marrakesh Agreement? Was there some external pressure over 
the Panel? Were the Panel members sympathetic to US? If so, why does 
basic principle of justice allow differential treatment between the strong 
and the weak? If not, why was such flexibility adopted by the Panel in 
adjudicatory process? 
In fact, explanation for the desperate participation of WTO member 
countries in WTO's dispute settlement process remains incomplete. 
The literature has not fully explored whether state's domestic petitioning 
mechanism such as the US section 301 or Europe Trade Barrier Regulation 
(TBR), contribute to state's frequency of participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement process.22 
22 . Thomas W. Walsh; "Dispute Settlement at the World Trade Organisation: Do Municipal 
Laws Promoting Private Party Identification of Trade Disputes affect State 
Participation", JWT, 40(5), (2006).Kluwer Law International, p. 889. 
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The records of the EC's and the United States appear to suggest that 
the accessibility of state's petitioning system contribute to the state's 
participation in the DSB. These two nations have the only long standing 
formal procedure for the identification of claim by private party and they 
are the first and second most frequent complainant before DSB, accounting 
for about fifty per cent complaints brought pursuant to the DSB. 
A careful analysis of dispute settlement mechanism of WTO shows 
the problem with regard to compliance and the same, therefore, remains a 
debatable issue. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism envisaged a 
reasonable period of time for the respondent to have an opportunity for 
compliance.23 If at the end of that period there is disagreement as to the 
effective compliance with the Panel or Appellate Body reports, the 
complainant can request a new Panel to verify compliance. 
It is beyond doubt clear that the bargaining power is at work in 
shaping north south free trade agreements in favour of the larger northern 
countries. Bargaining power also remains in play in dispute resolution 
context between a strong and a weak state. Whether states pursue a trade 
dispute in the WTO using the DSU or whether they use procedure 
available to them under a bilateral agreement, the dispute remains a 
bilateral dispute. In either case, the superior bargaining power of strong 
state also remains. If an African country decided to bring a WTO action 
against the United States, arguing that the United States improperly 
subsidizes its cotton producers, the United States could threaten to 
23 . Fernando Pierola and Gary Horlick; "WTO Dispute Settlement and Dispute Settlement 
in (North South) agreements of Americas: Consideration for choice of forum", Journal 
of World Trade 41(5), p. 900,2007, Kluwer Law International. 
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withdraw its food aid, whether that action was brought in the WTO or 
under the bilateral agreement.24 
It is gratifying to note that the World Trade Organisation with its 
dispute settlement procedure has been the most successful mechanism for 
peacefully settling disputes among nations in history. However, the 
nascent success of DSB system in the past fourteen years or so is tented by 
occasional non-implementation problems. The successful implementation 
of WTO panel rulings during last one decade has dropped from 69% in 
first five yeai*s to 54% in second five years. A large number of delays 
caused this decreasing implementation rule or disputed implementation 
case in which the implementation period was continuously extended or 
adequate compliance was disputed. 
Although retaliation is used to force non-complying states to 
become consistent with the WTO rules, this approach does not always 
force a state to comply. The monetary payment system proposed as an 
alternative retaliation, may work on a bilateral or regional basis, but it does 
not seem promising in a multilateral trade environment because it, could 
foster a culture of non-implementation and special interest politics. 
Therefore, possible ways to minimize the problem of non- implementation 
could be sought from a more effective, specific and fair implementation 
mechanism, focused on enhanced retaliation. This enhanced retaliation 
system could improve the cherished DSP enforcement system and play a 
24. Peter DRahos; "Wearing Web of Influence: The United State, Free Trade Agreement 




positive role in promoting compliance in a highly political environment 
such as in US politics.^s 
The above discussion makes it amply clear that a number of 
debatable and controversial questions crop-up from time to time in 
relation to the WTO Dispute Settlement process, which is not entirely free 
from the north- south divide and its ugly shadow. However, the 'rule 
oriented' nature of the dispute settlement process require that the Panel 
and Appellate Body must act as an independent, impartial and fair 
adjudicatory institution so that the confidence of member countries in its 
finding/ruling increases giving a boost to over all strength to the WTO in 
general and to its dispute settlement mechanism in particular. 
U.S. Unilateralism and the Developing Countries in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
The Marrakesh Ministerial meeting in 1994, mandated the 
Mirusterial conference, to complete a full review of the DSU rules and 
procedures "within four years" after entry into force of the WTO (!«' Jan. 
1995) and asked the first Ministerial meeting after the completion of the 
review, to decide whether to continue, modify or terminate the dispute 
settlement rules and procedures.26 
In fact, the original DSU review process, which had been scheduled 
for completion by the end 1998, remained installed and could not be 
completed in time.27 Although the review process had been conducted in 
25. Won Mog Choi; "To comply or not to comply'? Non-implementation problem in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement system", Journal of World Trade 41(5) p. 1043-(2007) Kluwer 
Law International. 
26 . Legal texts of Uruguay Round Agreements, p. 465. 
27. C. Raghavan; "DSB special session discuses EC proposals for review", 
http/ / : www. twn.in 
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various informal meetings held from time to time ever since 1998, the issue 
still remains imresolved and hanging. 
The basic hurdles, which blocked the DSU review, had their origins 
in the north-south divide and the US unilateralism inside WTO. Moreover, 
the way in which major developed countries participated in the review 
process gave rise to the feeling that these countries might prefer to extend 
the review process beyond 1998. As late as October 1998, Japan was the 
only QUAD (US, EU, Japan and Canada) country that had formally 
submitted proposals for improvement in the DSU. 
The then President Mr. Bill Clinton made certain concrete proposals 
regarding transparency of the dispute settlement process in a speech 
delivered on the 50*^  anniversary of the multilateral trading system. 
However, these proposals were not immediately followed up in the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding review process by the US delegation. 
The European Union, on the other hand, submitted substantive 
proposals to improve the operation of the DSU, it also seemed to favour 
extension of the time period to complete the review process. Perhaps, the 
European Union was interested in prolonging the review process to gamer 
support for its proposals regarding the start of a new round of 
comprehensive trade negotiations in early 2000.28 
All apprehensions regarding review of DSU were confirmed when 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was unable to conclude the review by 
end 1998 and agreed to continue the review process until the end of July 
1999. 
28 . World Trade Organisation, Annual Report 1998. 
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The decision of the DSB to continue the review process, at least 
partly, was in the interest of the developing countries. They got more time 
to analyze their experiences, coordinate with each other and prepare 
concrete proposals for improvements in the DSU. However, developing 
countries should be careful to point out that their proposals related 
essentially to implementation problems. The resolution of implementation 
problems does not require new cross-sectoral negotiations, as the existing 
balance of rights and obligations is not being disturbed. Developing 
countries should also realize that if, on the other hand, the improvement of 
the operation of the DSU becomes part of any new round of negotiations, 
they would certainly be asked to pay a price in areas of interest to major 
developed countries in return for effecting operational improvements in 
the DSU. This will tantamount to paying twice for the same thing, as 
developing countries had already made major concessions during the 
Uruguay Round on the expectation of being equal participants in the rule-
based multilateral trading system and the new dispute settlement 
mechanism.29 
Proposals of Developing Countries to Improve the Operation of 
the DSU 
During the review process, many developing countries have already 
submitted a number of proposals for the improvements of the operation of 
the DSU. The proposals are based on the experiences of developing 
countries with the operation of DSU thus far and, if implemented, will 
greatly improve the relevance and effectiveness of the DSU from a 




developing country perspective. The following is a brief summary of these 
proposals: 
(I) Proposals related to consultations under the DSU -
(a) Timely notification by the parties to a dispute to the DSB of 
mutually agreed solutions.^o 
(b) More disciplines on the complaining party at the consultations 
stage.3i 
(c) Elimination of the requirement of a "trade" interest for joining in 
consultations,32 so that WTO members who have a "systemic 
interest" rather than a trade interest can also join as third parties. 
(II) Proposals related to proceedings in the Panels and the 
Appellate Body: 
(a) Selection of panellists from a fixed pool of candidates to ensure 
that the panellists have the necessary knowledge and expertise; 
(b) Ethical standards for panellists so as to avoid conflicts of 
interests; 
(c) Permitting private counsel to participate in panel proceedings so 
that smaller countries that lack the adequate local expertise are 
better able to represent their case; 
(d) Requiring all documentary evidence to be submitted no later 
than the time when the second written submissions are due, so 
as to avoid unnecessary delays; 
30. Article 3.6 of the DSU 
31. Article 4 of the DSU 
32. Article 4.11 of the DSU 
200 
Chapter-V 
(e) Recognition of the current practice of allowing strict time limits 
to be extended with the consent of the parties; 
(f) Reversing the recent Appellate Body ruling regarding 
unsolicited submissions by the NGOs, so that only parties to the 
dispute and third parties have the right to make written 
submissions to the Panels and the Appellate Body (Article 13); 
(g) Ensuring that the Panels and the Appellate Body do not exceed 
the role granted to them under the DSU, unlike the shrimp-turtle 
case when the Appellate Body seems to have interpreted the 
Agreement which is clearly the mandate of the WTO members 
only; 
(h) Ensuring that the notice of appeal by the party that wishes to 
appeal against a ruling by a panel is clear so that the other party 
can prepare its defence in time and the process is not unduly 
delayed. 
(i) Creating a procedure for remand of the case to the panel if it is 
found that the panel has failed to make adequate findings on 
facts, to ensure that the Appellate Body does not become a fact 
finding Body and its review, as intended, is restricted to legal 
questions only. 
III. Proposals related to implementation of DSB 
recommendations^^ 
(a) Reconsidering the provision regarding cross retaliation that 




by the losing party in another sector (services or intellectual 
property), as this provision is more likely to work against 
developing countries; 
(b) Clarifying Article 21.5 to spell out cleanly all steps that have to 
be undertaken and the length of various stages to decide 
disputes over compliance v^ i^th the DSB recommendations; 
(c) Providing, in cases when implementation is questioned by a 
developing country that has won a case against a developed 
country, for compliance issues to be resolved by the original 
panel within 30 days, instead of 90 days, and without any 
further procedural requirements. 
rV. Proposals related to special and differential treatment for 
developing countries^ 
(a) Developing a monitoring mechanism to check 'whether special 
and differential treatment provisions in the DSU are being 
implemented, as many of these provisions have not yielded 
concrete benefits to developing countries; 
(b) Setting up an independent advisory unit staffed with legal 
experts to assist developing countries involved in dispute 
settlement proceedings; 
(c) Extending the "reasonable time" granted for implementation of 





(V) Proposals related to technical assistance to developing 
countries^s 
(a) Increasing the number of consultants to five; 
(b) Setting up an independent legal unit within the secretariat to 
provide legal advice to all members; 
(c) Establishing a permanent Defence Counsel to help developing 
and least developed countries when cases are brought against 
them; 
(d) Establishing a trust fund to finance "strategic alliance" with 
lawyer's offices to private firms to expand the scope of 
consultancy and advisory services. 
The Deadlock in DSU review 
The United States made it clear in July 1999 that it did not agree to 
any change in DSU, either by amendment of rules or by an agreed 
interpretation, which would sequence the process of multilateral 
determination of compliance and then authorisation for retaliation. The 
review discussioris, indeed, brought out a number of related issues and 
most, if not all of them; the U.S. had declined to agree to any changes that 
would need changes to its own law.^^ 
Since the change, mechanism of the DSU specifically requires a 
consensus, and thus the U.S. position means 'no change'. Hence, the U.S. 
adamant attitude became the major hurdle in the DSU review. 
35. Id. op.cit., 33. 




The Doha Ministerial Conference provided a renewed mandate 
(paragraph 30) for the review to be taken up and completed by 2003, 
detached from the single undertaking of the work programme and 
negotiations launched at Doha.^^ 
However, a special session of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) in the week or 15 April formally kicked off the review of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) mandated by the 4* Ministerial 
Conference at Doha completed in May 2003.38 
(D) Remedial Measures to strengthen the Position of Developing 
Countries39 
Laws are as good as their enforcement. Hence, it is very necessary 
that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) should be reformed to 
remove the various deficiencies in it. The developing countries have to 
take some actions on their own to utilize the system in a more effective 
way. The following four-tier approach may be desirable: 
1. The developing Cotmtries should eiihance their domestic legal 
capability to handle the dispute settlement process in the WTO on 
their own without having to call upon the assistance of lawyers of the 
major developed country centres. In some cases, it may also be 
appropriate to build up regional capability to be utilized by a set of 
developing countries. 
2. The developing countries should start initiatives in the General 
Council for improvements in the dispute settlement process for which 
37. C. Raghavan; "DSB Special Session discusses EC proposal for review", 2002 (SUNS) 
38 . The DSB special session was chaired by Amb. Peter Balas of Hungary. 
39. Supra Note 16 
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no amendment to the DSU is required. The following issues may be 
raised; 
(a) The General Council should give guidelines to the Panels and 
Appellate Body in respect of the interpretations of the 
agreements. There should be specific instruction that the Panels 
and Appellate Body should not imdertake substantive 
interpretations. If a conflict between two provisions of the 
agreement; is noticed, the Panel/Appellate Body should refer the 
matter to the Central Coimcil for an authoritative interpretation 
rather than itself undertake the exercise of determining which 
provision is more binding.'^o 
(b) When a developing country's stand has been found to be correct 
and the other party in a dispute is a developed country, the 
Panel should be asked to determine the cost to be paid to the 
developing country by the developed country. The General 
Council should have a general decision for the payment of such 
costs to the developing country. 
(c) When the Panel/Appellate Body has found that the action of a 
developed country has brought harm to a developing country, 
the erring developed country should give compensation to the 
developing country for the loss suffered by the latter from the 
time offending action was initiated by the developed country. 
3. The following proposals may be placed in the General Council for the 
improvement of the DSU; 
a) In case a developing country has to take retaliatory measures 
against a developed country, there should be a mechanism for 
joint retaliation by all the Members. 
40. B.L. Das; "Preface to C. Raghavan's paper".http//www.twn.in 
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b) There should be a rethink about the utility and desirability of 
having a standing Appellate Body. A continuing body of this 
type is bound to develop and perpetuate certain learning's and 
orientations, which may not be a healthy practice, given the 
fact that its recommendations are in the nature of final 
pronouncements on the issue in question. 
c) The developing countries should move to undo the harm done 
so far by the substantive interpretations of the Panels and 
Appellate Body (AB). The General Council should be requested 
to pronounce that these interpretations would not guide the 
future work of the dispute settlement process.^i 
To sup up, it is evident that the Dispute Settlement Process of World 
Trade Organisation is not as neutral as it would like to be because there are 
certain factors, which directly influence the outcome of the litigation 
process. The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) thus, provides an 
excellent analytical framework to study the place of developing countries 
in the World Trading System and their relationship with developed 
countries. 
The dispute discussed in this chapter make it very clear that the 
developing countries exercise self-constraint in picking their fights because 
of unfavourable distortions in the Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP). To 
assess the extent to which the WTO legal system remains on political 
foundations and, thus, power considerations, is evident from the analysis 
of prominent disputes such as Fibre Underwear, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, 




It is also observed that sanctions have little role in putting required 
pressure on defaulting party if it is a developed country and the 
consequent imbalance shows that wining a case before the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) can be meaningless for developing countries, 
leaving them unable to defend their trade rights. Non-implementation of 
the reports of the Panels and Appellate Body is a big problem for 
developing countries and countries in transition. 
The Dispute Settlement Process cannot become effective unless and 
imtil its execution mechanisms remained and made strange capable of 
putting sufficient pressure on all member countries irrespective of the 
strong position of a country. If the problem of non-implementation is 
resolved, it would generate not only confidence of developing countries 
but would also convince them to take more interest in the Dispute 
Settlement Process (DSP). 
Developing Countries lack representation in Geneva and legal 
resources to adjudicate cases. The increasing number of reviews under 
the strengthened procedures of the new WTO places a premium on 
sophisticated legal argumentation that may work against developing 
coimtries. The Dispute Settlement System is so technical and the 
comparative advantage in legal skills held by countries such as United 
States on the European Union may further augment the disparity in power 
resources. The Dispute Settlement Understanding seems to fail to offset 
differences in legal capacity in spite of legal provisions specifically 
intended for developing coimtries. 
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Prologue: The newest and perhaps most important phenomenon in 
globalisation process is the emergence of trade agreements as key 
instruments of economic liberalisation and as a mechanism used by major 
countries to have discipline and rule based on a wide range of issues. 
Any institution seeking international cooperation amongst member 
countries needs a mechanism to settle disputes arising amongst its 
member coimtries. 
Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as World 
Trade Organisation has an inbuilt mechanism for dispute resolution, 
hi fact, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of GATT 1947, of which India 
was a member, was based on some what satisfactory dispute settlement 
mechaiusm but the same could not be called an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism and therefore it needed improvements which 
ultimately resulted in the establishment of World Trade Organisation, 1995 
with its strong dispute settlement mechanism. 
India has been associated with the multilateral trade system since 
the beginning and has also been an active member country, if not a 
pro-active member. It is indeed; true that no country can progress in 
isolation in the present global economic order and if any country attempts 
to do so the loss will be exemplary. The most prominent example of this 
fact is the recent Chinese entry into the World Trade Organisation as a full 
fledged member. This compelling reality has been beautifully placed in 
few lines by the trade analyst Anwarul Hoda as under: 
WTO is good for India. It is wrong to consider the 
Uruguay Round a Western conspiracy. International Trade 
is not a zero-some game. Trade is about mutual gain. 
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International trade is of course, for mutual gain but the developing 
and least developed countries need to be extra careful because of their 
weak bargaining capacity as compared to the developed countries. The 
information available shows that India has actively used the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation for the redressal of 
its grievances ever since the World Trade Organisation came into effect on 
1st January 1995. 
In this chapter, an attempt is made by the researcher to first provide 
a broad outline about the level of participation by India in the dispute 
settlement system of World Trade Organisation with the help of certain 
tables. Then some what detail analysis of certain important disputes 
involving India is made so as to make the entire picture visible. Finally 
views of some of the trade experts dealing in WTO are mentioned showing 
the pros and cons involved in India's participation in Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism of the World Trade Orgarusation. 
1. Participation of India in Dispute Settlement of WTO 
A cursory glance at the information and data available regarding the 
dispute settlement system under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1947,1 shows that India, like most other developing countries, did not 
actively use the Dispute Settlement Body for the redressal of its grievances. 
There were many reasons for the inactive participation of India in Dispute 
Settlement Process under GATT 1947. Since the reasons behind inactive 
role of the developing countries were more or less common and have been 
1. htpp://www.wto.org; based on the information posted on WTO website and the website 
Third World Network (TWN) (http://www.twn.com). 
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discussed in some detail in chapter IV and V, those reasons need not be 
repeated here in the Indian context. 
But the Indian attitude, like other developing countries changed 
significantly with regard to dispute settlement mechanism of the World 
Trade Organisation. The information available reveals that the developing 
countries in general and India in particular have, quite actively used the 
dispute settlement body for the redressal of their grievances ever since the 
WTO came into effect. 
Interestingly the story of India's participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement system goes back to the year 1995 itself, when India brought a 
case involving import regime for automobile against Poland.^ The first 
dispute involving India as a defendant was brought in 1996 by United 
States of America with regard to patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural product.^ The chronological list of disputes brought before the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO from January 1995 to 23 June 2009 
shows that a total of 395 disputes have been brought for settlement, out of 
which India has been involved as a complainant in 16 disputes the latest 
being one against European Communities,^ whereas India has been 
involved as a defendant in 20 disputes from January 1995 to 23 June 2009, 
the latest being dispute relating to certain taxes on wines brought by 
2. http://www.wto.org.; Poland - Import Regime for Automobile (Complamant India) 
WT/DS19, 28* September, 1995 posted on WTO website 
3. http://www.wto.org. India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Products (complaint: United State) WT/DS 50, 2"'' July 1996. 
4. http://www.wto.org; European Communities - Expiry Review of Anti Dumping and 
Countervailing duties imposed on impacts of PET from India (complaint India) WT/DS 
385 4* December 2008. 
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European Communities.^ The following tables would make the 
participation of India in the dispute settlement process under the World 
Trade Organisation from 1995 to 2009 more clear. 
Table-I 
India's Position in Dispute Settlement System 
from 1995 to 23^<^ June 2009 
Total Disputes 
from 1995 to 
2009 
395 
Disputes Involving India 








Total 36 Disputes 
involving India so far 
By India as % of total 
9.25% 
The above table shows that the India has been involved in WTO 
dispute settlement system on an average of more than two disputes and 
less than three disputes per year during the last 15 years of its operation. It 
may also be noticed here from the above table that India has used the 
Dispute Settlement Body as a complaint in less than fifty percent of total 
disputes that it has been involved into. In two disputes,^ India had joined 
as a co-complainant with other coimtries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Australia, Brazil and Korea etc. 
http://www.wto.org. India - Certain Taxes and other measures on imported wines 
and spirits (Complaint: European Communities) WT/DS 380, 22"^ Sept. 2008. 




INDIA AS A COMPLAINANT IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 






























European Communities - Expiry Reviews 
of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties Imposed on Imports of PET from 
India 
-
United States - Customs Bond Directive for 
Merchandise Subject to Anti-
Dumping/Countervailing Duties 
-
European Communities - Anti Dumping 
Duties on Certain Flat Rolled Iron or Non-
Alloy Steel Products from India 
-
European Communities - Conditions for 
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries. 
United States - Rules of Origin for Textiles 
and Apparel Products 
Argentina - Measures Affecting the Import 
of Pharmaceutical Products 
Brazil - Anti Dumping Duties on Jute Bags 
from India 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000 
United States - Anti Dumping and 
Countervailing Measures on Steel plate 
from India 
South-Africa -Anti Dumping Duties on 
Certain Pharmaceutical Products from 
India 
European Communities - Anti Dumping 
Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen 
from India 
European Communities - Anti Dumping 












Cotton Fabrics from India 
European Communities - Restrictions on 
Certain Import Duties on Rice 
-
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textiles 
and Clothing Products. 
United States - Measures Affecting Imports 
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India 
United States - Measures Affecting Imports 
of Women's and Girls Wool Coat. 
Poland - Import Regime for Automobiles 
Table-11 
INDIA AS A DEFENDANT IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 






















India - Certain Taxes and Other Measures 
on Imported Wines and Spirits 
(Complainant - E.C.) 
India - Additional and Extra - Additional 
Duties on Import from U.S. (Complainant -
U.S.) 
India - Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Sale of Wines and Spirits from E.C. 
(Complainant - E.C.) 
-
India - Anti Dumping Measures on Certain 
Products from Separate Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matru 
(Complainant - Chines Taipei) 
India - Anti Dumping Measure on Batteries 
from Bangladesh. 
India- Anti Dumping Measure on certain 
products from the E.C. (Complainant E.C.) 










India - Measures Affecting Trade and 
Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector 







India -Measures Affecting Customs Duties 
(Complainant - E.C.) 
Import Restrictions (Complainant - E.C) 
Import Restrictions (Complainant -E.C.) 
Measures affecting the Automotive Sector 
(Complainant - E.C.) 
India - Measures Affecting Export of 








India - Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural Textiles and 
Industrial Products (Complainant - Chile) 
India - Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products (Complainant 
Switzerland) 
India - Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textiles and 
Industrial Products (Complainant - New 
Zealand) 
India - Quantitative Restricts on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial 
Products (Complainant - Canada) 
India - Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products (Complainant 
Australia) 
India - Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products (Complainant - U.S.) 
India - Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 






India - Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products (Complainant - U.S.) 
-
2. Attitude of Panellists and Appellate Body Towards India 
Any discussion on India's participation in the WTO's dispute 
settlement system could be incomplete if a detailed discussion of some of 
the disputes involving India is not made. For that purpose following 
important cases is taken up for discussion and analysis of the dispute. 
In fact, one of the most popular disputes involving India is Imports 
of Wool Shirts and Blouses from India^ in which India was complainant. 
This dispute concerns transitional safeguard measures imposed by the 
United States on import of Textile Product. In its report circulated in June 
1997, the Panel found measure was in violation of the Agreement on 
Textile and Clothing (ATC). In reaching its conclusion the Panel adopted 
rather restrictive approach regarding its scope of examination. For 
instance, in assessing the conformity of the US measure with Article 6.2 of 
the ATC, the Panel restricted its review to an examination of a statement 
issued by the US investigating authority when the United States requested 
consultation under the ATC with India in April 1995. 
Following its finding of violation the Panel did not go on to consider 
India's request that it finds that importing country has to choose at the 
beginning of process whether it will claim the existence of 'serious 
7. http://www.wto.org; United States - Measures affecting imports of Woven Wool 
Shirts and Blouses from India (Complainant India) WT/DS 33,14* March 1996, Post on 
Official Website of WTO. 
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damage' or 'actual threat of serious damage' to the domestic industry 
because in India's view, they were two separate concepts, not inter-
changeable with each other. Nor did the Panel consider India's claim that 
the United States consulted with India only on the basis of 'serious 
damage' and referred the matter to the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) on 
that basis and not on the basis of actual threat. The Panel also declined to 
consider India's claim that the United State had improperly back dated the 
effective date of restrain. 
India obviously was not satisfied with this narrow finding by the 
Panel. Although the United States had lifted the measure against imports 
from India in December 1996, even before the issuance of the final report 
of the Panel, India filed a notice of appeal in February 1997. The grounds 
for appeal included the following issues: 
i) Which parties bear the burden of proof concerning the legality of 
trade restrictive measures? 
ii) What role the Textile Monitoring Body should play in Dispute 
Settlement Process in Textile Sector? 
iii) Whether a panel is required to make findings on all legal claims 
made by the complaining party? 
In April 1997, the Appellate Body issued its report upholding the 
legal finding and conclusion of Panel on all issues as of the finder of proof 
the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that it was upto India to present 
evidence and agreement sufficient to establish a presumption that the 
measure was inconsistent with the agreement on Textile and Clothing.^ 
8. Rao, M.B. & Guru, Manjula: WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, lexis 
Nexis Bultarworth, New Delhi, 2004, p. 94. 
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With this presumption thus estabhshed, it was then upto the United States 
to bring evidence and arguments to rebuild this presumption. 
Regarding the role of Textiles Monitoring Body, the Appellate Body 
concluded that the statement in the Panel report on what information the 
TMB may take into account was purely a descriptive comment and not a 
'legal finding or conclusion' which the Appellate Body may uphold, 
modify or reverse. 
On the issue of 'judicial economy' the Appellate Body concluded 
that the panel's finding that it only needed to address those legal claims 
that it considered necessary for the resolution of dispute was consistent 
with the Dispute Settlement understanding as well as the practice under 
GATT1947 and the WTO Agreement. 
In May 1997, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the 
reports of Panel and the Appellate Body. There was no implementation 
issue because the restraint was no longer in place at the time of the 
adoption of the report. 
On an analysis of the facts and findings in above mentioned dispute, 
it appears that the motive of India, in bringing this case, was probably 
systemic rather than economic. That is why India pursued the case even 
after the revocation of the measure by the United States. In response, the 
Appellate Body came up with clear cut ruling on the burden of proof and 
judicial economy, which may not have necessarily satisfied India, but 
nevertheless greatly influenced later practice in the WTO. 
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The Appellate Body report in this dispute became an important 
precedent regarding burden of proof and judicial economy, often cited by 
Panel and Appellate Body in some other cases. 
In fact, a lesson to be learned from this case is that one cannot expect 
too much of rule making from the WTO Dispute Settlement System. As 
adjudicatory organs, both the Panels and Appellate Body would generally 
exercise a judicial restraint and limit their rulings to the issues, which are 
absolutely necessary for bringing a dispute to a position of conclusion. 
In India Patent Case^ which is related to the protection for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product in India. The facts 
briefly are that pursuant to Article 65.4 of the agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) India delayed the product 
of patent protection in respect of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
product until 1*' January 2005. Under Article 70.8 (b), those members 
which do not make available patent protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical product as of 1** January 1995, must provide a means 
by which patent application can be filled to preserve novelty and priority 
in respect of these applications. 
Since they are not obligated to examine the application or to grant 
patent during the transition period, the applications under Article 70.8 (a) 
are often referred to as mail box application. Further more. Article 70.9 
requires that exclusive marketing rights must be granted, even during 
transition period, to certain products, which were subject to mail box 
9. http://www.wto.org; India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Product, WT/DS 50,2^ July 1996. Posted on official website of WTO, 
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application. Immediately before entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
the hidian administration introduced a Legislative Bill to amend Patent 
Act so that India can have a system of mail box application for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural products, as well as that of exclusive 
marketing rights. Hov^^ever, Parliament failed to enact the Bill.^ o India 
received mail box applications under the authority of administrative 
instruction to the patent controller and there was not mechanism for the 
grant of exclusive marketing rights. The Panel report, which was circulated 
in September 1997, found that India did not comply with its obligation 
under Article 70.8 (a) because it failed to establish a mechanism that 
adequately preserves novelty and priority in respect of applications for 
product patent for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical inventions. 
The Panel made an alternative finding and found India was not in 
compliance of its obligations under Article 70.9 because it failed to 
establish a system for the grant of exclusive marketing rights. India went 
in appeal agairist the finding of the Panel. 
The Appellate Body (in its December 1997 reports) upheld, with 
certain modifications regarding the reasoning, on Article 70.8 (a) and 70.9 
but ruled that Article 70.9 was not within the terms of reference. The 
Appellate report was adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body in January 
1998. At the Dispute Settlement Body meeting in April 1998, the United 
States and India announced that they had agreed on implementation 
period of 15 months. 




This dispute was the first WTO case where the Panel or Appellate 
Body made a ruling on TRIPS Agreement which was between developed 
country at one hand and developing country on the other hand. The 
situation could drastically change after the year 2000, if developed 
countries choose to secure compliance with the TRIPS agreement by 
developing coimtries and coimtries in transition by rigorously having 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism. 
The next important dispute is Bed Linen Dispute^hn which the EC 
initiated an Anti-Dumping investigation in September 1996 on Cotton 
Types Bed Linen from India and some other countries.^^ x^js jgd to 
imposing Anti-Dumping duties, after the EC linked 'Dumping' with injury 
and imposing provisional anti-dumping duties from January 1997. Soon 
after this, India moved to the Dispute Settlement Body. The DSB adopted 
the Appellate Body report and the Panel report as modifies by 
the Appellate Body report and recommended that the European 
communities should bring its measures in conformity with its obligations 
under the anti-dumping obligations under the anti-dumping Agreement. 
Consequently E.U. suspended levy of anti-dumping duties on 7^ August 
2001 and later amended it regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping 
duty. 
However, India made a statement before the Dispute Settlement 
Body whereby it expressed the view that the new EC regulation did not 
bring the EC legislation into full compliance with the dispute settlement 
11. http://www.wto.org.EC-Anti Dumping Duties on Imports Cotton Type Bed Linen 
from India, WT/DS141, 23 August, 1998, posted on the WTO website. 
12. WT/DS 141; Pakistan and Egypt were third party participant in the WTO action. 
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body's recommendation. On 8* March 2002 India sought recourse to 
Article 21.5 (request for consultation) regarding the disagreement on the 
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings.^^ 
Then India requested for establishment of a compliance panel. 
At the Dispute Settlement Body meeting, it was agreed that the matter be 
referred to the original Panel. The US reserved its third party rights to 
participate into the proceedings. The Panel gave its ruling against India. 
India filed an appeal to the Appellate Body against the panel on the 
compliance report.^^ 
It may be added that the EC in order to implement the 
recommendations and ruling of the Dispute Settlement Body, adopted the 
WTO enabling regulation.^s Under the enabling regulation, the EC adopted 
regulation 1644/2001 amending the original definitive anti-dumping 
duties on Bed Linen from India, purporting to comply with the Dispute 
Settlement Body recommendations, while simultaneously suspending its 
application. This re-determination was amended by the Council regulation 
160/2002 terminating the proceedings against Pakistan. On 13* February 
2002, the EC terminated anti-dumping proceeding against Egypt. 
It is pertinent to point out here that the time of adoption of the 
above WTO enacting regulation, the commission's view is that although 
WTO rules do not obliged the community to implement the report 
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, in certain circumstances the 
13. Rao, M.B. and Guru Manjula, op. cit.,p. 179 
14. Raj Bhalla & David A Gantz: "WTO Case Review", Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol.XIX, No. 2009, p. 324. 
15. Regulation NO. 1515/2001 of 23'" July 2001 
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community might find it appropriate to amend anti-dumping or anti-
subsidy regulations to bring them in line with such report. 
It is surprising to note that Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement was clearly disregarded by the Panel in its findings. Article 15 
of Anti-Dumping Agreement under the heading 'developing countries 
member' recognises the special regard must be given by the developed 
country member to the special situation of developing country member 
when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under the 
agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies shall be explored where 
entry would affect essential interest of developing country member. 
It is submitted here that the approach adopted by the Panel while 
considering Article 15 of the Anti-dumping agreement is quite 
dissatisfactory and tilts the balance of rights against the developing 
covmtry and in favour of developed country which is detrimental for any 
institution based on rules and working as an impartial institution for 
adjudicating the rights and obligations of member countries. 
The next important dispute involving India which has generated a 
lot of debate as to the position of developing countries against the might of 
developed countries. That is the dispute of India-quantitative Restriction 
case.^ 6 In this case, no consideration was given to the provision 'special 
and differential treatment' of Article 21.7 and 21.8 of the Dispute 
settlement Understanding. The Appellate Body rejected the argument 
raised by India of the principle of institutional imbalance in considering 
16. WT/DS 90;India - Quantitative Restriction on Imports of Agricultural Textile and 
Industrial Products,, 1997. 
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the balance of payments position by the Panel. In Support of its stand, 
India referred to the GATT Panel reports in the EC Citrus and Korea Beef, 
the Appellate Body observed that the Panel reports in EC citrus and 
EC-Bananas were both un-adopted. Moreover, these two reports concern 
the relationship between Article XXIII & XVIII on balance of payments 
restrictions, with the relationship at issue in this case. Similarly the 
Appellate Body distinguished the Penal Report in Korea - Beep^ 
It is submitted here that the distinction sought by the Appellate 
Body is without a difference,- so much for the consistency in approach by 
the adjudicating bodies under the WTO and the scant regard for the 
special and differential treatment in favour of developing countries. 
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body's decision in this case was also 
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, despite strong reactions by the 
developing countries at the meeting of Dispute Settlement Body of the 
way, the special & differential treatment provision in favour of developing 
countries have been ignored. 
The next prominent dispute involving India is the popular Shrin-
Turtle dispute, which in often regarded as sequel to the earlier Juna -
Dolphin cases under General Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947^ 8 
and has been portrayed as involving the politically sensitive issue of 
possible conflict between the objectives of trade liberalization and the 
preservation of environment. 
17. Rao M.B. and Guru Manjula, op. cit, p. 213 
18. http://www.org, WT/DS 58; United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (complainant India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailan) -, 1996. 
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What is often overlooked is that the case was fundamentally about 
non-discrimination and about the extra-territoriality of domestic laws of 
major trading power. The complaint was not so much about whether each 
exporting country should adopt similar measures in line with under the 
threat by losing market access to that country. 
This case concerns a joint complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Thailand against a ban on the importation of shrimp and shrimp 
products from these coimtries imposed by the United States under section 
609 of the U.S. Public Law 101-162. The complainants alleged the violations 
of Articles I, XI and XIII of GATT, 1994, as well as mollification and 
impairment of benefits. 
Accordingly, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a Panel 
at its meeting on 25* February 1997. Australia, Columbia, the European 
Communities, Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Japan, Nigeria and Sri Laiika indicated their interest as third parties. 
The Panel, after due deliberation, found that the import ban on 
Shrimp and Shrimp products as applied by the United States was 
inconsistent with Article XI.l of the GATT, 1994 and can not be justified 
under the exception in Article XX of GATT, 1994. The Panel also held that 
under Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement understanding, it could not 
entertain the unsolicited briefs submitted by the Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) directly to the Panel. 
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the U.S. 
measure at issue was not within the scope of measures permitted under 
Article XX of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body also held that Panels had a 
224 
Chapter-VI 
discretionary authority to consider or reject non-solicited material. 
However, the Appellate Body also ruled that the US measure, while 
qualifying for exceptions under Article XX (g) of GATT1994, failed to meet 
the requirements of Article XX of GATT 1994 regarding objective and non-
discriminatory application of the measure in question. The Dispute 
Settiement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel 
report, as modified by the Appellate Body on November 6,1998. 
It is important to note that this case has raised two important issues 
related to the process of dispute settlement under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. 
(i) can the Appellate Body take upon itself the role reserved for 
member countries only? And 
(ii) can non-governmental organisations enjoy privileges superior to 
those accorded to WTO members? 
The questions raised here need serious attention and may very well 
be taken as part of the agenda for the review of Dispute Settlement 
Understanding by developing Countries whenever the actual negotiations 
for the review of Dispute Settlement understanding starts in future. 
It would not be out of place here to mention the Quantitative 
Restrictions Dispute^^ in which the then Indian Ambassador, Mr. S. 
Narayanan while joining the consensus for adoption (due to negative 
consensus rule) made a lengthy presentation, in polite language, but 
which nevertheless was stinging in its effect, outlining India's serious 
19. http://www.wto.org WT/DS 90/1997; India - Quantitative Restrictions on imports of 
agricultural and Industrial Products, posted on the official website of WTO. 
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reservations and consensus and the implications of the ruling on 
developing countries and their rights. 
In fact, the Indian statement showed several points of contradiction 
in the Appellate Body in this case, and certain other rulings where the 
same issue is interpreted differently in relation to different agreements and 
parties. India cited one passage in the Appellate Body report, which in 
effect rejected the right of India (or any other developing countries), under 
Article XVIir.ll of GATT 1994, its right to follow its own 'development 
policy', and not be challenged with the argument that with a different 
policy there would be no need for balance of payments restrictions.^o 
But even more ii\iquitous effect of the Appellate Body ruling was 
that the "macroeconomic policies" of the industrialised economies, that is 
their domestic policies aimed at achieving and maintaining full and 
productive employment or development of economic resources, can not be 
challenged in the WTO^^, the macro-economic policies developing 
countries pursue can be challenged and the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Trade Organisation can ask the developing country 
concerned to change its macroeconomic policy so that no balance of 
payments restrictions are necessary. 
The Appellate Body's formulation about macroeconomic and 
development policy, that has made these outcomes possible, is either a 
case of perverse economics to buttress a legal attempt to end developing 
20. http://twn.org. C. Raghavan - 'A millstone for developing world, a milestone for the 
US (South - North Development Monitor, 1999) posted at official website of WTO. 
21. Article XII3 (d) of the Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization, 1994. 
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country privileges, or case of its sheer ignorance, bordering on literacy, 
macro-economics and development economics. 
The attitude of Appellate Body had been such that a number of 
other developing countries also backed India. Generally, at the adoption 
stage of Panel rulings, only parties concerned present their views but a 
number of developing countries, not parties to the dispute, also spoke up 
at the Dispute Settlement Body, joining India in expressing concerns were 
Malaysia, the Dominican Republic Cuba, Egypt, the Philippines Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia and Jamaica. 
Then there had been Tariff preferences to developing countries 
case22 in which India requested consultations with the European 
Commimities pursuant to Article 4 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, Article XXIII:I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 1994 and Paragraph 4 of More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries I. The request was 
circulated to members E.C. and India held consultations with a view to 
reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter. Unfortunately 
the consultations failed to settle the dispute. India brought to notice the 
following features of the European Communities Generalised System of 
Preferences Scheme :-
(i) the tariff preferences accorded under the special arrangements 
for combating drug production and trafficking are available only 
to specified countries selected by EC, and 
22. http://www.wto.org; European Communities Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 




(ii) the tariff preferences accorded under the special incentive 
arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the 
environment are accorded only to countries that are determined 
by the EC to comply Vk^ ith certain labour and environment policy 
standards. 
The outcome had been a little dissatisfactory in the process of 
determination of important issues such as whether the provisions of the 
EC Generalised System of Preferences scheme granting tariff preferences 
under -the special arrangements for combating drug production and 
trafficking and the special incentive arrangements for the protection 
of labour rights and environment, any implementation rules and 
regulations. The battle for protection of rights of the developing countries 
goes on an on. 
To sum up, the discussion made in this chapter shows that India is 
more active participant in the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
Organisation during last one and half decade than other developing 
countries. India has been a party in 36 disputes out of total 395 disputes 
brought so far before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which is not an 
insignificant share of participation by a developing country like India. 
It has also been observed that most of the time either the 
complainant or defendant had been United States or European 
Communities which are the most frequent users of the Dispute Settlement 
Process of WTO. An sinalysis of the cases involving India in the preceding 
pages shows that the powerful shadow of developed countries still 
surrounds in its own way over the legal mechanism of the WTO. 
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It is also evident from the discussion in this chapter that all is not 
well with the dispute settlement system of WTO when it comes to disputes 
involving a developing country member of the WTO. India is no exception 
to the general attitude of discrimination as adopted by the Panels and the 
Appellate Body. It is, indeed, extremely disturbing to note that 
Bodies/Institutions created to render 'justice', while resolving trade 
disputes tilt the balance against the weaker party and hence distort the 





Conclusion and Suggestions 
To conclude any study and more so a research work is difficult and 
cumbersome task. I am reminded of the immortal words of famous Greek 
philosopher Socrates who said, "I know nothing except the fact of my 
ignorance". My ignorance may be visible everywhere in this study but it 
may be more prominently visible in this part of the work. 
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO has been efficient, 
independent and impartial as compared to other international judicial 
courts or tribunals. The extent of system strengthening in the Uruguay 
Round and the system apphed to global trade arrangements implies a 
coordinated and well organized set of rules and institutions which 
overseas and regulates world trade. One of the key elements in the 
strengthening of the system of trade rules is the degree of enforcement 
built into the rules which through clarity or interpretation of rules, dealing 
with a complaint end up with a credible resolution of dispute. 
This postulates that in a dispute settlement, procedures laid down are 
followed by the formation of a Panel. Panel Reports are implemented not 
through imposition of light penalties, but through well planned out 
proportionality irrespective of the parties involved, be it the economic 
giants or the LDC involved. But, despite such conceptions, the question 
remains whether the system worked as envisaged and whether the 
developing countries got something of value from a strengthened system 
as envisaged in the Uruguay Round. 
It is significant to note that like all well intentioned mechanisms, 
DSU suffers from potential weaknesses - in the lengthy and numerous 
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covered agreements and new schedules, creating potential for new trade 
conflicts. However, there are well-framed rules with virtual automatic 
rights to a Panel, negative (instead of positive) consensus in adopting the 
Panel Reports with clear time frames for the disposal of complaints. 
As regards penalties, it may be noticed that while there is no change in the 
level of penalties, new rules tend to make penalties by way of 
compensation and suspension of concessions. A new Appellate Body has 
been established to oversee the decisions of the Panels. 
The participation of member countries in the dispute settlement 
process of the WTO during last fifteen years hds been considerably high. 
Around three hundred ninety five disputes have been brought before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) during last fifteen years, which 
shows the increased level of faith of member countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement process. 
Despite this impeccable record, experience with WTO dispute 
settlement has exposed certain problems and need for reforms. The WTO 
dispute settlement process effectively corrects the defects of the previous 
GATT process, but perhaps overshoots the mark. During the Uruguay 
Roimd, the choice between a 'negotiation model' and an 'adjudicative 
model' of dispute settlement was too often presented as an 'either or'. 
This is a false dichotomy. In truth both models are needed; certain disputes 
can be settled by applying the legal rules of the covered agreements, other 
disputes are economic and political in nature and should be settled by 
non-legal means. 
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It is not that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) fails 
to provide for alternatives to Panel/Appellate Body Dispute Settlement; on 
the contrary, the DSU provides a complete menu of dispute settlement 
options such as consultations between parties, good offices, conciliation 
and mediation, the convening of an expert review group to resolve factual 
issues, and binding arbitration. Nevertheless, the procedural rules of the 
DSU furmel the parties, sometimes prematurely, into the Panel/Appellate 
Body process. 
However, forcing dispute to a rul&^based conclusion through 
adjudication may put undue stiain upon the WTO system can lead to 
unwise results. Even certain rule-based disputes are better settled through 
the negotiation. An example is the 1995 dispute in relation to U.S. section 
301 & 304 which began to counter a US retaliatory measure unilaterally 
imposing 100 per cent tariffs on six models of cars imported from Japan. 
Although this was a blatant violation of GATT rules, and a WTO Panel 
certainly would have given a finding in Japan's favour, such a result 
would have caused political furores in the United States. Fortimately, the 
dispute was settled through negotiation rather than through adjudication, 
and this result was avoided. 
The current WTO dispute settlement regime also forces non-rule 
based disputes through the adjudicative process. The DSU, continuing the 
GATT tradition, provides for the filing of a 'non-violation' complaint 
where a party considers that a trade benefit is being nullified or impaired 
by a measure applied by a WTO member that does not conflict with a 
covered agreement. The DSU also allows a member to file a 'situation 
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complaint', if the objective of a trade agreement is being impeded as a 
result of the existence of any situation. Both of these complaints are 
handled through the panel process, although a negotiation based dispute 
settlement process may sometimes be more appropriate. 
The main gains from WTO systems are said to be MFA elimination, 
removal of VERs, bindings on agriculture, market access and from the 
developing countries' point of view, provision of special and differential 
treatment with the aims of greater FDI, flow of technology etc, the 
elimination of unilateral actions outside the system, less regional 
arrangement vis-^-vis free flow of trade. Indeed the preamble to the 
agreement establishing WTO explicitly recognizes that 'with a view to 
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, extending 
production and trade in goods and services, optimal use of world 
resources with the objective of sustainable development is called for'. 
This system's overriding purpose is to help trade flow freely and for 
that purpose, to remove restrictions and barriers. Knowledge circles are of 
the view that none of the above stated gains have materialized -the poor 
have become poorer and the rich, richer. However, it has to be considered 
that how far any of the purposes and objectives is realized during the last 
fifteen years. To establish a fairer and freer trade regime, countries need to 
adhere to certain basic principles. Evidence shows that things are not 
moving as per the premises on which the multilateral trading system is 
written into the WTO code. 
It has been noticed in the India - Bed Linen case that the EU gross 
domestic product of dollar 7.7 million, as against the US dollar 7.1 million 
233 
and Japan's dollar 4.3 dollar. The EU gross fixed capital formation is 
dollar 1.6 million, as against dollar 1.5 million for the US and dollar 1.1 
million for Japan, whereas India does not even account for 1% of the 
World Trade. Still the EU persisted ad targeted India out of proportion in 
terms of the cases pitted against it. A trade analyst says instead of 
concentrating a cooperation of the latest technological fields in an age of 
globalization, the EU seems to be scoring points on products like bed lines. 
There were also anti-dumping duties by the EU against India on pretext 
that it was hurting their industry. 
The next controversial point relates to the disputes on some 
restrictions maintained by India in its Exim policy 2002-07 which was 
created by the EU with US backing. Surprising to note is the fact that all 
this controversy is being raised in spite of the EU-India cooperation 
agreement 1994, which is observed more in breach. Again it was amazing 
as to how it dropped anti dumping investigations against Pakistan and 
Egypt initiated simultaneously with India and the reason given was that it 
was due to a deal with Pakistan for the control of narcotic trade forcing 
India to raise the matter as a dispute under the DSU, where it succeeded. 
One may legitimately ask: is it the way the WTO multilateral trade 
agreements are perceived or actually worked? 
An analysis of a number of cases involving developing countries 
makes it crystal clear that how the two champions of free trade (Japan and 
US) which are highly developed countries, are unable to rise above narrow 
parochial interests- Japanese restrictions on Chinese farm products and US 
action to protect the domestic steel industry. It is the domestic political 
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compulsions that are at the root cause of these actions, for instance. Euro 
Cotton in the case of Bed linen from India, Chiquita Brands International 
of the US and Noboa of Ecuador in the case of bananas. The EU did not 
comply with the ruling of Appellate Body again in appeal against panel's 
compliance report ruled in favour of India. 
In the bananas I and II case, a GATT Panel in 1993 and 1994 found 
the EU policy inconsistent and the EU successfully blocked further action. 
In September 1994, Chiquita Brands International, a US Company 
operating in Latin America requested an investigation from the office of 
the US Trade Representative. In April 1996, the US asked for consultations 
with the EU. The panel formed in May 1996, upheld in April 1997, the 
charger of discrimination against Growers and marketing companies 
which was later upheld by the Appellate Body. As the EU did not comply, 
ultimately the US was permitted to retaliate for a sum of dollar 192 million 
and US imposed tariff on imports from the EU, mainly on non-agricultural 
products. Ecuador, the World's largest bananas producer was allowed 
retaliation of dollar 2.2. million. 
Ecuador thereupon decided to suspend IPRs. Consequences of 
suspension of concessions/retaliation have already been dealt with while 
dealing with Article 22 of the DSU, which may ultimately heart the 
credibility of the disputes settlement rather than strengthening it. 
Another controversial case discussed in preceding pages is the 
EC-Hormones case, in which the EC banned the use of six hormones for 
cattle growth. Few experts, including some in Europe believed that there 
was serious risk to health in beef hormones. In fact three of the six were 
235 
authorized in the EC for therapeutic uses. Moreover there are strong 
rumours reporting a sizeable illegal growth in the use of all these 
hormones in the EC suggesting that the ban is motivated by the depressed 
situation of the beef market and the inability to reform the common 
Agricultural policy (CAP). When EC directives were contested, the 
Appellate Body in appeal upheld Panel ruling with modifications, ruling 
against the EC Regulations which was subsequently adopted by the 
Dispute Settlement Body. In this case, the EU was dealing with an issue of 
consumer based protectionist pressure. As a result of this, the EU decided 
to ignore the WTO ruling and accepted retaliation. 
The US safeguard action by imposing 30% duties on imported steel 
is an example of how the biggest champion of free trade had to bow 
narrow parochial local industries pressures, ignoring the fundamental 
requirement of multilateral trading system. In addition, the US also would 
not implement an adjudicated case, not to its liking. This is what happened 
in the Shrimp Turtle Dispute. The Panel report on the US implementation of 
WTO rulings in this case was delayed. 
In case of differences between countries on the working of 
multilateral trade agreements, the US does not simply have only section 
301; it has special and super 301 also aimed at focusing action that could 
now be taken against the trading partners. While special 301 was designed 
to address violations in the area of IPRs, super 301 was to perform similar 
functions in the area of services — two key areas in the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade agreements. 
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The US trade administration would review ail countries actions and 
prepare a 'priority watch list', warn countries to take corrective actions 
before initiating the urulateral section 301 action. India has the singular 
distinction of appearing in the watch list from time to time and has to 
defend itself both before the US and subsequently, before the DSB. But 
then came a stage when the EC contested these (section 301) provisions as 
not in accordance with the WTO obligations and Article 23 of the DSU. 
The trend that is emerging from the actions of major developed 
countries is not at all healthy, and against the spirit of WTO and the DSU. 
The importance of these reputed organizations is increasingly being 
undermined by powerful lobbies at work in these countries. These major 
trading countries cannot or do not adhere to the basics of the multilateral 
trading system and view the problems faced by developing countries in 
their developmental efforts by increased market access, etc. 
In such situations how can developing countries resist the pressures 
in their own countries? It is pertinent to remember that one country's 
preferential policies hurt firms and industries in other countries. Under the 
WTO set-up, only members can initiate action and not the affected firms or 
industries with the result that the affected firms or industries lobby with 
their governments to irutiate dispute settlement process at WTO. Given 
the increasing volume of trade across the globe, it is to be expected that 
one's gain in one country would possibly have a negative effect on another 
entity in another country. 
Therefore when a dispute is raised, the initiating country goes 
through the whole procedure of dispute settlement process provided 
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under the DSU, to please the people of the country in the municipal sphere 
including compliance with report receipt of compensation or retaliation. 
Only one of the parties wins. When a country has to ultimately pay 
compensation or incur retaliation, it collects the amount only from its 
people by way of revenue. The successful country in the dispute then 
receives the compensation and not the firms on whose behalf the dispute is 
raised or defended. If the aggrieved firm does not receive compensation 
what is the end result? 
One prominent example which may be mentioned here is the EU's 
Banana dispute, in which domestic and ACP country producers of bananas 
gained, but the US retaliatory tariffs were imposed on non-agricultural 
imports from EU. Ecuador's cross retaliation to suspend agreements on 
intellectual property, only resulted in royalty losses to European 
musiciai\s. The EU's banana producers might have earned higher profits 
but the EU's producers of other goods and music got caught in this 
exchange of fire for no fault of theirs. Such results are inherent in the 
dispute settlement mechanism as emerged. 
All this only shows the need to reform the DSU. But amendments to 
the DSU are more easily said than done. It needs political will to agree to 
amendments. While the Doha Declaration called for negotiations on 
improvements and clarifications to be based on the work done so far, as 
well as any additional proposals by members and set a time limit of May 
2003, at which time steps had to be taken to ensure that the results enter 
into force as soon as possible thereafter, that time limit expired. Even on 
matters that were agreed to at Doha, nobody is sure for certain as to how 
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things end up especially after the Cancun fiasco. It is for the two trading 
giants to stand by their solemn duty to ensure that the agenda moves 
forward and people do not lose faith. 
Unfortunately, the two major economic giants had not shown much 
flexibility in their approach. The EU sticks to its Generalised System of 
Preference (GSP) and its spokesman, reaffirming that 'Regionalism is in 
our DNA'.^ While the WTO and the Ministerial Declaration at Punta-del-
est calls for globalization of economy, the EU emphasizes on having trade 
agreements with the ASEAN or MERCOSUR in Latin America, in such 
areas as trade facilitation, market access and financial services. 
The reference to the EU GSP and its views on regional arrangements 
are only referred to as a pointer to the difficulties ahead. This also 
demonstrate the need for a political will to carry out amendments to the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Understandings (including the 
DSU) in near future as to fulfil the urifulfilled dreams. 
The discussion carried out in different chapters of this work makes 
it quite clear that the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO has worked 
very well during last one and half decades and has adjudicated a number 
of complicated International Trade Disputes. Yet, there are a number of 
instances, as enumerated above, which make it clear that there are some 
ambiguities in the Dispute Settlement Understanding as well as in some of 
the covered Agreements which need to be removed at the earliest. The 
researcher, therefore, proposes the following suggestions which could help 
make the DSU more effective, efficient and powerful. 
1. Macolm Subhan; "Regionalism is in our DNA", The Financial Express, 12 May 2003. 
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Suggestions 
1. Expand the Appellate Body's scope of review to allow, under certain 
circumstances, the Appellate Body to review manifestly erroneous or 
unreasonable characterization or appreciation of the facts before a 
Panel. 
2. The present rules of DSU allow the Appellate Body to hear cases in 
appeal from the Panels only on the substantive legal issues of WTO 
and not on facts. So, no appeal could be made to clarify the facts of 
the case that the Panel may not have established or overlooked and 
which may be central to that particular dispute. It is, therefore, 
suggested that if the Appellate Body finds that some facts are missing 
or have not been established it should be able to send back or remand 
the case to the original Panel. 
3. There is also a need to change the manner in which the Appellate 
Body selects divisions to hear particular cases. 
4. Experience shows that disputes remain pending including important 
disputes, for long time before the Appellate Body due to paucity of 
time. The Appellate Body, therefore, be allowed to sit in plenary in 
cases which were considered to be 'important'. 
5. The current number of Appellate Body members is not sufficient and 
there is a need to increase the number of Appellate Body Members by 
at least two or four persons. 
6. Under the present structure, the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
process remains out of view and insulated from public scrutiny. It 
needs to be changed to ensure more transparency into the system by 
making Appellate Body hearings open to the public. 
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7. It would be convenient to allow WTO Members which had not been 
third parties before a Panel to appear before the Appellate Body on 
appeal. 
8. The establishment of a WTO's Centre in each developing country in 
order to overcome those problems. 
9. There must be 3-4 Panellists specialized in each field having a wide 
range of general experience in the WTO. 
10. The problems relating to interpretations may be resolved by 
the establishment of a committee composed of three specialists 
supervised administratively by the Director-General to be in charge of 
such interpretation. 
11. The retaliation procedure should be struck out of the system as it 
completely distorts trade and instead a compulsory compensation 
system should be adopted. 
12. Remedies should involve private companies which incur loss due to 
the violation of the WTO or one of the covered agreements. Those 
private companies should have the right to directly bring actions to 
Panels under strict restrictions. 
13. The Dispute Settlement Understanding should be divided into 
sections according to subject matters and perhaps should address new 
issues to cope with globalization. 
14. The General Council should issue guidelines to the Panels and 
Appellate Body in respect of the interpretations of the agreements. 
There should be specific instruction that the Panels and Appellate 
Body should not undertake substantive interpretations. In particular, 
when a conflict between two provisions of the agreements in noticed, 
the Panel/Appellate Body should refer the matter to the General 
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Council for an authoritative interpretation rather than itself undertake 
the exercise of determining which provision is more binding. 
15. It is very necessary for all the contracting parties of WTO in general, 
and that if developing countries in particular, to evolve a consensus 
on DSU review and work effectively in that direction in near future so 
that the existing anomalies in the DSU could be removed and it is 
further strengthened. 
16. Several provisions are set out in the DSU for special and differential 
treatment for developing countries such as Articles 3.12, 4.10, 8.10, 
12.10, 12.11, 21.2, 21.7, 21.8,24 and 27.8 but a number of these 
provisions for special and differential treatment in various WTO 
Agreements are rather of declaratory nature and in the absence of 
implementation modalities, have not been of practical use to 
developing coimtries. This needs to be made practicable otherwise the 
purpose behind 'special and differential treatment' in favour of the 
developing countries in the DSU would remain colourless and would 
exist merely in the legal documents as they have been in the past. 
17. The developing countries as well as the economies in transition can 
take the following steps to improve their position by means of co-
operative action: 
i) Establishing a joint service for legal expertise, or a south 
network accessible and available to all, at minimal or no cost. 
ii) The regular exchange of information and experience between 
developing countries. 
iii) Undertaking regular group consultation and reviews 
regarding the functioning of the dispute settlement system, 
including the outcomes of individual cases. 
18. Unless the legal foundations of the Uruguay Round Agreements are 
supportive of development and cognizant of developing countries 
specific characteristics, needs and aspirations, it is unrealistic to 
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expect that the DSU will generate outcomes that will be balanced and 
equitable from the perspective of the South. Except with matters of 
process, the DSU itself can hardly become development friendly. The 
potential inherent in DSU can only be harnessed more deliberately 
and systematically in support of development needs if developing 
countries, as a group, press in a concerted way for changes in the 
basic thrust of policies across the spectrum of WTO agreements, both 
present and future. 
19. At present, only members of the WTO, States and Custom Unions like 
the European Union may participate in Dispute Settlement 
proceedings. To ensure greater transparency in the system the 
proceedings of Panel/Appellate Body should be opened to the NGOs 
to present amicus curiae briefs and that will make civil society 
organizations to participate in the best of manner. 
In view of the existing difficulties, balanced with the desirability of 
permitting private claims, it may be advisable to establish an addition 
Dispute Settlement forum for private parties at the WTO. Private parties 
would still have to apply through the WTO member state authorities under 
municipal law and would have to meet International Law standards for 
bringing a claim, but Member States would have the option of bringing the 
claim or allowing the private party to file a complaint directly with the WTO. 
Last but not the least, good intentioned pledges and well-directed 
steps for reforms would go a long way in making the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Process as one of the best and most effective settlement 
mechanism in the history of International Organisations and would 
become a "role model" for other International and Regional Organisations 
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes 
Members hereby agree as follows: 
1. Coverage and Application 
1. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this 
Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the 'covered agreements'). The rules and 
procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes 
between Members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the 'WTO Agreement') 
and of this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement. 
2. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or 
additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are 
identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the 
rules and procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth 
in Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail. In disputes 
involving rules and procedures under more than one covered agreement, if there is a conflict between 
special or additional rules and procedures of such agreements under review, and where the parties to 
the dispute cannot agree on rules and procedures within 20 days of the establishment of the Panel, the 
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 (referred to in this 
Understanding as the 'DSB'), in consultation with the parties to the dispute, shall determine the rules 
and procedures to be followed within 10 days after a request by either Member. The Chairman shall be 
guided by the principle that special or additional rules and procedures should be used where possible, 
and the rules and procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent necessary to 
avoid conflict. 
2. Administration 
1. The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rule; and procedures and, 
except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement 
provisions of the covered agreement Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish Panels, 
adopt Panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and 
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered 
agreements. With respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade 
Agreement, the term 'Member' as use herein shall refer only to those Members that are parties to the 
relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement. Where the DSB administers the dispute settlement provision of 
a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that Agreement may participate 
in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute. 
2. The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments in disputes 
related to provisions of the respective covered agreements. 
3. The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its ftmctions within the time-ft-ames provided 
in this Understanding. 
4. Where the rules and procedure of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall 
do so by consensus.' 
3. General Provisions 
1. Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore 
applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT1947, and the rules and procedures as further 
elaborated and modified herein. 
2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the 
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions 
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rig and obligations provided in 
the covered agreements. 
3. The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another 
Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance 
between I rights and obligations of Members. 
The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted its consideration, if no Member, present 
at the meeting of the DSB when decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision 
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4. Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement 
of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the 
covered agreements. 
5. All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of 
the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, I be consistent with those agreements and shall 
not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the 
attainment of elective of those agreements. 
6. Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement 
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and 
Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto. 
7. Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these 
procedures would be fruitftil. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive 
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the 
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first 
objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. 
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure 
is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is 
inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the 
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the 
other Member, subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures. 
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under covered agreement, the action 
is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is 
normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to 
that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint 
has been brought to rebut the charge. 
8. The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek 
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the 
WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement. 
9. It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute element procedures should 
not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will engage 
in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. It is also understood that complaints 
and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked. 
10. This Understanding shall be applied only with respect to new requests for consultations under the 
consultation provisions of the covered agreements made xi or after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement. With respect to disputes for which the request for consultations was made under any 
other predecessor agreement to the covered agreement date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
the relevant dispute settlement rules and procedures in effect immediately prior to the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement shall continue to apply.^ 
11. Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the covered agreements is brought 
by a developing country Member against a developed country Member, the complaining party shall 
have the right to invoke, as an alternative to the provisions contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of this 
Understanding, the corresponding provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD14S/18), except 
that where the Panel considers that the time-frame provided for in paragraph 7 of that Decision is 
insufficient to provide its report and with the agreement of the complaining party, that time-frame may 
be extended. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of Articles 4, 5, 6 
and 12 and the corresponding rules and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall prevail. 
4. Consultations 
1. Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation 
procedures employed by Members. 
2. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity 
for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting 
the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former.^  
3. If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement. Member to which the request 
is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days after the date of its 
This paragraph shall also be apphed to disputes on which Panel reports have not been adopted or fully implemented 
Where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or 
authorities withm the territory of a contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the pro' of such 
other covered agreement shall prevail 
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receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than 30 days after the 
date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If the Member 
does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter mto 
consultations within a period of no more 3o days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed, after the date 
of receipt of the request, then the Member that requested the holding of consultations may proceed 
directly to request the establishment of a Panel. 
4. All such requests for consultations shall be notified to the DSB and relevant Councils and 
Committees by the Member which requests consultations. Any request for consultations shall be 
submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the measures 
at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint. 
5. In the course of consultations in accordance with the provisions of a covered agreement, before 
resorting to further action under this Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory 
adjustment of the matter. 
6. Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further 
proceedings. 
7. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for 
consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a Panel. The complaining party 
may request a Panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that 
consultations have failed to settle the dispute. 
8. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods. Members all enter into 
consultations within a period of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the 
consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of the 
request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a Panel. 
9. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, the parties to the dispute, 
Panels and the Appellate Body shall make every effort to accelerate the proceedings to the greatest 
extent possible. 
10. During consultations Members should give special attention to the particular problems and 
interests of developing country Members. 
11. Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has a substantial trade 
interest in consultations being held pursuant to paragraph 1 Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 
of Article XXII of GATS, or the cortesponding provisions in other covered agreements,'' such Member 
may notify r e : insulting Members and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the circulation of the 
request for consultations under said Article, of its desire to be joined in the consultations. Such 
Member shall be joined in the consultations, provided that Member to which the request for 
consultations was addressed agrees that claim of substantial interest is well-founded. In that event they 
shall so inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the consultations is not accepted, the applicant 
Member shall be fi-ee to request consultations under paragraph 1 of Article XXll or paragraph 1 of 
Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATS, 
or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements. 
5. Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation 
1. Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the parties 
to the dispute so agree. 
2. Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation, and in particular positions taken by 
the parties to the dispute during these proceedings, shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the 
rights of either party in any further proceedings under these procedures. 
3. Good offices, conciliation or mediation may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute. 
They may begin at any time and be terminated at any time. Once procedures for good offices, 
conciliation or mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed with a request for the 
establishment of a Panel. 
4. When good offices, conciliation or mediation are entered into within 60 days after the date of 
receipt of a request for consultations, the complaining party must allow a period of 60 days after the 
date of receipt of the request for consultations before requesting the establishment of a Panel The 
complaining party may request establishment of a Panel during the 60-day period if the parties to the 
The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are hsted hereunder Agreement on Rules of 
Origin, Article 7, Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, Article 7, Agreement on Implementation of Article V! of 
GATT, Article 18 6, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 14 1, Agreement on Import licensing 
Procedures, Article 6, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Articles 13 and 30, Agreement on 
Agriculture, Article 18 1, and Part C, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, paragraph 
35, Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures, Article 8, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Article 8 4, 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Article 64, 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Article 8 8, Agreement on Government Procurement, Article VII 3, International 
Diary Agreement, Article YIll 7, Agreement Regarding Bovine Meat, Article VI 6 
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dispute jointly consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle the 
dispute. 
5. If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may continue 
while the Panel process proceeds. 
6. The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices conciliation or 
mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute. 
6 Establishment of Panels 
1. If the complaining party so requests, a Panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting 
following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting 
the DSB decides by consensus not to : establish a Panel.^ 
2. The request for the establishment of a Panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether 
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the 
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the 
establishment of a Panel with other than standard terms of reference, the -written request shall include 
the proposed text of special terms of reference. 
7. Terms of Reference of Panels 
1. Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise 
within 20 days from the establishment of the Panel. 'To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions 
in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB 
by (name of party) in document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/ those agreement(s)'. 
2. Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the 
parties to the dispute. 
3. In establishing a Panel, the DSB may authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of 
the Panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1. The 
terms of reference thus drawn up shall be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms of 
reference are agreed upon, any Member may raise any point relating thereto in the DSB. 
8. Composition of Panels 
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, 
including persons who have served on or presented a sic to a Panel, served as a representative of a 
Member or of a contracting party a: GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of 
any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on 
international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a member. 
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a 
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience. 
3. Citizens of Members whose governments* are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined in 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a Panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to 
the dispute agree otherwise. 
4. To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of 
governmental and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph, 
from which panelists may be drawn as appropriate. That list shall include the roster of non-
governmental panelists established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9), and other rosters and 
indicative lists established under any of the covered agreements, and shall retain the names of persons 
on those rosters and indicative lists at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Members 
may periodically suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on 
the indicative list providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of the 
sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon 
approval by the DSB. For each of the individuals on the list, the list shall indicate specific areas of 
experience or expertise of the individual in the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements. 
5. Panels shall be composed of three Panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days 
from the establishment of the Panel, to a Panel composed of five Panelists. Members shall be informed 
promptly of the composition of the panel. 
6. The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the Panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties to 
the dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons. 
5. If the complaining party so requests, a meeting of the Dispute Settlement bcwt shall be convened for this 
purpose within fifteen days of the request, provided that at least ten days' advance notice of the meeting is 
given. 
6. In the case where customs unions or coimnon markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to 
citizens of all member countries of the customs unions or common markets. 
7. If there is no agreement on the Panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a 
Panel, at the request of either party, the Director - General, in consultation with the Chairman of the 
DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the 
Panel by appointing the Panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance 
with any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered 
agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting - -parties to the dispute. The Chairman of 
the DSB shall inform the Member; 3 composition of the Panel thus formed no later than 10 days after 
the date the Chairman receives such a request. 
8. Members shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as Panelists. 
9. Panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as 
representatives of any organization. Member; therefore not give them instructions nor seek to influence 
them as individuals with regard to matters before a Panel. 
10. When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed country Member the 
Panel shall, if the developing country Member so requests, include at least one Panelist from a 
developing country Member. 
11. Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget 
in accordance with criteria to be adopted in General Council, based on recommendations of the 
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. 
9 Procedures for Multiple Complainants 
1. Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a Panel related to the same matter, a 
single Panel may be established to examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all 
Members concerned. A single Panel should be established to examine such complaints whenever 
feasible. 
2. The single Panel shall organize its examination and present its findings to the DSB in such a 
manner that the rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate Panels 
examined the complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the parties to the dispute so requests, the 
Panel shall submit separate reports on the dispute concerned. The written submissions by each of the 
complaints shall be made available to the other complainants, and each complaint shall have the right 
to be present when any one of the other complaints presents its views to the Panel. 
3. If more than one Panel is established to examine the complaints related to the same matter, to the 
greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate Panels and the 
timetable for the Panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized. 
10. Third Parties 
1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members' under a covered; agreement at 
issue in the dispute shall be ftilly taken into account during the panel process. 
2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a Panel and having notified its interest 
to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a 'third') shall have an opportunity to be heard by the 
Panel and to make written 
submissions to the Panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall 
be reflected in the Panel report. 
3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the 
Panel. 
4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a Panel proceeding nullifies or impairs 
benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal dispute 
settlement procedures under this understanding. Such a dispute shall be referred to the original Panel 
wherever possible. 
11 Function of Panels 
The function of Panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this understanding 
and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a Panel should make an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB 
in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements Panels 
should consuh regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a 
mutually satisfactory solution. 
12 Panel Procedures 
1, Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless decides otherwise after consulting 
the parties to the dispute. 
With respect to disputes arising under covered agreements contained in Annex to the WTO Agreement, the term 
'member' as used herein shall refer to only those members that are parties to the relevant Annex 4 agreements Where the 
DSB administers the dispute settlement provisions of a covered agreement contained m Annex 4, only those members 
that are parties to the agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute 
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2. Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality Panel reports, 
while not unduly delaying the Panel process. 
3. After consulting the parties to the dispute, the Panelists shall, as soon as practicable and whenever 
possible within one week after the composition and terms of reference of the Panel have been agreed 
upon, fix the timetable for the Panel process, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of 
Article 4, if relevant. 
4. In determining the timetable for the Panel process, the Panel shall provide sufficient time for the 
parties to the dispute to prepare their submissions. 
5. Panels should set precise deadlines for written submissions by the parties and the parties should 
respect those deadlines. 
6. Each party to the dispute shall deposit its written submissions Secretariat for immediate 
transmission to the Panel and to the other parties to the dispute. The complaining party shall submit its 
first submission in advance of the responding party's first submission unless the Panel de fixing the 
timetable referred to in paragraph 3 and after consultations parties to the dispute, that the parties should 
submit their first submissions simultaneously. When there are sequential arrangements for the deposit 
of first submissions, the Panel shall establish a firm time-period for receipt of 1 responding party's 
submission. Any subsequent written submissions shall submitted simultaneously. 
7. Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the Panel 
shall submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the report of a Panel 
shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind 
any findings and recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of the matter among the parties to 
the dispute has been found, the report of the Panel shall be confined to a brief description of the case 
and to reporting that a solution has been reached. 
8. In order to make the procedures more efficient, the period in which the Panel shall conduct its 
examination, from the date that the composition and terms of reference of the Panel have been agreed 
upon until the date the final report is issued to the parties to the dispute, shall, as a general rule, not 
exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to perishable goods, the Panel shall 
aim to issue its report to the parties to the dispute within three months. 
9. When the Panel considers that it cannot issue its report within six months, or within three months in 
cases of urgency, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an 
estimate of the period within which it will issue its report. In no case should the period from the 
establishment of the Panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months. 
10. In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a developing country Member, the 
parties may agree to extend the periods established in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after the 
relevant period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded, 
the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to extend the 
relevant period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint against a developing 
country. 362 Member, the Panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to 
prepare and present its argumentation. The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of 
Article 21 are not affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph. 
11. Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the Panel's report shall explicitly 
indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-
favourable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements which 
have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures. 
12. The Panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party for a period not 
to exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time-frames set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 
of this Article, paragraph 1 of Article 20, and paragraph 4 of Article 21 shall be extended by the 
amount of time that the work was suspended. If the work of the Panel has been suspended for more 
than 12 months, the authority for establishment of the Panel shall lapse. 
13 Right to Seek Information 
1. Each Panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body 
which it deems appropriate. However, before a Panel seeks such information or advice from any 
individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member, A 
Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a Panel for such information as the Panel 
considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed 
without formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing the 
information. 
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their 
opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other 
technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a Panel may request an advisory report in writing from 




1. Panel deliberations shall be confidential. 
2. The reports of Panels shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute in the light of 
the information provided and the statements made. 
3. Opinions expressed in the Panel report by individual Panelists shall be anonymous... 363 
15 Interim Review Stage 
1. Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the Panel shall issue the 
descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within a 
period of time set by the Panel, the parties shall submit their comments in writing. 
2. Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of comments from the parties to the 
dispute, the Panel shall issue an interim report to the parties, including both the descriptive sections and 
the Panel's findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set by the Panel, a party may submit a 
written request for the Panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the 
final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the Panel shall hold a ftirther meeting with the 
parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party 
within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final Panel report and circulated 
promptly to the Members. 
3. The findings of the final Panel report shall include a discussion of the arguments made at the interim 
review stage. The interim review stage shall be conducted within the time-period set out in paragraph 8 
of Article 12. 
16 Adoption of Panel Reports 
1. In order to provide sufficient time for the Members to consider Panel reports, the reports shall not be 
considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been circulated to the 
Members. 
2. Members having objections to a Panel report shall give written reasons to explain their objections for 
circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the Panel report will be considered 
3. The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate ftilly in the consideration of the Panel 
report by the DSB, and their views shall be fully recorded. 
4. Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a Panel report to the Members the report shall be 
adopted at a DSB meeting 7 unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to 
appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its decision to 
appeal, the report by el shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the 
appeal. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on 
a Panel report. 
17 Appellate Review Standing Appellate Body 
1. A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals 
from Panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. 
Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the 
working procedures of the Appellate Body. 
2. The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each person 
may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons appointed immediately 
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined 
by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose term of 
office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term. 
3. The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in 
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be 
unaffiliated with any government, tee Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of 
membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at all times and 
on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities me other relevant activities of the 
WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or 
indirect conflict of interest. 
4. Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a Panel report. Third parties which have 
notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make 
written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body. 
5. As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute 
formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing its 
fimetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if 
relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall 
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within 
which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 9 days. 
6. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by the Panel. 
7. The Appellate Body shall be provided with appropriate administrative and support as it requires. 
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8. The expenses of persons serving on the Appellate Body, including travel and subsistence allowance, 
shall be met from the WTO budget in accordant criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on 
recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. 
Procedures for Appellate Review 
9. Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of 
the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information... 365 
10. The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. The reports of the Appellate Body 
shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute and in the light of the information 
provided and the statements made. 
11. Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body 
shall be anonymous. 
12. The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during 
the appellate proceeding. 
13. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the Panel. 
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports 
14. An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties 
to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 
days following its circulation to the Members.9' This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the 
right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report. 
18 Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body 
1. There shall be no ex parte communications with the Panel or Appellate Body concerning matters 
under consideration by the Panel or AppeHate Body. 
2. Written submissions to the Panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be 
made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a 
dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as 
confidential information submitted by another Member to the Panel or the Appellate Body which that 
Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member, 
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could 
be disclosed to the public. 
19 Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations 
1. Where a Panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned' bring the measure into conformity with 
that agreement.'" In addition to its recommendations, the Panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in 
which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations. 
In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the Panel 
and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements. 
20 Time-frame for DSB Decisions 
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties to the dispute, the period from the date of 
establishment of the Panel by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the Panel or Appellate report 
for adoption shall as a general rule not exceed nine months where the Panel report is not appealed or 12 
months where the report is appealed. Where either the Panel or the Appellate Body has acted, pursuant 
to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or paragraph 5 of Article 17, to extend the time for providing its report, the 
additional time taken shall be added to the above periods. 
21 Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings 
I. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members. 2. Particular attention should be paid to 
matters affecting the interests of developing country Members with respect to measures which have 
been subject to dispute settlement. 
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days" after the date of adoption of the Panel or Appellate Body 
report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the 
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time m which 
to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be: (a) the period of time proposed by the Member 
concerned, provided that such period is approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval, (b) a 
8. If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose 
9 The 'Member concerned' is the party to the dispute to which the Panel or Appellate Body recommendations are directed 
10. With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement, see 
Article 26. 
11. If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose 
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period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the date of adoption of 
the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement, (c) a period of time determined 
through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and 
rulings.'^ In such arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator" should be that the reasonable period of time 
to implement Panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of 
adoption of a Panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending 
upon the particular circumstances. 
Except where the Panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to paragraph 9 of 
Article 12 or paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing the report, the period from the date of 
establishment of the Panel by the DSB until the date of determination of the reasonable period of time 
shall not exceed 15 months unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the Panel or 
Appellate Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report, the additional time taken shall be 
added to the 15-month period; provided that unless the parties to the dispute agree that there are 
exceptional circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months. 5. Where there is disagreement as 
to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute 
settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original Panel. The Panel shall 
circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the Panel considers 
that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons 
for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. 6. The DSB 
shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings. The issue of 
implementation of the recommend or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any Member at any time 
following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB after six months following the 
date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the 
DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days prior to each such DSB meeting, the Member 
concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing of its progress in the implementation of 
the recommendations or rulings. 
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the DSB shall consider 
what fiirther action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances. 
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action 
might be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, 
but also their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned. 
22 Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions 
1. Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures 
available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable 
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
is preferred to ftiU implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the 
covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered 
agreements. 
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered 
agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings 
within the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member 
shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into 
negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to 
developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 
20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute 
settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the 
Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements... 368 
3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply 
the following principles and procedures: 
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or 
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the Panel or Appellate Body has 
found a violation or other nullification or impairment; 
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other 
obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations 
in other sectors under the same agreement; 
12. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be 
appointed by the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties. 
13. The expression 'arbitrator' shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group. 
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(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other 
obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are 
serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered 
agreement; 
(d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account: 
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the Panel or Appellate Body has 
found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party, 
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader 
economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; 
(e) if that party decides to request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations 
pursuant to sub-paragraphs (b) or (c), it shall state the reasons therefor in its request. At the same time 
as the request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded to the relevant Councils and also, in 
the case of a request pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) the relevant sectors bodies; 
(f) for purposes of this paragraph, 'sector' means: 
(i) with respect to goods, all goods; 
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current 'Services Sectoral 
Classification List' which identifies such sectors;''' 
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of a categories of intellectual 
property rights covered in Section I, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, or Section 5, or Section 6, 
or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part IV of the Agreement on TRIPS; 
(g) for purposes of this paragraph, 'agreement' means:' 
(i) with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, taken as a 
whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements in so far as the relevant parties to the dispute are 
parties to these agreements; 
(ii) with respect to services, the GATS; 
(iii) with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPS. 
4. The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be 
equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment. 
5. The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement 
prohibits such suspension. 
6. When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request shall grant authorization 
to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of 
time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. However, if the Member concerned 
objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in 
paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend 
concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to 
arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original Panel, if members are available, or by 
an arbitrator" appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the date 
of expiry of the reasonable period of time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended 
during the course of the arbitration. 
7. The arbitrator'* acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the concessions or 
other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is 
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the proposed 
suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement. However, if the 
matter referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 
have not been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim. In the event the arbitrator determines 
that those principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining party shall apply them 
intent with paragraph 3. The parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties 
concerned shall not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed promptly of the decision of 
the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations 
where the request is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator, unless the DSB decides by consensus 
to reject the request. 
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until 
such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the 
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or 
impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In accordance with Paragraph 6 
of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted 
14 The list in document MTN GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors 
15 The expression 'arbitrator' shall be interpreted as referring either to anindi vidual or a group 
16. The expression 'arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group or to the members of the 
onginal Panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator 
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recommendations or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or 
concessions or other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a measure into 
conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented. 
9. The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of measures 
affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a 
Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agreement has not been observed, the 
responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its 
observance. The provisions of the covered agreements and this Understanding relating to compensation 
and suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to 
secure such observation.'^ 
Strengthening of the Multilateral System 
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of 
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding. 
2. In such cases. Members shall: (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has 
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance 
with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent 
with the findings contained in the Panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration 
award rendered under this Understanding; (b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine 
the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and 
rulings; and (c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of 
concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures 
before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the 
failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable 
period of time. 
24 Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Country Members 
1. At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures 
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special 
situation of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint in 
raising matters under these procedures involving a least-developed country Member. If nullification or 
impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least-developed country Member, complaining 
parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the 
application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to these procedures. 
2. In dispute settlement cases involving a least-developed coimtry Member, where a satisfactory 
solution has not been found in the course of consultations the Director-General or the Chairman of the 
DSB shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member offer their good offices, conciliation and 
mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle the dispute, before a request for a Panel is made. 
The Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above assistance, may consult any 
source which either deems appropriate. 
25 Arbitration 
1. Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate 
the solution of certain disputes that concern is issues that are clearly defined by both parties. 
2. Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort to arbitration shall be subject to mutual 
agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed. Agreements to resort to 
arbitration shall be notified to all Members sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement of the 
arbitration process. 
3. Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of the 
parties which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration. The parties to the proceeding shall agree to 
abide by the arbitration award. Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council or 
Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point relating thereto. 
4. Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards 
26 Non-Violation 
26.1 Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(b) of XXIII ofGA TT1994 
Where the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a covered 
agreement, a Panel or the Appellate Body may only make rulings and recommendations where a party 
to the dispute considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered 
17 Where the provisions of any covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or 
authorities withm the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the 
provisions of such covered agreement shall prevail 
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agreement is being nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being 
impeded as a result of the application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
provisions of that Agreement. Where and to the extent that such party considers and a Panel or the 
Appellate Body determines that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict with the provisions of 
a covered agreement to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are 
applicable, the procedures in this Understanding shall apply, subject to the following: (a) the 
complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a 
measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement; (b) where a measure has been 
found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the attainment of objectives, of the relevant 
covered agreement without violation thereof, there is no obligation to withdraw the measure. However, 
in such cases, the Panel or the Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a 
mutually satisfactory adjustment; (c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration 
provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 21, upon request of either party, may include a determination of 
the level of benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways and means of 
reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be binding upon the parties to 
the dispute;. 372 (d) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be 
part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute. 
26.2 Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(c) ofXXIII ofGA TT1994 
Where the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a 
covered agreement, a Panel may only make rulings and recommendations where a party considers that 
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is being nullified 
or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a result of the 
existence it any situation other than those to which the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Article 
XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable. Where and to the extent that such party considers and a Panel 
determines that the matter is covered by this paragraph, the procedures of this Understanding shall 
apply only up to and including the point in the proceedings where the Panel report has been circulated 
to the Member; The dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the Decision of 12 April 1989 
(BISD 36S/6I-67) shall apply to consideration for adoption, and surveillance and implementation of 
recommendations and rulings. The following shall also apply: (a) the complaining party shall present a 
detailed justification in support of any argument made with respect to issues covered under this 
paragraph; (b) in cases involving matters covered by this paragraph, if a Panel finds that cases also 
involve dispute settlement matters other than those covered by this paragraph the Panel shall circulate a 
report to the DSB addressing any such matters and a separate report on matters falling under this 
paragraph. 
27 Responsibilities of the Secretariat 
1. The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting Panels, especially on the legal, historical and 
procedural aspects of the matters dealt, with, and of providing secretarial and technical support. 
2. While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their request, there may also 
be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to 
developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal expert 
from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country Member which so requests. 
This expert shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality 
of the Secretariat. 3. The Secretariat shall conduct special training courses for interested Members 
concerning these dispute settlement procedures and practices so as to enable Members' experts to be 
better informed in this regard. 
APPENDIX 1: Agreements Covered by the Understanding 
(A) Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(B) Multilateral Trade Agreements 
Annex 1 A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods 
Annex IB: General Agreement on Trade in Services 
Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(C) Plurilateral Trade Agreements 
Annex 4: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement on Government Procurement, International 
Dairy Agreement, International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
The applicability of this Understanding to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements shall be subject 
to the adoption of a decision by the parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application 
of the Understanding to the individual agreement, including any special or additional rules or 
procedures for inclusion in Appendix 2, as notified to the DSB. 
APPENDIX 2: Special or Additional Rules and Procedures Contained in the Covered 
Agreements 
Special or Additional Rules and Procedures 
Xlll 
Agreement Rules and Procedures Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 36 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 2.14, 2.21, 4.4, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 5.1 through 
8.12 Annex 2 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 14.2 through 14.4, 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 17.4 through 17.7 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 19.3 through 19.5, Annex 11.2(0, 
3, 9, 21 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 4.2 through 4.12, 6.6, 7.2 through 7.10, 
8.5, footnote 35, 24.4, 27.7, 
Annex V General Agreement on Trade in Services XXI1:3, XXII1:3 
Annex on Financial Services 4 
Annex on Air Transport Services 4 
Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the GATS 1 through 5 
The list of rules and procedures in this Appendix includes provisions where only a part of the 
provision may be relevant in this context. Any special or additional rules or procedures in the 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the competent bodies of each agreement and as 
notified to the DSB. 
APPENDIX 3: Working Procedures 
1. In its proceedings the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of this Understanding. In addition, 
the following working procedures shall apply. 
2. The Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties to the dispute, and interested parties, shall be 
present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it. 
3. The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing 
in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions 
to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the 
Panel which that Member has designated as confidential. Where a party to a dispute submits a 
confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, 
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be 
disclosed to the public. 
4. Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, the parties to the dispute shall 
transmit to the Panel written submissions in which they present the facts of the case and their 
arguments. 
5. At its first substantive meeting with the parties, the Panel shall ask the party which has brought the 
complaint to present its case. Subsequently, and still at the same meeting, the party against which the 
complaint has been brought shall be asked to present its point of view. 
6. AH third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to the DSB shall be invited in 
writing to present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the Panel set aside for 
that purpose. All such third parties may be present during the entirety of this session. 
7. Formal rebuttals shall be made at a second substantive meeting of the Panel. The party complained 
against shall have the right to take the floor first to be followed by the complaining party. The parties 
shall submit, prior to that meeting, written rebuttals to the Panel. 
8. The Panel may at any time put questions to the parties and ask them for explanations either in the 
course of a meeting with the parties or in writing. 
9. The parties to the dispute and any third party invited to present its views in accordance with Article 
10 shall make available to the Panel a written version of their oral statements. 
10. In the interest of ftill transparency, the presentations, rebuttals and statements referred to in 
paragraphs 5 to 9 shall be made in the presence of the parties. Moreover, each party's written 
submissions, including any comments on the descriptive part of the report and responses to questions 
put by the Para, shall be made available to the other party or parties. 
11. Any additional procedures specific to the Panel. 
12. Proposed timetable for Panel work: 
(a) Receipt of first written submissions of the parties: 
(1) complaining Party: 3-6 weeks 
(2) Party complained against: 2-3 weeks 
(b) Date, time and place of first substantive meeting with the parties; party session: 1-2 
weeks 
(c) Receipt of written rebuttals of the parties: 2^-3 weeks 
(d) Date, time and place of second substantive meeting with the parties: 1-2 weeks 
(e) Issuance of descriptive part of the report to the parties: 2-4 
(f) Receipt of comments by the parties on the descriptive part of the r 2 weeks 
(g) Issuance of the interim report, including the findings and conclusions, to the parties: 2-4 
weeks 
(h) Deadline for party to request review of part(s) of report: 1 week 
(i) Period of review by Panel, including possible additional meeting with parties: 2 weeks 
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(j) Issuance of final report to parties to dispute: 2 weeics 
(k) Circulation of the final report to the Members: 3 weeks 
The above calendar may be changed in the light of unforeseen developments. Additional 
meetings with the parties shall be scheduled if required. 
APPENDIX 4: Expert Review Groups 
The following rules and procedures shall apply to expert review groups established in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 13. 
1. Expert review groups are under the Panel's authority. Their terms of reference and detailed working 
procedures shall be decided by the Panel, and they shall report to the Panel. 
2. Participation in expert review groups shall be restricted to persons of professional standing and 
experience in the field in question. 
3. Citizens of parties to the dispute shall not serve on an expert review group without the joint 
agreement of the parties to the dispute, except in exceptional circumstances when the Panel considers 
that the need for specialized scientific expertise cannot be ftilfilled otherwise. Government officials of 
parties to the dispute shall not serve on an expert review group. Members of expert review groups shall 
serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any 
organization. Governments or organizations shall therefore not give them instructions with regard to 
matters before an expert review group. 
4. Expert review groups may consult and seek information and technical advice from any source they 
deem appropriate. Before an expert review group seeks such information or advice from a source 
within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the government of that Member. Any Member shall 
respond promptly and fully to any request by an expert review group for such information as the expert 
review group considers necessary and appropriate. 
5. The parties to a dispute shall have access to all relevant information provided to an expert review 
group, unless it is of a confidential nature. Confidential information provided to the expert review 
group shall not be released without formal authorization from the government, organization or person 
providing the information. Where such information is requested fi-om the expert review group but 
release of such information by the expert review group is not authorized, a non-confidential summary 
of the information will be provided by the government, organization or person supplying the 
information. 
6. The expert review group shall submit a draft report to the parties to the dispute with a view to 
obtaining their comments, and taking them into account, as appropriate, in the final report, which shall 
also be issued to the parties to the dispute when it is submitted to the Panel. The final report of the 




Working Procedures for Appellate Review 
Deflnitions 
1. In these Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 
"appellant" 
means any party to the dispute that has filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 20 or has filed a 
submission pursuant to paragraph I of Rule 23; 
"appellate report" 
means an Appellate Body report as described in Article 17 of the DSD; 
"appellee" 
means any party to the dispute that has filed a submission pursuant to Rule 22 or paragraph 3 of Rule 
23; 
"consensus" 
a decision is deemed to be made by consensus if no Member formally objects to it; "covered 
agreements" has the same meaning as "covered agreements" in paragraph \ of Article 1 of the DSU; 
"division" 
means the three Members who are selected to serve on any one appeal in accordance with paragraph 1 
of Article 17 of the DSU and paragraph 2 of Rule 6; 
"documents" 
means the Notice of Appeal and the submissions and other written statements presented by the 
participants; 
"DSB" 
means the Dispute Settlement Body established under Article 2 of the DSU; 
"DSU" 
means the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes which is 
Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement; 
"Member" 
means a Member of the Appellate Body who has been appointed by the DSB in accordance with 
Article 17 of the DSU;WT/AB/WP/7 
"participant" 
means any party to the dispute that has filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 20 or a submission 
pursuant to Rule 22 or paragraphs 1 or 3 of Rule 23; 
"party to the dispute" 
means any WTO Member who was a complaining or defending party in the panel dispute, but does not 
include a third party; 
"proof of service" 
means a letter or other written acknowledgement that a document has been delivered, as required, to the 
parties to the dispute, participants, third parties or third participants, as the case may be; 
"Rules" 
means these Working Procedures for Appellate Review; 
"Rules of Conduct" 
means the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes as attached in Annex II to these Rules; 
"SCM Agreement" 
means the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which is in Annex 1A to the WTO 
Agreement; 
"Secretariat" 
means the Appellate Body Secretariat; 
"service address" 
means the address of the party to the dispute, participant, third party or third participant as generally 
used in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, unless the party to the dispute, participant, third party or 
third participant has clearly indicated another address; 
"third participant" 
means any third party that has filed a written submission pursuant to Role 24(1); or any third party that 
appears at the oral hearing, whether or not it makes an oral statement at that hearing; 
"third party" 
means any WTO Member who has notified the DSB of its substantial interest in the matter before the 
panel pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the DSU;.WT/AB/WP/7 
"WTO" 
means the World Trade Organization; 
"WTO Agreement" 
XVI 
means the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, 
Morocco on 15 April 1994; 
"WTO Member" 
means any State or separate customs territory possessing fiill autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations that has accepted or acceded to the WTO in accordance with Articles XI, XII or 
XIV of the WTO Agreement; and 
"WTO Secretariat" 
means the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization. .WT/AB/WP/7 
Part I: Members 
Duties and Responsibilities 
1(1) A Member shall abide by the terms and conditions of the DSU, these Rules and any decisions of 
the DSB affecting the Appellate Body. 
(2) During his/ her term, a Member shall not accept any employment nor pursue any professional 
activity that is inconsistent with his/her duties and responsibilities. 
(3) A Member shall exercise his/her office without accepting or seeking instructions from any 
international, governmental, or non-governmental organization or any private source. 
(4) A Member shall be available at all times and on short notice and, to this end, shall keep the 
Secretariat informed of his/her whereabouts at all times. 
Decision-Making 
3.(1) In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU, decisions relating to an appeal shall be 
taken solely by the division assigned to that appeal. Other decisions shall be taken by the Appellate 
Body as a whole. (2) The Appellate Body and its divisions shall make every effort to take their 
decisions by consensus. Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter 
at issue shall be decided by a majority vote. 
Collegiality 
-.(I) To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, and to draw on the individual and 
collective expertise of the Members, the Members shall convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of 
policy, practice and procedure. 
(2) The Members shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the 
WTO and, in particular, each Member shall receive all documents filed in an appeal. 
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(3) In accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the divisicn responsible for deciding 
each appeal shall exchange views with the other Members before the division finalizes the appellate 
report for circulation :: the WTO Members. This paragraph is subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 ;: Rule 11. 
(4) Nothing in these Rules shall be interpreted as interfering with a divisicr ; full authority and 
freedom to hear and decide an appeal assigned to it :3H accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of 
the DSU..WT/AB/WP/7 
Chairman 
5. (1) There shall be a Chairman of the Appellate Body who shall be elected by ~= Members. 
(2) The term of office of the Chairman of the Appellate Body shall be one vezr The Appellate Body 
Members may decide to extend the term of office for ir additional period of up to one year. However, 
in order to ensure rotation oi the Chairmanship, no Member shall serve as Chairman for more than r. ? 
consecutive terms. 
(3) The Chairman shall be responsible for the overall direction of the Appears Body business, and in 
particular, his/her responsibilities shall include: 
(a) the supervision of the internal functioning of the Appellate Body; ir z 
(b) any such other duties as the Members may agree to entrust to him ': ^r. 
(4) Where the office of the Chairman becomes vacant due to permanent incapacity as a result of 
illness or death or by resignation or expiration J his/her term, the Members shall elect a new Chairman 
who shall serve I full term in accordance with paragraph 2. 
(5) In the event of a temporary absence or incapacity of the Chairman -_"<£ Appellate Body shall 
authorize another Member to act as Chairmar '^ a interim, and the Member so authorized shall 
temporarily exercise all tJ powers, duties and functions of the Chairman until the Chairman is caparii of 
resuming his/her functions. 
Divisions 
6.(1) In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU, a division consis of three Members 
shall be established to hear and decide an appeal. 
(2) The Members constituting a division shall be selected on the basis of rot while taking into account 
the principles of random selection, unpredict and opportunity for all Members to serve regardless of 
their national; 
(3) A Member selected pursuant to paragraph 2 to serve on a division serve on that division, unless: 
XVll 
(i) he/she is excused from that division pursuant to Rules 9 or 10; (ii) he/she has notified the 
Chairman and the Presiding Member th; - : 
she is prevented from serving on the division because of illr.e 
other serious reasons pursuant to Rule 12; or 
(iii) he/she has notified his/her intentions to resign pursuant to Rule 14..WT/AB/WP/7 
Presiding Member of the Division 
7.(1) Each division shall have a Presiding Member, who shall be elected by the Members of that 
division. 
(2) The responsibilities of the Presiding Member shall include: 
(a) coordinating the overall conduct of the appeal proceeding; 
(b) chairing all oral hearings and meetings related to that appeal; and 
(c) coordinating the drafting of the appellate report. 
(3) In the event that a Presiding Member becomes incapable of performing his/her duties, the other 
Members serving on that division and the Member selected as a replacement pursuant to Rule 13 shall 
elect one of their number to act as the Presiding Member. 
Rules of Conduct 
S.(l) On a provisional basis, the Appellate Body adopts those provisions of the Rules of Conduct for the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, attached in Annex II to 
these Rules, which are applicable to it, until Rules of Conduct are approved by the DSB. 
(2) Upon approval of Rules of Conduct by the DSB, such Rules of Conduct shall be directly 
incorporated and become part of these Rules and shall supersede Annex II. 
9.(1) Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, each Member shall take the steps set out in Article 
VI:4(b)(i) of Annex II, and a Member may consult with the other Members prior to completing the 
disclosure form. 
(2) Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, the professional staff of the Secretariat assigned to that 
appeal shall take the steps set out in Article VL4(b)(ii) of Annex II. 
(3) Where information has been submitted pursuant to Article Vl:4(b)(i) or (ii) of Annex II, the 
Appellate Body shall consider whether further action is necessary. 
(4) As a result of the Appellate Body's consideration of the matter pursuant to paragraph 3, the 
Member or the professional staff member concerned may continue to be assigned to the division or 
may be excused from the division. 
10.(1) Where evidence of a material violation is filed by a participant pursuant to Article VHl of Annex 
II, such evidence shall be confidential and shall be supported by affidavits made by persons having 
actual knowledge or a reasonable belief as to the truth of the facts stated. 
(2) Any evidence filed pursuant to Article VIII: 1 of Annex II shall be filed at the earliest practicable 
time: that is, forthwith after the participant submitting it 
knew or reasonably could have known of the facts supporting it. In no .-3»J 
shall such evidence be filed after the appellate report is circulated to 4hJ WTO 
Members..WT/AB/WP/7 
(3) Where a participant fails to submit such evidence at the earliest practice: e time, it shall file an 
explanation in writing of the reasons why it did not do sr earlier, and the Appellate Body may decide to 
consider or not to conskiJ such evidence, as appropriate. 
(4) While taking fiilly into account paragraph 5 of Article 17 of the DSU, whsx evidence has been 
filed pursuant to Article VIII of Annex II, an appeal =rj_ be suspended for fifteen days or until the 
procedure referred to in Artroe VIIL14-16 of Annex II is completed, whichever is earlier. 
(5) As a result of the procedure referred to in Article VIII: 14-16 of Annex II- rac Appellate Body 
may decide to dismiss the allegation, to excuse the Me 
or professional staff member concerned from being assigned to the div or make such other order as it 
deems necessary in accordance with . VIII of Annex II. 
11. (1) A Member who has submitted a disclosure form with information atta;'- (-pursuant to Article 
VI\4^o)^i) ot is tWe subject oi evidence ot a mate violation pursuant to Article VIILl of Annex II, shall 
not participate in < decision taken pursuant to paragraph 4 of Rule 9 or paragraph 5 of Rule 
(2) A Member who is excused from a division pursuant to paragraph 4 of} 9 or paragraph 5 of Rule 
10 shall not take part in the exchange of conducted in that appeal pursuant to paragraph 3 of Rule 4 
(3) A Member who, had he/she been a Member of a division, would have besr excused from that 
division pursuant to paragraph 4 of Rule 9, shall not zaj-t part in the exchange of views conducted in 
that appeal pursuant to paragra re 3 of Rule 4. 
Incapacity 
12.(1) A Member who is prevented from serving on a division by illness or fx other serious reasons 
shall give notice and duly explain such reasons to rrtr Chairman and to the Presiding Member. 




13. Where a Member is unable to serve on a division for a reason set ou: ir paragraph 3 of Rule 6, 
another Member shall be selected forthwith pursuar: to paragraph 2 of Rule 6 to replace the Member 
originally selected for thi -division. 
Resignation 
14.(1) A Member who intends to resign from his/her office shall notify his/her intentions in writing to 
the Chairman of the Appellate Body who shall immediately inform the Chairman of the DSB, the 
Director-General and the other Members of the Appellate Body..WT/AB/WP/7 The resignation shall 
take effect 90 days after the notification has been made pursuant to paragraph 1, unless the DSB, in 
consultation with the Appellate Body, decides otherwise. 
A person who ceases to be a Member of the Appellate Body may, with the : u thorization of the 
Appellate Body and upon notification to the DSB,: rmplete the disposition of any appeal to which that 
person was assigned -'vhile a Member, and that person shall, for that purpose only, be deemed " 
continue to be a Member of the Appellate Body..WT/AB/WP/7 
" II: Process 
- •" Provisions 
"- the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, where a procedural 
question arises that is not covered by these Soles, a division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the 
purposes of r-it appeal only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the rcher covered 
agreements and these Rules. Where such a procedure is adopted, the division shall immediately notify 
the parties to the dispute, t irdcipants, third parties and third participants '^ <s well as the other Members 
a: the Appellate Body. 
- exceptional circumstances, where strict adherence to a time period set: -: in these Rules would result 
in a manifest unfairness, a party to the :_5Tu.te, a participant, a third party or a third participant may 
request that modify a time period set out in these Rules for the filing of or the date set out in the 
working schedule for the oral hearing, "-ere such a request is granted by a division, any modification of 
time rail be notified to the parties to the dispute, participants, third parties - :hird participants in a 
revised working schedule. 
-ess the DSB decides otherwise, in computing any time period stipulated the DSU or in the special or 
additional provisions of the covered r-rrinents, or in these Rules, within which a communication must 
be - -; or an action taken by a WTO Member to exercise or preserve its -rrs, the day from which the 
time period begins to run shall be excluded subject to paragraph 2, the last day of the time-period shall 
be SB Decision on "Expiration of Time-Periods in the DSU", WT/DSB/ shall apply to appeals heard by 
divisions of the Appellate Body. 
18.(1) No document is considered filed with the Appellate Body unless :_-= document is received by 
the Secretariat within the time period set out ~r filing in accordance with these Rules. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, every document filed "r~ ; party to the dispute, a 
participant, a third party or a third participant sh=l :* served on each of the other parties to the dispute, 
participants, third psrc — and third participants in the appeal. 
(3) A proof of service on the other parties to the dispute, participants, thrr parties and third 
participants shall appear on, or be affixed to, each docurverr filed with the Secretariat under paragraph 
1 above... WT/AB/WP/7 
(4) A document shall be served by the most expeditious means of delivery a communication available, 
including by: 
(a) delivering a copy of the document to the service address of the ra_— to the dispute, participant, 
third party or third participant; or 
(b) sending a copy of the document to the service address of the parr i: the dispute, participant, third 
party or third participant by facsimile transmission, expedited delivery courier or expedited mail servi;; 
(5) Upon authorization by the division, a participant or a third participant — j . correct clerical errors 
in any of its submissions. Such correction shall be made within 3 days of the filing of the original 
submission and a copy c: ±e revised version shall be filed with the Secretariat and served upon the :-_-
— parties to the dispute, participants, third parties and third participants. 
Ex Parte Communications 
19.(1) Neither a division nor any of its Members shall meet with or contacr :r-party to the dispute, 
participant, third party or third participant in the abser -of the other parties to the dispute, participants. 
third parties and thz; participants. 
(2) No Member of the division may discuss any aspect of the subject matter rr an appeal with any 
party to the dispute, participant, third party or thr: participant in the absence of the other Members of 
the division. 
(3) A Member who is not assigned to the division hearing the appeal shall r :-discuss any aspect of 
the subject matter of the appeal with any party to rae dispute, participant, third party or third 
participant. 
Commencement of Appeal 
XIX 
20.(1) An appeal shall be commenced by notification in writing to the DSz r accordance with paragraph 
4 of Article 16 of the DSU and simultar.e: _• filing of a Notice of Appeal with the Secretariat. (2) A 
Notice of Appeal shall include the following information: 
Annexure II 
(a) the title of the panel report under appeal; 
(b) the name of the party to the dispute filing the Notice of Appeal; 
(c) the service address, telephone and facsimile numbers of the party to the dispute; and (d) a brief 
statement of the nature of the appeal, including the allegations of errors in the issues of law covered in 
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.WT/ AB/WP/7 
Appellant's Submission 
21.(1) The appellant shall, within 10 days after the date of the filing of the Notice of Appeal, file with 
the Secretariat a written submission prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 and serve a copy of the 
submission on the other parties to the dispute and third parties. (2) A written submission referred to in 
paragraph I shall 
(a) be dated and signed by the appellant; and 
(b) set out 
(i) a precise statement of the grounds for the appeal, including the specific allegations of errors in the 
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel, and the legal 
arguments in support thereof; 
(if) a precise statement of the provisions of the covered agreements and other legal sources relied on; 
and 
(iii) the nature ofthe decision or ruling sought. 
Appellee's Submission 
22. (1) Any party to the dispute that wishes to respond to allegations raised in an appellant's submission 
filed pursuant to Rule 21 may, within 25 days after the date ofthe filing ofthe Notice of Appeal, file 
with the Secretariat a written submission prepared in accordance with paragraph 2 and serve a copy of 
the submission on the appellant, other parties to the dispute and third parties. (2) A written submission 
referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
(a) be dated and signed by the appellant and 
(b) set out 
(i) a precise statement ofthe grounds for opposing the specific allegations of errors in the issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel raised in the appellant's 
submission, ana the legal arguments in support thereof; 
(ii) an acceptance of, or opposition to, each ground set out in the appellant's submission; 
(iii) a precise statement of the provisions of the covered agreements 
and other legal sources relied on; and (iv) the nature ofthe decision or ruling sought. 
Multiple Appeals 
23.(T) Within 15 days after the date ofthe filing ofthe Nofice of Appeal, a party to the dispute other 
than the original appellant may join in that appeal or appeal on the basis of other alleged errors in the 
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. 
(2) Any written submission made pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be in the format required by paragraph 
2ofRule2I..WT/AB/WP/7 
(3) The appellant, any appellate and any other party to the dispute that wishes to respond to a 
submission filed pursuant to paragraph I may file a written submission within 25 days after the date of 
the filing ofthe Notice of Appeal and any such submission shall be in the format required by paragraph 
2 of Rule 22. 
(4) This Rule does not preclude a party to the dispute which has not filed a submission under Rule 21 
or paragraph 1 of this Rule from exercising Us right of appeal pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of 
the DSU. 
(5) Where a party to the dispute which has not filed a submission under Rule 2! or paragraph 1 of this 
Rule exercises its right to appeal as set out in paragraph 4, a single division shall examine the appeals. 
Third Participants 
24. (1) Any third party may file a written submission containing the grounds ar.i legal arguments in 
support of its position. Such submission shall be file: within 25 days after the date ofthe filing ofthe 
Notice of Appeal. 
(2) A third party not filing a written submission shall, within the same period: : 25 days, notify the 
Secretariat in writing if it intends to appear at the cr:_ hearing, and, if so, whether it intends to make an 
oral statement. 
(3) Third participants are encouraged to file written submissions to facilities their positions being 
taken fully into account by the division hearing ft -appeal and in order that participants and other third 
participants will h=- e notice of positions to be taken at the oral hearing. 
(4) Any third party that has neither filed a written submission pursuant: paragraph (1), nor notified the 
Secretariat pursuant to paragraph (2), notify the Secretariat that it intends to appear at the oral hearing. 
XX 
and ; request to make an oral statement at the hearing. Such notifications requests should be notified to 
the Secretariat in writing at the earlies opportunity. 
Transmitted of Record 
25.(1) Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, the Director-General of the WTO transmit forthwith to 
the Appellate Body the complete record of the panel 
proceeding. 
The complete record of the panel proceeding includes, but is not limited to: 
(i) written submissions, rebuttal submissions, and supporting evidence attached thereto by the parties to 
the dispute and the third parties; 
(ii) written arguments submitted at the panel meetings with the parties to the dispute and the third 
parties, the recordings of such panel meetings, and any written answers to questions posed at such 
panel meetings; 
(iii) the correspondence relating to the panel dispute between the panel or the WTO Secretariat and the 
parties to the dispute or the third parties; and 
(iv) any other documentation submitted to the panel...WT/AB/WP/7, 
forking Schedule 
Forthwith after the commencement of an appeal, the division shall draw up an appropriate working 
schedule for that appeal in accordance with the time periods stipulated in these Rules. 2) The working 
schedule shall set forth precise dates for the filing of documents and a timetable for the division's work, 
including where possible, the date for the oral hearing. 
(3) In accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 4 of the DSU, in appeals of urgency, including those 
which concern perishable goods, the Appellate Body shall make every effort to accelerate the appellate 
proceedings to the greatest extent possible. A division shall take this into account in drawing up its 
working schedule for that appeal. 
(4) The Secretariat shall serve forthwith a copy of the working schedule on the appellant, the parties to 
the dispute and any third parties. 
Oral Hearing 
I 27.(i) A division shall hold an oral hearing, which shall be held, as a general rule, 30 days after the 
date of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
(2) Where possible in the working schedule or otherwise at the earliest possible date, the Secretariat 
shall notify all parties to the dispute, participants, third parties and third participants of the date for the 
oral hearing. 
(3) (a) Any third party that has filed a submission pursuant to Rule 24( 1), or 
has notified the Secretariat pursuant to Rule 24(2) that it intends to appear at the oral hearing, may 
appear at the oral hearing, make an oral statement at the hearing, and respond to questions posed by the 
division. 
(b) Any third party that has notified the Secretariat pursuant to Rule 24(4) that it intends to appear at 
the oral hearing may appear at the oral hearing. 
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(c) Any third party that has made a request pursuant to Rule 24(4) mar : the discretion of the division 
hearing the appeal, taking into accourr the requirements of due process, make an oral statement at the 
hearir,.; and respond to questions posed by the division. 
(4) The Presiding Member may, as necessary, set time-limits for oral argumer -and 
presentations...WT/AB/WP/7. 
Written Responses 
28. (I) At any time during the appellate proceeding, including, in particular, dun" the oral hearing, the 
division may address questions orally or in writing :: or request additional memoranda from, any 
participant or third participar -. and specify the time periods by which written responses or memorar.^; 
shall be received. 
(2) Any such questions, responses or memoranda shall be made available :: the other participants and 
third participants in the appeal, who shall ':* given an opportunity to respond. 
(3) When the questions or requests for memoranda are made prior to the cri_ hearing, then the 
questions or requests, as well as the responses :: memoranda, shall also be made available to the third 
parties, who shall als-: be given an opportunity to respond. 
Failure to Appear 
29. Where a participant fails to file a submission within the required time peric i; or fails to appear at 
the oral hearing, the division shall, after hearing ir.-i views of the participants, issue such order, 
including dismissal of the appeal as it deems appropriate. 
Withdrawal of Appeal 
30. (I) At any time during an appeal, the appellant may withdraw its appeal bv 
XXI 
notifying the Appellate Body, which shall forthwith notify the DSB. (2) Where a mutually agreed 
solution to a dispute which is the subject of ar. appeal has been notified to the DSB pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article 3 c: the DSU, it shall be notified to the Appellate Body. 
Prohibited Subsidies 
31.(1) Subject to Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, the general provisions of the>e Rules shall apply to 
appeals relating to panel reports concerning prohibited subsidies under Part 11 of that Agreement 
(2) The working schedule for an appeal involving prohibited subsidies under Part II of the SCM 
Agreement shall be as set out in Annex I to these Rule;. 
Entry into Force and Amendment 
32.(1) These Rules shall enter into force on 15 February 1996. 
12) The Appellate Body may amend these Rules in compliance with the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the DSU. 3) Whenever there is an amendment to 
the DSU or to the special or additional rules and procedures of the covered agreements, the Appellate 
Body shall examine whether amendments to these Rules are necessary. WT/AB/ WP/7 
Annexe I: Timetable for Appeals 
1-general Appeals Prohibited Subsidies Appeals 
Jay Day 
Choice of Appeal 1 
Appellant's Submission210 5 
Appellant(s) Submission(s)315 7 
Submission(s)4 
Third Participant(s) Submission(s)5 
Third Participant(s) Notification(s)6 
OralHearing7 30 15 
Circulation of Appellate Report 60 - 90s 30 - 609 
:SB Meeting for Adoption 90 -12010 50 - 80n 




On 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh, Ministers welcomed the stronger and clearer legal framework they had 
adopted for the conduct of international trade, including a more effective and reliable dispute 
settlement mechanism; "Hjognizing the importance of full adherence to the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and the principles for the management of 
disputes applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, as further elaborated and modified by 
the DSU; 
Affirming that the operation of the DSU would be strengthened by rules of 
1 Rule 20. 
2 Rule 21. 
3 Rule 23(1). 
4 Rules 22 and 23(3). 
5 Rule 24(1). 
6 Rule 24(2). 
7 Rule 27 
8 Article 17:5, DSU 
9 Article 4:9, SCM Agreement. 
10 Article 17:14, DSU. 
11 Article 4:9, SCM Agreement..WT/AB/WP/7 
WTO Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries conduct designed to maintain the integrity, 
impartiality and confidentiality in proceedings conducted under the DSU thereby enhancing 
confidence in the dispute settlement mechanism; Hereby establish the following Rules of Conduct. 
II. Governing Principle 
I. Each person covered by these Rules (as defined in paragraph 1 of Section F\ below and hereinafter 
called "covered person") shall be independent and impartial shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of 
interest and shall respect the confidential!:-, of proceedings of bodies pursuant to the dispute settlement 
mechanism, so that through the observance of such standards of conduct the integrity and impartiality 
of that mechanism are preserved. These Rules shall in no way modify the rights and obligations of 
Members under the DSU nor the rules and procedures therein. 
III. Observance of the Governing Principle 
1. To ensure the observance of the Governing Principle of these Rules, each covered person is expected 
(1) to adhere strictly to the provisions of the DSU; (2) to disclose the existence or development of any 
interest, relationship or matter that that person could reasonably be expected to know and that is likely 
to affect, or give rise to justifiable douks as to, that person's independence or impartiality; and (3 to 
xxu 
take due care in the performance of their duties to fulfil these expectations including through avoidance 
of any direct or indirect conflicts of interest in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. 
2. Pursuant to the Governing Principle, each covered person, shall be independent and impartial, and 
shall maintain confidentiality. Moreover, such persons shall consider only issues raised in, and 
necessary to fulfil their responsibilities within, the dispute settlement proceeding and shall not delegate 
this responsibility to any other person. Such person shall not incur any obligation or 
accept.WT/AB/WP/7 any benefit that would in anyway interfere with, or which could give rise to, 
justifiable doubts as to the proper performance of that person's dispute settlement duties. 
TV. Scope 
1. These Rules shall apply, as specified in the text, to each person serving: (a) on a panel; (b) on the 
Standing Appellate Body; (c) as an arbitrator pursuant to the provisions mentioned in Annex "la"; or 
(d) as an expert participating in the dispute settlement mechanism pursuant to the provisions mentioned 
in Annex "lb". These Rules shall also apply, as specified in this text and the relevant: provisions of the 
Staff Regulations, to those members of the Secretariat called upon to assist the panel in accordance 
with Article 27.1 of the DSU or to assist in formal arbitration proceedings pursuant to Annex "la"; to 
the Chairman of the Textiles Monitoring Body (hereinafter called "TMB") and other members of the 
TMB Secretariat called upon to assist the TMB in formulating recommendations, findings or 
observations pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; and to Standing Appellate 
Body support staff called upon to provide the Standing Appellate Body with administrative or legal 
support in accordance with Article 17.7 of the DSU (hereinafter "Member of the Secretariat or 
Standing Appellate Body support staff'), reflecting their acceptance of established norms regulating the 
conduct of such persons as international civil servants and the Governing Principle of these Rules. 
2. The application of these Rules shall not in any way impede the Secretariat's discharge of its 
responsibility to continue to respond to Members' requests for assistance and information. 
3. These Rules shall apply to the members of the TMB to the extent prescribed in Section V. 
V. Textiles Monitoring Body 
1. Members of the TMB shall discharge their functions on an ad personam basis, in accordance with 
the requirement of Article 8.1 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, as further elaborated in the 
working procedures of the TMB, so as to preserve the integrity and impartiality of its proceedings.! 
VI. Self-Disclosure Requirements by Covered Persons 
l.(a) Each person requested to serve on a panel, on the Standing Appellate Body, as an arbitrator, or as 
an expert shall, at the time of the request, receive from the Secretariat these Rules, which include an 
Illustrative List (Annex 2) of examples of the matters subject to disclosure. 
(b) Any member of the Secretariat described in paragraph IV: 1, who may expect to be called upon to 
assist in a dispute, and Standing Appellate Body support staff, shall be familiar with these Rules. 
2. As set out in paragraph VI:4 below, all covered persons described in paragraph VI.1(a) and Vll(b) 
shall disclose any information that could reasonably be expected to be known to them at the time 
which, coming within the scope of 
These working procedures, as adopted by the TMB on 26 July 1995 (G/TMB/R/ 1), currently include, 
inter alia., the following language in paragraph 1.4: "In discharging their functions in accordance with 
paragraph l.l above, the TMB members and alternates shall undertake not to solicit, accept or act upon 
instructions from governments, nor to be influenced by any other organisations or undue extraneous 
factors. 
They shall disclose to the Chairman any information that they may consider likely to impede their 
capacity to discharge their functions on an adhoc personnel basis. Should serious doubts arise during 
the deliberations of the TMB regarding the ability of a TMB member to act on an ad personam basis, 
they shall be communicated to the Chairman. The Chairman shall deal with the particular matter as 
necessary "...WT/AB/WP/7. the Governing Principle of these Rules, is likely to affect or give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. These disclosures include the type of 
information described in the Illustrative List, if relevant. 
3. These disclosure requirements shall not extend to the identification of matters whose relevance to the 
issues to be considered in the proceedings would be insignificant. They shall take into account the need 
to respect the personal privacy." of those to whom these Rules apply and shall not be so 
administratively burdensome as to make it impracticable for otherwise qualified persons to serve on 
panels, the Standing Appellate Body, or in other dispute settlement roles. 
4. (a) All panellists, arbitrators and experts, prior to confirmation of the:: appointment, shall complete 
the form at Annex 3 of these Rules. Such information would be disclosed to the Chair of the Dispute 
Settlement Body ("DSB") for consideration by the parties to the dispute. 
(b) (i) Persons serving on the Standing Appellate Body who, through rotator, 
are selected to hear the appeal of a particular panel case, shall review the factual portion of the Panel 
report and complete the form a: Annex 3. Such information would be disclosed to the Standing 
Appellate Body for its consideration whether the member concerned should hear a particular appeal. 
XXlll 
(ii) Standing Appellate Body support staff shall disclose any relevant matter to the Standing Appellate 
Body, for its consideration in deciding on the assignment of staff to assist in a particular appeal, 
(c) When considered to assist in a dispute, members of the Secretariat sha" disclose to the Director-
General of the WTO the information required under paragraph Vl:2 of these Rules and any other 
relevant information requires under the Staff Regulations, including the information described in tri 
footnote. ** 
Pending adoption of the Staff Regulations, members of the Secretariat shall disclosures to the Director-
General in accordance with the following draft provisions to be included in the Staff Regulations: 
"When paragraph VI:4( c) of the Rules .- Conduct for the DSU is applicable, members of the 
Secretariat would disclosed the Director-General of the WTO the information required in paragraph 
VLI :-• those Rules, as well as any information regarding their participation in -formal consideration of 
the specific measure at issue in a dispute under it provisions of the WTO Agreement, including through 
formal legal advice under Article 27.2 of the DSU, as well as any involvement with the dispute as an 
official of a WTO Member government or otherwise professionally, before having the Secretariat. The 
Director-General shall consider any such disclosure; -deciding on the assignment of members of the 
Secretariat to assist in a dispute When the Director-General, in the light of his consideration, including 
of available to Secretariat resources, decides that a potential conflict of interest is not sufficient material 
to warrant non-assipment of a particular member of the Secretary: assist in a dispute, the Director-
General shall inform the panel of his decision !_• of the relevant supporting information." 
WT/ABAVP/7. 
4. During a dispute, each covered person shall also disclose any new information relevant to paragraph 
VI:2 above at the earliest time they become aware "of it. 
5. The Chair of the DSB, the Secretariat, parties to the dispute, and other individuals involved in the 
dispute settlement mechanism shall maintain the confidentiality of any information revealed through 
this disclosure process, even after the panel process and its enforcement procedures, if any, are 
completed. 
VII. Confidentiality 
Each covered person shall at all times maintain the confidentiality of dispute settlement deliberations 
and proceedings together with any information identified | a party as confidential. No covered person 
shall at any time use such information required during such deliberations and proceedings to gain 
personal advantage for others. 
2. During the proceedings, no covered person shall engage in ex-parte contacts concerning matters 
under consideration. Subject to paragraph VII: 1, no covered person shall make any statements on such 
proceedings or the issues in dispute in which that person is participating, until the report of the panel or 
the Standing Appellate Body has been derestricted. 
1. Any party to a dispute, conducted pursuant to the WTO Agreement, who possesses or comes into 
possession of evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality or 
confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interest by covered persons which may 
impair the Integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism, -hall at the 
earliest possible time and on a confidential basis, submit such evidence o the Chair of the DSB, the 
Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body, as appropriate according to the respective procedures 
detailed in paragraphs VIIL5 o VIIL17 below, in a written statement specifying the relevant facts and 
circumstances. Other Members who possess or come into possession of such evidence, may provide 
such evidence to the parties to the dispute in the interest of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of 
the dispute settlement "mechanism. 
2. When evidence as described in paragraph VIILl is based on an alleged allure of a covered person to 
disclose a relevant interest, relationship or matter, 
that failure to disclose, as such, shall not be a sufficient ground for disqualification unless there is also 
evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, confidentiality or the 
avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests and that the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality 
of the dispute settlement mechanism would be impaired thereby. 
3. When such evidence is not provided at the earliest practicable time, the 
party submitting the evidence shall explain why it did not do so eariier and explanation shall be taken 
into account in the procedures initiated 2 paragraph VIII: I. 
4. Following the submission of such evidence to the Chair of the DSB, Director-General of the WTO 
or the Standing Appellate Body, as specified below, the procedures outlined in paragraphs VlU-,5 to 
VIILl7 below shall be complete: within fifteen working days. 
Panellists, Arbitrators, Experts 
5. If the covered person who is the subject of the evidence is a panellist, arbitrator or an expert, the 
party shall provide such evidence to the Chair of DSB. 
6. Upon receipt of the evidence referred to in paragraphs VIILl and VIJL2, — Chair of the DSB shall 
forthwith provide the evidence to the person who is the subject of such evidence, for consideration by 
the latter..WT/AB/WP/7 
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7. If, after having consulted with the person concerned, the matter is -;-resolved, the Chair of the DSB 
shall forthwith provide all the evidence, and additional information from the person concerned, to the 
parties to the dispute. H the person concerned resigns, the Chair of the DSB shall inform the parties to 
dispute and, as the case may be, the panellists, the arbitrator(s) or experts. 
8. In all cases, the Chair of the DSB, in consultation with the Director-General -and a sufficient 
number of Chairs of the relevant Council or Councils to provide an odd number, and after having 
provided a reasonable opportunity for the views of the person concerned and the parties to the dispute 
to be heard, would decide whether a material violation of these Rules as referred to in paragraphs 
VIILl and VIIL2 above has occurred. Where the parties agree that a matter violation of these Rules has 
occurred, it would be expected that, consistent wife maintaining the integrity of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, the disqualification of the person concerned would be confirmed. 
9. The person who is the subject of the evidence shall continue to participate for the consideration of 
the dispute unless it is decided that a material violation dc these Rules has occurred. 
10. The Chair of the DSB shall thereafter take the necessary steps for the appointment of the person 
who is the subject of the evidence to be formally revoked, or excused from the dispute as the case may 
be, as of that time. 
Secretariat 
11. If the covered person who is the subject of the evidence is a member of the Secretariat, the party 
shall only provide the evidence to the Director-General c: the WTO, who shall forthwith provide the 
evidence to the person who is the subject of such evidence and shall fiirther inform the other party or 
parties to the dispute and the panel. 
12. It shall be for the Director-GeneraUotake any appropriate action in accordance with the Staff 
Regulations 
13. The Director-General shall inform the parties to the dispute, the panel and the Chair of the DSB of 
his decision, together with relevant supporting information. 
Standing Appellate Body 
14. If the covered person who is the subject of the evidence is a member of the Standing Appellate 
Body or of the Standing Appellate Body support staff, the party shall provide the evidence to the other 
party to the dispute and the evidence shall thereafter be provided to the Standing Appellate Body. 
15. Upon receipt of the evidence referred to in paragraphs VIII: 1 and VIIL2 above, the Standing 
Appellate Body shall forthwith provide it to the person who is the subject of such evidence, for 
consideration by the latter. 
16. It shall be for the Standing Appellate Body to take any appropriate action after having provided a 
reasonable opportunity for the views of the person concerned and the parties to the dispute to be heard. 
17. The Standing Appellate Body shall inform the parties to the dispute and the Chair of the DSB of its 
decision, together with relevant supporting information. 
18. Following completion of the procedures in paragraphs VIIL5 to VIILl7, if the appointment of a 
covered person, other than a member of the Standing Appellate Body, is revoked or that person is 
excused or resigns, the procedures specified in the DSU for initial appointment shall be followed for 
appointment of a replacement, but the time periods shall be half those specified in the DSU.**** The 
member of the Standing Appellate Body who, under that Body's rules, would next be selected through 
rotation to consider the dispute, would automatically be assigned to the appeal. The panel, members of 
the Standing Appellate Body hearing the appeal, or the arbitrator, as the case may be, may then decide 
after consulting with the parties to the dispute, on any necessary modifications to their working 
procedures or proposed timetable. 
19. All covered persons and Members concerned shall resolve matters involving possible material 
violations of these Rules as expeditiously as possible so as not to delay the completion of proceedings, 
as provided in the DSU. 
20. Except to the extent strictly necessary to carry out this decision, all information concerning 
possible or actual material violations of these Rules shall be kept confidential. 
Pending adoption of the Staff Regulations, the Director-General would act in accordance with the 
following draft provision for the Staff Regulations: "If paragraph VIII: II of the Rules of Conduct for 
the DSU governing the settlement of disputes is invoked, the Director-General shall consult with the 
person who is the subject of the evidence and the panel and shall, if necessary, take appropriate 
disciplinary action"..WT/AB/WP/7 
Appropriate adjustments "would be made in the case of appointments pursuant to the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures..WT/AB/WP/7 
1. These Rules of Conduct shall be reviewed within two years of their adoption and a decision shall be 
taken by the DSB as to whether to continue, modify or terminate these Rules. 
Annex la 
Arbifrators acting pursuant to the following provisions: 
- Articles 21.3(c); 22.6 and 22.7; 26.1(c) and 25 of the DSU; 
Article 8.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; 
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- ArtidesXXI.3 and XXII.3 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. WT/AB/WP/7. 
Annex lb 
Experts advising or providing information pursuant to the following provisions: 
- Article 13.1; 13.2 of the DSU; 
Article 4.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures; 
Article II.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures; 
Article 14.2; 14.3 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Tradc.WT /AB/ 
WP/7. 
Annex 2: Illustrative List of Information to be Disclosed 
This list contains examples of information of the type that a person called upon to serve in a dispute 
should disclose pursuant to the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
Each covered person, as defined in Section IV: I of these Rules of Conduct has a continuing duty to 
disclose the information described in Section VT.2 of these Rules which may include the following: 
(a) financial interests (e.g. investments, loans, shares, interests, other den-business interests (e.g. 
directorship or other contractual interests ; property interests relevant to the dispute in question; 
(b) professional interests (e.g. a past or present relationship with private clients, or any interests the 
person may have in domestic or international proceedings, and their implications, where these involve 
issues similar to those addressed in the dispute in question); 
(c) other active interests (e.g. active participation in public interest groups nr other organisations 
which may have a declared agenda refevant to the dispute in question); 
(d) considered statements of personal opinion on issues relevant to the dispute in question (e.g. 
publications, public statements); 
(e) employment or family interests (e.g. the possibility of any indirect advantage or any likelihood of 
pressure which could arise from their employer, business associates or immediate family 
members)..WT/AB/WP/7. 
Annex 3: 
I have read the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
and the Rules of Conduct for the DSU. I understand my continuing duty, while participating in the 
dispute settlement mechanism, and until such time as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) makes a 
decision on adoption of a report relating to the proceeding or notes its settlement, to disclose herewith 
and in future any information likely to affect my independence or impartiality, or which could give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism; and to 




Draft Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Group of Revision 
As indicated by the Chairman at the last meeting of the Permanent Group of Experts prepared a revised 
draft Rules of Procedure and requested that it be circulated in view of the meeting of the Committee on 
26 July 1996. 
Draft Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Group of Experts Part I: Definitions 
I. In these Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Group of Experts, 
"SCM Agreement" means the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which is in Annex 
1A to the WTO Agreement; 
"SCM Committee" means the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures established by 
Article 24.1 of the SCM Agreement; 
"DSB", means the Dispute Settlement Body established under Article 2 of the DSU; 
"DSU" means the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes which 
is Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement; 
"Expert" means a person elected by the SCM Committee to serve on the PGE in accordance with 
Article 24.3 of the SCM Agreement; 
"party to the dispute" means any WTO Member who is a complaining or defending party in the panel 
dispute, but does not include a third party; 
"PGE" means the Permanent Group of Experts established by the SCM Committee pursuant to Article 
24.3 of the SCM Agreement;-
"Rules" means these Rules of Procedure for the PGE; 
"Secretariat" means the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization; 
"third party" means any WTO Member who has notified the DSB of its substantial interest in the 
matter before the panel pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the 
DSU; 
"WTO" means the World Trade Organization; 
"WTO Agreement" means the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, done at Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994; 
Part II: Experts 
Duties and Responsibilities 
II. (1) An Expert shall abide by the terms and conditions of the SCM 
Agreement, these Rules and any decisions of the SCM Committee affecting the PGE. 
(2) An Expert shall exercise his/her office without accepting or seeking instructions from any 
international, governmental, or non-governmental organization or any private source. 
(3) Whenever an Expert considers that his/her family relationships and/ or past or present 
professional or financial activities are incompatible with his/her independent participation in a 
particular proceeding before the PGE, he/she shall immediately inform the Chairman of the PGE. The 
Chairman of the PGE shall exclude the Expert for that particular proceeding. 
(4) Whenever an Expert has reasons to believe that his/her family relationships and/or past or 
present professional or financial activities may be incompatible with his/her independent participation 
in a particular proceeding before the PGE, he/she shall immediately inform the Chairman of the PGE. 
The Chairman of the PGE may, after consultation with the other Experts, excuse the Expert for that 
particular proceeding. 
(5) An Expert shall keep the Secretariat informed on how to contact him/ her. 
Chairman of the PGE 
III. (1) There shall be a Chairman of the PGE who shall be elected by the Experts. 
(2) The term of office of the Chairman of the PGE shall be one year. In order to ensure rotation of 
the Chairmanship, no Expert shall serve as Chairman for more than one term consecutively. 
(3) The Chairman of the PGE shall be responsible for the overall direction of PGE business, and in 
particular, his/her responsibilities shall include: 
(a) the supervision of the internal flinctioning of the PGE; 
(b) such duties ,as are assigned to him/her under these Rules; and 
(c) any other duties the Experts may agree to entrust to him/her. 
(4) Where the office of the Chairman of the PGE becomes vacant due to permanent incapacity as a 
result of illness or death or by resignation 
or expiration of his/her term, the Experts shall elect a new Chairman who shall serve a full term in 
accordance with paragraph 2, but not exceeding the term of that Expert. 
(5) In the event of a temporary unavailability or incapacity of the Chairman of the PGE, the PGE. shall 
authorize another Expert to act as Chairman ad interim, and the Expert so authorized shall temporarily 
exercise all the powers, duties and ftmctions of the Chairman of the PGE until the Chairman is capable 
of resuming his/per functions. 
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Incapacity 
IV. (1) An Expert who is prevented from serving by reason of illness or for other serious reasons shall 
give notice and duly explain such reasons to the Chairman of the PGE. 
(2) Upon receiving such notice, the Chairman of the PGE shall forthwith inform the SCM Committee. 
Resignation 
(1) An Expert who intends to resign from his/her office shall notify his/ her in tentions in writing to 
the Chairman of the PGE who shall immediately in form the Chairman of the SCM Committee and the 
other Experts. 
(2) The resignation shall take effect 90 days after the notification has been made pursuant to paragraph 
1, unless the SCM Committee decides otherwise. 
Part III: Assistance to Panels 
Commencement of Procedure 
VI. (1) The PGE shall provide assistance at the request of a panel with respect to whether a measure is 
a prohibited subsidy, as provided in Article 4.5 of the SCM Agreement. 
(2) The request for assistance should be made in writing, within days of the date of composition and 
establishment of the terms of reference of the panel, and should be directed to the Chairman of the PGE 
through the Secretariat.! 
(3) The request should identify the measure(s) with respect to which the panel seeks the assistance 
of the PGE. 
(4) The request should be accompanied by any relevant documentation, including any 
correspondence relating to the panel dispute between the panel or the WTO Secretariat and the parties 
to the dispute or the third parties and any other documentation submitted to the panel. It should also 
include the service address of each party to the dispute and third party, as notified to the Secretariat. 
Collegiality 
VII. (1) All conclusions shall be rendered on behalf of the PGE. Except where an Expert is 
excluded or excused pursuant to Rules 2(3), 2(4) or 19. conclusions of the PGE shall be deemed to be 
prepared and rendered coUegially by the five Experts. 
(2) Except where an Expert is excluded or excused pursuant to Rules 2(3 or 2(4), all five Experts 
shall contribute to the conclusions of the PGE on each request for assistance. However, where the 
Chairman of the PGE may, in with the other Experts, select three Experts to examine and respond to a 
request for assistance from a panel. 
(3) The three Experts shall be selected on a basis which shall ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, that the composition of each group of three Experts will not be predictable. The Chairman of 
the PGE may serve a; one of the three Experts. 
(4) An Expert selected pursuant to paragraph 2 shall make best endeavours to be available for that 
service. In the event an Expert is prevented from serving on the basis of nationality pursuant to Rule 
19, due to incapacity or resignation under Rules 4 and 5, or is otherwise unavailable to serve, the 
Chairman of the PGE will assign the next Expert on the basis set forth in paragraph 3. 
(5) Where three Experts have been selected by the Chairman of the PGE pursuant to paragraph 2 
they shall, in the interests of consistency and coherence, consult with the other Experts regarding the 
matter under review and shall circulate the report to the other Experts for comments before presenting 
it to the panel. Experts excused or excluded pursuant to Rules 2(3), 2 (4) shall not be consulted. 
Presiding Member 
VIII. (1) For each proceeding, the PGE or group of three Experts appointed 
pursuant to Rule 7(2) above shall have a Presiding Member, who shall be elected by the members of 
the PGE or the members of the group of three Experts as the case may be. 
(2) The responsibilities of the Presiding Member shall include: 
(a) coordinating the overall conduct of the proceeding; 
(b) chairing all oral hearings and meetings related to that proceeding; and 
(c) coordinating the drafting of the report. 
(3) When a matter is referred to a group of three Expert in the event that it Presiding Member 
becomes incapable of performing his/her duties, the other members and the member selected as a 
replacement pursuant to Rule 7(4) shall elect one of their number as Presiding Member. 
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Written Submissions 
(1) The parties to the dispute and any third parties so desiring shall, within seven (7) days after the 
date of a request for assistance, make a written submission to the PGE through the Secretariat and serve 
a copy of the submission on the other parties to the dispute and on any third parties. 
(2) A written submission referred to in paragraph 1 shall address the issue whether the measure 
identified by the panel in its request for assistance is a prohibited subsidy. It shall contain any relevant 
information regarding the measure including any legislation, regulations or other documentation 
relating to the establishment and operation of the measure. 
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(3) Any parties to the dispute so desiring, but not third parties, may, within fourteen (14) days after 
the date of a request for assistance, make a written rebuttal submission to the PGE through the 
Secretariat and shall serve a copy of any such submission on the other parties to the dispute and on any 
third parties. 
Oral Hearing 
X. (1) The PGE or the group of three Experts selected pursuant to Rule 7, as the case may be, 
may hold one oral hearing at the request of at least one of the parties to the dispute or on its own 
initiative. This hearing should be held, as a general rule, twenty-one (21) days after the request of the 
panel for assistance. 
(2) The parties to the dispute shall, in the written submissions submitted pursuant to Rule 9(1), 
specify whether they request the PGE to hold an oral hearing. When an oral hearing is to be held 
pursuant to paragraph 1, the Presiding Member shall, at the earliest possible date, notify all parties to 
the dispute .and third parties of the date and place for the oral hearing. 
(3) Any party to the dispute or third party who has made a submission pursuant to Rule 9(1) may 
appear to make an oral presentation at the oral hearing. 
(4) During the oral hearing, each party to the dispute or third party referred to under paragraph 3 
shall be entitled to make one presentation the presence of the other parties to the dispute. The 
complaining party (ies) before the panel shall make its/their oral presentation(s) first. Third parties may 
attend the oral hearing only for the duration of their presentations. The Presiding Member, with the 
agreement of the other members of the PGE or of the other members of the group of three Experts as 
the case may be, may, as adapt the rules for oral presentations. 
Written Responses 
XI. (1) At any time during the proceeding, including during any oral hearing, the PGE or the group 
of three experts may address questions orally or in writing to any party to the dispute or third party, and 
specific the time periods within which written responses shall be received. 
(2) Any such written questions and responses shall be served on the other parties to the dispute, 
who shall be given an opportunity to respond. 
Conclusions of the PGE 
XII (1) Except under the circumstances contemplated under Rule 13(1) or unless otherwise 
requested by the panel pursuant to Article 4.5 of the SCM Agreement, the PGE should present its 
conclusions to the Panel within forty six (46) days of the request for assistance. 
(2) The PGE's conclusions shall be presented in a written report. Pursuant to Article 4.5 of the SCM 
Agreement, the conclusions shall be restricted to a determination whether the measure in question is a 
prohibited subsidy. 
(3) The PGE's report shall also set out a summary of the arguments presented by the parties and 
third parties, the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind 
its conclusions. 
(4) When applicable, the PGE's report shall also specify whether one or more Experts were excused 
or excluded for the proceeding pursuant to Rules 2(3), r 2( 4) or 12. 
General Provisions 
XIII. (1) In exceptional circumstances, where strict adherence to a time pence set out in these Rules 
would result in a manifest unfairness, the PGE or the group of three Experts as the case may be may, at 
the request of a party to the dispute, modify a time period set out in these Rules for ire filing of 
documents or the date set out in the working schedule for toe oral hearing. Where such a request is 
granted, any modification of time shall be notified to the parties to the dispute and to third parties in a 
revised working schedule. Under those circumstances, the Presiding Member may postpone the date of 
presentation of the report to ire panel by a number of days to be agreed with the panel. 
(2) In computing any time period stipulated in these Rules, within which a communication must be 
made or an action taken by a WTO Member to exercise or preserve its rights, the day from which the 
time period begins to run shall be excluded and, subject to paragraph I, the last day of the time period 
shall be included. 
(3) The PGE or the group of three Experts, as the case may be, may extern the time periods 
provided for in Rules 6. 9.10 and 12 with the censer of the parties to the dispute and the panel. 
(4) The DSB Decision on "Expiration of Time-Periods in the DSU", 'WT/DSB/M/7, shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to matters considered by the PGE. 
Working Procedures and Schedule 
XIV. (1) Forthwith after being requested to assist a panel, the PGE or the group of three Experts, as 
the case may be, shall draw up an appropriate working schedule in accordance with the time periods 
stipulated in these Rules. 
(2) The working schedule shall set forth precise dates for the submission of documents and a 
timetable for the PGE's work including, where possible, the date when the, oral hearing would be held. 
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should one of the parties to the dispute request one or should the PGE or the group of three Experts, as 
the case may be, decide to have one. 
(3) The Secretariat shall promptly provide a copy of the working schedule to the panel, the parties to 
the dispute and any third parties. 
Documents 
XV. (1) ThePGEorthegroupofthreeExperts, as thecasemaybe, may 
disregard any submission not received by the Secretariat within the time period as set out in these Rules 
or in the working schedule referred to in Rule 14 unless the PGE or the group of three Experts 
determines that there is good cause for accepting the submission after the expiration of the relevant 
time period. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, every document filed by a party to the dispute or a 
third party shall be served on each of the other parties to the dispute and on third parties. 
(3) A document shall be served by the most expeditious means of delivery or communication 
available, including by: 
(a) delivering a copy of he document to the service address of the party to the dispute or third party; 
or 
(b) sending a copy of the document to the service address of (the party to the dispute or third party by 
facsimile transmission, expedited delivery courier or expedited mail service. 
Decision-Making 
XVI. (1) The PGE or the group of three Experts, as the case may be, shall make every effort to take 
decisions by consensus, Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter 
at issue shall be decided by a majority vote. Individual opinions shall not be disclosed. (2) Whenever a 
request for assistance to a panel has not been assigned by the Chairman of the PGE to a group of three; 
Experts and it appears in the course of the proceeding that, for reasons: foreseen under Rules 2 and 4, 
only four Experts can take part in the decision-making process the Chairman of the PGE shall 
immediately select a group of three Experts to examine and respond to the request for assistance. 
Confidentiality 
XVII.(l) PGE deliberations shall be confidential. The PGE report shall remain confidential until 
released by the panel. 
(2) The report of the PGE shall be drafted without the 'presence of the parties to the dispute in the light 
of the information provided and the s-tftlefftents presentations made. 
Ex Parte Communications 
XVlII.(l) Neither the PGE nor any of its Experts shall discuss any aspect of the subject matter of a 
request for assistance with any party to the dispute or third party in the absence of the other patty (ies) 
to the dispute until the report of the panel is adopted or, in case of appeal, until the report of the 
Appellate Body is adopted. 
(2) No Expert may discuss any aspect of the subject matter of a requestor assistance with any party to 
the dispute or third party in the absence of the other members of the PGE or of the other members of 
the group of three Experts, as the case may be, until the report of the pane'^ is adopted or, in case of 
appeal, until the report of the Appellate Body is adopted. 
Nationals of Parties to the Dispute 
XIX (1) Unless a party to the dispute objects. Experts who are nationals of WTO Members' parties to 
the dispute may contribute to the decision-making & process in accordance with Rule 16. may be 
selected as members of a group of three Experts or may make comments pursuant to Rule 7(5). 
(2) No objections under paragraph 1 shall be considered where such objections would lead, by 
themselves or in addition to other factors to a situation where fewer than three Experts could contribute 
to the decision-making process. 
(3) Any objection under paragraph 1 shill be communicated to the Chairman of the PGE within two 
(2) days after the date of a request for assistance. 
Transition 
XX. (1) A person who ceases to be an Expert may, subject to the provisions of Rules 2(3) and 2(4), 
with the authorization of the Chairman of the PGE and upon notification to the SCM Committee, 
complete the disposition of any pending request for assistance from a panel, and that person shall, for 
that purpose only, be deemed to continue to be an Expert. 
(2) Any newly elected Expert shall serve only in proceedings initiated after his/her election, unless 
decided otherwise by the Chairman of the PGE in agreement with the other Experts. 
Part IV: Advisory Opinions to WTO Members 
Request for Advisory Opinion 
XXI. (I) Pursuant to Article 24.4 of the SCM Agreement, a WTO Member may request an advisory 
opinion from the PGE on the nature of any subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained 
that WTO Member. 
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(2) A request for an advisory opinion shall be made in writing. The request shall contain the 
following: 
1 
(a) A clear statement of the matter the WTO Member requests the PGE to address: 
(b) A detailed description of the programme or measure, addressing any points relevant to the nature 
of the subsidy; 
(c) A copy of any legislation, regulations or other relevant documents establishing the programme or 
measure and/or governing its operation; 
(d) Any other relevant information 
(3) The request shall be submitted to the Chairman of the PGE through the Secretariat. The 
Chairman of the PGE shall review the request to determine whether it contains the information 
identified in paragraph 2, if the Chairman of the PGE considers that the request is not complete, he/she 
shall so indicate to the WTO Member and shall identify the additional information required. 
Preparation of the Advisory Opinion 
XII. (1) The PGE or the group of three Experts selected pursuant to Rule 23 (2) may, as necessary, in 
writing or at an oral hearing if any, request further information from, or may pose questions to, the 
WTO Member requesting an advisory opinion. 
(2) The PGE shall make its best efforts to provide its opinion, at earliest date possible. 
(3) Unless otherwise requested by the WTO Member seeking an advisory opinion, an advisory 
opinion shall be provided in writing. The advisory opinion shall include the relevant facts on which the 
PGE based its opinion, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind its 
conclusions. 
(4) When applicable, the PGE's advisory opinion shall also specify whether one or more Experts were 
excused or excluded for the proceeding pursuant to Rules 2(3) or 2( 4). 
Collegiality 
XXII. (1) All advisory opinions shall be rendered on behalf of the PGE. Except where an Expert is 
excluded or excused pursuant to Rules 2(3) or 2(4 advisory opinions of the PGE shall be deemed to be 
prepared and rendered collegially by the five Experts. 
(2) Except where an Expert is excluded or excused pursuant to Rules 2(5 or 2(4), all five Experts 
shall contribute to the advisory opinion of the PGE on each request for such an opinion. However, 
where necessary the Chairman of the PGE may serve as one of the three experts. 
(3) The three Experts shall be selected on a basis which shall ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, that the composition of each group of three Experts will not be predictable. The Chairman of 
the PGE may serve as one of the three Experts. 
(4) An Expert selected pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall make best endeavours to be available 
for that service. In the event an Expert is prevented from serving due to incapacity or resignation under 
Rules -and 5, or is otherwise unavailable to serve, the Chairman of the PGE will assign the next Expert 
on the basis set forth in paragraph 3. 
(5) Where three Experts have been appointed by the Chairman of the PGE pursuant to paragraph 2, 
they shall, in the interests of consistence and coherence, consult with the other Experts regarding the 
matter under review and shall circulate the advisory opinion to the other Experts for comments before 
presenting it to the WTO Member who requested the advisory opinion. Experts excused or excluded 
pursuant to Rules 2(3) or 2(4) shall not be consulted. 
Presiding Member 
XXN. (1) For each proceeding, the PGE or each group of three Experts appoints; pursuant to Rule 
23(2) above shall have a Presiding Member, who shall be elected by the members of the PGE or the 
members of the group of three Experts as the case may be. 
(2) The responsibilities of the Presiding Member shall include: 
(a) coordinating the overall conduct of; the work of the group of three Experts; 
(b) chairing all meetings related to that work; and 
(c) coordinating the drafting of the advisory opinion. 
(3) When a matter is referred to a group of three Experts, In the event that a Presiding Member 
becomes incapable of performing his/her duties the other members and the member selected as a 
replacement pursuant to Rule 23(4) shall elect one of their number as Presiding Member. 
Decision-Making 
XXV. (1) The PGE or the group of three Experts, as the case may be, shall make every effort to take 
decisions by consensus. Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus', the matter 
at issue shall be decided by a majority vote. Individual opinions shall not be discloser. (2) Whenever a 
request for an advisory opinion has not been assigned by the Chairman of the PGE to a group of three 
Experts and it appears in the course of the proceeding that, for reasons foreseen under Rules 2 and 4, 
only four Experts can take part in the decision-making process, the Chairman of the PGE shall 
immediately select a group of three Experts to examine and respond to the request for an advisory 
opinion. 
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Confidentiality and Status of Advisory Opinions 
XXVI. ()) An advisory opinion is for the exclusive use of the WTO Member requesting it. The 
existence and content of a request for an advisory opinion, and of any advisory opinion, will be 
confidential. Neither the PGE nor the WTO Member seeking the advisory opinion shall reveal its 
existence or content. 
Transition 
XXVII. (1) A person who ceases to be an Expert may, subject to the provisions of Rules 2(3) and 
2(4), with the authorization of the Chairman of the PGE and upon notification to the SCM Committee, 
complete the disposition of any pending request for an advisory opinion, and that person shall, for that 
purpose only, be deemed to continue to be an Expert. (2) Any newly elected Expert shall serve only in 
proceedings initiated after his/her election, unless decided otherwise by the Chairman of the PGE in 
agreement with the other Experts. 
Part V: Advisory Opinions to the SCM Committee 
Request for an Advisory Opinion 
XXVIII. (1) Pursuant to Article 24.3 of the SCM Agreement, the SCM Committee may seek an 
advisory opinion on the existence and nature of any subsidy. 
(2) A request for an advisory opinion shall be made in writing. The request shall clearly state the matter 
the SCM Committee requests PGE to address, and should include a copy of any legislation, regulations 
or other relevant information relating to the measure or programme. 
Information 
XXIX. (1) The PGE may, as it considers necessary, request information from, or address questions to 
" any WTO Members regarding the measure(s) or programme(s) in question. WTO Members to whom 
such requests or questions are addressed shall make best endeavours to respond fully and completely to 
the PGE. Such requests or questions, and any answers thereto, shall be made in writing, and copies 
shall he provided to the SCM Committee. 
(2) Any WTO Member may present, in writing, any information regarding the measure or 
programme in question and/or its views regarding the issue the SCM Committee has requested the PGE 
to address. Any such information or views shall be made in writing, and copies shall be provided to the 
SCM Committee. 
(3) All WTO Members shall have an opportunity to comment upon any requests or questions and 
answers thereto pursuant to paragraph 1. and upon any information and views provided to the PCE 
pursuant to paragraph 2, above. Any such comment shall be made in "writing, and copies shall be 
provided to the SCM. Committee. 
CoUegiality 
XXX. (1) All advisory opinions shall be rendered on behalf of the PCE except where an Expert is 
excluded or excused pursuant Rules 2(3) or 2(4 advisory opinions of the PGE shall be deemed to be 
prepared and rendered coUegially by the five Experts. 
(2) Except where an Expert is excluded or excused pursuant 10 Rules 2(3) or 2(4), all five Experts 
shall contribute to the advisory opinion of the PCE on each request for such an opinion. However, 
where necessary the Chairman of the PGE may, in agreement with the other Expert select three Experts 
to examine and respond to a request for it advisory opinion from the SCM Committee. 
(3) The three Experts shall be selected on a basis which shall ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, that the composition of each group of three Experts will not be predictable. The Chairman of 
the PGE may serve as one of the three Experts. 
(4) An Expert selected pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall make best endeavours to be available 
for that service. In the event an expert is prevented from serving due to incapacity or resignation under 
Rules -and 5, or is otherwise unavailable to serve, the Chairman of the PGE will assign the next Expert 
on the basis set forth in paragraph 3. 
(5) Where three Experts have been appointed by the Chairman of the PGE pursuant to paragraph 2, 
they shall, in the interests of consistency and coherence, consult with the other Experts regarding the 
mar-" under review and shall circulate the advisory opinion to the other Experts for comments before 
presenting it to the SCM Committee. Experts excused or excluded pursuant to Rules 2(3) or 2(4) shall 
not be consulted. 
Presiding Member 
XXXI. (1) For each proceeding, the PGE or each group of three Experts appointed pursuant to Rule 
30(2) above shall have a Presiding Member, who shall be elected by the members of the PGE or the 
members of the group of three Experts as the case may be 
(2) The responsibilities of the Presiding Member shall include: 
(a) coordinating the overall conduct of the work of the group of three Experts; 1 
(b) chairing all meetings related to that work; and 
(c) coordinating the drafting of the advisory opinion. 
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i(3) When a matter is referred to a group of three Experts, in the event that a Presiding Member 
becomes incapable of performing his/her duties, the other members and the member selected as a 
replacement pursuant to Rule 30(4) shall elect one of their number as Presiding Member. 
The Advisory Opinion 
XXXII. (1) Unless otherwise requested by the SCM Committee, the PGE's advisory opinion shall be 
provided in the form of a written report. 
(2) The PGE's report shall also set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions 
and the basic rationale behind its conclusions. 
(3) When applicable, the PGE's report shall also specify whether one or more Experts were excused 
or excluded for the proceeding pursuant to Rules 2(3) or 2(4). 
Decision-Making 
XXXIII. (1) The PGE or the group of three Experts, as the case may be, shall make 
every effort to take decisions by consensus. Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by 
consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by a majority vote. Individual opinions shall not be 
disclosed. (2) Whenever & request for an advisory opinion has not been assigned by the Chairman of 
the PGE to a group of three Experts and it appears in the course of the proceeding that, for reasons 
foreseen under Rules 2 and 4, only four Experts can take part in the decision-making process, the 
Chairman of the PGE shall immediately select a group of three Experts to examine and respond to the 
request for an advisory opinion. 
Confidentiality 
XXXIV. PGE deliberations shall be confidential. 
Direction of the SCM Committee 
XXXV (1) The status of and use to be made of an advisory opinion is a matter to be determined by 
the SCM Committee. 
(2) Notwithstanding this Part, the SCM Committee may with respect to a given request for an advisory 
opinion specify, after consultation with the Chairman of the PGE, the procedures to be followed by the 
PGE. 
Transition 
XXXVI. (1) A person who ceases to be an Expert may, subject to the provisions of 
Rules 12(3) and 2(4), with the authorization of the Chairman of the PGE and upon notification to the 
SCM Committee, complete the disposition of any pending request for an advisory opinion, and that 
person shall, for that purpose only, be deemed to continue to be an Expert. 
(2) Any newly elected Expert shall serve only in proceedings initiated after his/her election, unless 
decided otherwise by the Chairman of the PGE in agreement with the other Experts. 
Part VI: Other 
Secretariat 
XXXVII. The Secretariat shall provide such assistance to the PGE as is necessary and appropriate. 
Entry into Force and Amendment 
XXXVIII. (1) These Rules shall enter into force upon their approval by the SCM Committee, 
(2) The PGE may propose amendments to these Rules in light of experience Any such amendments 
shall enter into force upon their approval by the SCM Committee and, unless otherwise agreed by the 
WTC Member(s) concerned, shall apply only to requests made on or after such date. 
(3) Any WTO Member may suggest amendments to these Rules in the light of experience. Any 
suggested amendment shall be examined by the SCM Committee. After examination, the SCM 
Committee may forward the suggested amendment to the PGE. The PGE shall review the suggested 




Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures 
The Contracting Parties 
Recognizing that the prompt settlement of situations in which a contracting party considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly from the General Agreement are being impaired by 
measures taken by another contracting party, is essentia! to the effective functioning of the General 
Agreement and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of all 
contracting parties; 
Recognizing further that the existence of such a situation can cause severe damage to the trade 
and economic development of the less-developed contracting parties; and 
Affirming their resolve to facilitate the solution of such situations while taking fully into 
account the need for safeguarding both the present and potential trade of less-developed contracting 
parties affected by such measures; 
Decide that: 
1. If consultations between a less-developed contracting party and a developed contracting party in 
regard to any matter falling under paragraph 1 of Article XXIII do not lead to a satisfactory settlement, 
the less-developed contracting party complaining of the measures may refer the mater which is the 
subject of consultations to Director General so that, acting in a ex officio capacity, he may use his good 
offices with a view to facilitating a solution. 
2. To this effect the contracting parties concerned shall, at. the request of the Director General, 
promptly furnish all relevant information. 
3. On receipt of this information, the Director-General shall consult with the contracting parties 
concerned and with such other contracting parties or inter-govemmental organizations as he considers 
appropriate with a view to promoting a mutually acceptable solution. 
4. After a period of two months from the commencement of the consultations referred to in paragraph 
3 above, if no mutually satisfactory solution has been reached, the Director-General shall, at the request 
of one of the contracting parties concerned, bring the matter to the attention of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES or the Council, to whom he shall submit a report on the action taken by him, together with 
all background information. 
5. Upon receipt of the report, the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council shall forth-with appoint 
a panel of experts to examine the matter with a view to recommending appropriate solution. The 
members of the panel shall act on a personal capacity and shall be appointed in consultation with, and 
with the approval of, the contracting parties concerned. 
6. In conducting its examination and having before it all the background information, the panel shall 
take due account of the circumstances and considerations relating to the application of the measures 
complained of, and their impact on the trade and economic development of affected contracting parties. 
7. The panel shall, within a period of sixty days from the date matter was referred to it, submit its 
findings and recommendations to the CONTRACTfNG PARTIES or to the Council, for consideration 
and decision. Where the matter is referred to the Council, it may, in accordance with Rule 8 of the 
Intercessional Procedures adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTY at their thirteenth session', address 
its recommendations directly to the interested contracting parties and concurrently report to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
8. Within a period of ninety days from the date of decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, or the 
Council, the confracting party to which a recommendation is directed shall report to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES or the Council on the action taken by it in pursuance of the decision. 
9. If on examination of this report ii if found that confracting to which recommendation has been 
directed has not complied in full with the relevant recommendation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
or Council, and that any benefit accruing directly or indirectly under the General Agreement continues 
in consequence to be nullified or impaired, and that the circumstances are serious enough to justify 
such action, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may authorize the affected contracting party or parties to 
suspend, in regard to the contracting party causing the damage, application of any concession or any 
other obligation under the General Agreement whose suspension is considered warranted, taking 
accoimt of the circumstances 
10. In the event that a recommendation to developed country by the CONTRACTING PARTIES is 
not applied within the time-limit prescribed in paragraph 8, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall 
consider what measure; furdier to those undertaken under paragraph 9, should be taken to resolve the 
matter. 
11. If consultations, held under paragraph 2 of Article XXXVII, relate to restrictions for which there 
is no authority under any provisions to the General Agreement, any of the parties to the consultations 
may, in the absence of a satisfactory solution, request that consultations be carried out by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XXIII and in accordance with the 
procedures set out in the present decision, is being understood that a consultation held under paragraph 
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2 of Article XXXVII in respect of such restrictions will be considered by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES as fijlfilling the conditions of paragraph I of Article XXIII if the parties to the consultations 
so agree. 
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance 
Adopted on 28 November 1979 (1/4907) 
21. Reports of panels and working parties should be given prompt consideration by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTfNG PARTIES should take appropriate action on 
reports of panels and working parties within a reasonable period of time. If the case is one brought by a 
less-developed contracting party, such action should be taken in a specially convened meeting, if 
necessary. In such cases, in considering what appropriate action might be taken the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their 
impact on the economy of less-developed contracting parties concerned. 
23. If the matter is one which has been raised by a less-developed contracting party, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall consider what further action they might take which would be 
appropriate to the circumstances. 
Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures Decision of 
12 April 1989 (1/6489) 
G. Adoption of Panel Reports 
1. In order to provide sufficient time for the members of the Council to consider panel reports, the 
reports shall not be considered for adoption by the Council until thirty days after they have been issued 
to the contracting parties. 
2. Contracting parties having objections to panel reports shall give written reasons to explain their 
objections for circulation at least ten days prior to the Council meeting at which the panel report will be 
considered. 
3. The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the panel 
report by the Council, and their views shall be fully recorded. The practice of adopting panel reports by 
consensus shall be continued, without prejudice to the GATT provisions on decision-making which 
remain applicable. However, the delaying of the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided. 
4. The period from the request under Article XXILl or Article XXIII: 1 until the Council takes a 
decision on the panel report shall not, unless agreed by the parties, exceed fifteen months. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 6 of Section F(t).' 
I. Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings 
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the Contracting Parties under Article XXIIl 
is essential in order to ensure effective resolution cc disputes to the benefit of all contracting parties. 
2. The contracting party concerned shall inform the Council of its intentions in respect of 
implementation of the recommendations or rulings. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with 
the recommendations or rulings, the contracting party concerned shall have a reasonable period of time 
in which to do so. 
3. The Council shall monitor the implementation of recommendations or ruling adopted under Article 
XXIII-2 The issue of implementation of the recommendation or rulings may be raised at the Council 
decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be on the 
agenda of the Council meeting after six months following their adoption and shall remain on the 
Council's agenda until the issue is resolved. At least ten days prior to each such Council meeting, the 
contracting party concerned shall provide the Council with a status report in writing of its progress in 
the implementation of the panel recommendations or rulings. 
4. In case brought by developing contracting parties, the Council shall consider what further action it 
might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances in conformity with paragraphs 21 and 23 
of the 1979 Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 
(BISD26S/214). 




Procedures for Arbitration under Article 8.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
Introduction 
The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has discussed at length the 
provisions contained in Article 8.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In 
view of the importance of these provisions, the Committee has developed the following procedures 
with the aim of facilitating the operation of arbitration proceedings and enhancing transparency and 
predictability for all Members with respect to the application of Article 8 of the Agreement. The 
Committee affirms that because arbitration under Article 8.5 determines the status of a notified 
programme or individual cases of subsidization under Article 8, the results of any such arbitration 
proceeding are equally applicable to all Members. This is without prejudice to the right of any Member 
to request arbitration. 
The Committee notes that the provisions of Article 8.5 cannot be viewed strictly in isolation, 
insofar as they form an integrated part of the whole of Part IV of the Agreement. In this regard, the 
Committee recognizes the importance of the review procedure under Article 8.4 and the seriousness 
with which Members are expected to treat it. In particular, to the extent that Members may have 
questions about the consistency of a notified prograiiime with the conditions and criteria provided for 
in the provisions of Article 8.2, the Committee would expect Members to make full and substantive use 
of the procedures under Article 8.4 in order to clarify all relevant questions regarding a notified 
programme. In the same vein, the Committee notes that, pursuant to Article 8.3, a Member which is 
notifying a programme is required to provide sufficiently precise information to enable other Members 
to evaluate the consistency of the programme with the relevant conditions and criteria of Article 8.2. 
The Committee would, therefore, expect notifying Members to cooperate as fully as possible in 
responding to the questions of other Members in the course of the Article 8.4 review procedure. 
In short, the Committee exhorts all Members to participate constructively and in good faith in 
the notification and review process provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 8 so as to resolve any 
questions and concerns about notified programmes at the earliest opportunity. Where appropriate, it is 
recognized that such efforts encompass the possibility of concerned Members consulting informally 
prior to requesting arbitration in order to avoid unnecessary arbitration request Finally, without 
prejudice to Members' rights as provided for under Article 8.5, the Committee notes that: (i) the 
interests of clarity, predictability and greater legal certainty would be best served if arbitration requests 
involving Committee determinations under Article 8.4 (or the failure of the Committee to make a 
determination) were made as soon as practicable following the conclusion of the procedure set forth in 
Article 8.4; and (ii) arbitration procedures would be facilitated if requesting Members fully identify and 
describe those issues which were not raised during the Article 8.4 procedure. 
Procedures 
The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hereby decide; pursuant to the 
decision of the General Council of 31 January 1995 (WT/GCA^ 1), to adopt the following procedures 
for use in binding arbitration conducts: pursuant to Article 8.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. These procedures shall not add to or detract from the existing rights and 
obligations of Members under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or under any 
other WTO Agreement. 
I Requests for Arbitration 
1. Any Member wishing to request arbitration under Article 8.5 shall address a written request to that 
effect to the Chairman of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("the Committee"). 
The request shall include: 
(a) the basis for the request, i.e. a determination by the Committee under Article 8.4, a failure by the 
Committee to make such a determination, and or the violation in individual cases of subsidization of 
the conditions set out in a subsidy programme notified under Article 8.3; 
(b) the specific questions to be addressed by the arbitration body, as related to requirements under the 
provisions of Article 8.2, and a statement of the position taken by the Member requesting the 
arbitration with respect to each such question; 
(c) a brief summary of the information on which the request is based. 
2. Any request for arbitration shall be circulated immediately to the Members. 
3. Without prejudice to the right of any Member to request arbitt^tion. Members should take into 
account the need to avoid undue multiplication of arbitration proceedings in respect of the same 
programme, and should therefore avail themselves of the procedures under paragraph 4 for becoming 
Parties, or the .procedures under paragraph 17 for becoming Third Parties, to an arbitration. 
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4. In order to become Parties to the arbitration proceeding, other Members shall have a period of 15 
days after the date of circulation of the request for arbitration to provide the Chairman of the 
Committee with a communication which shall conform with the requirements for requests for 
arbitration set forth in paragraph 1. Any such communication shall be circulated immediately to the 
Members. 
5. During the 30-day period referred to in paragraph 10, Parties also may agree, subject to the 
provisions of Section VI, to any supplemental or alternative procedures for arbitration under Article 8.5 
to those specified herein, provided that such supplemental or alternative procedures are not 
incompatible with Article 8.5. Any such supplemental or alternative procedures shall be promptly 
notified to the Members. In the event that there is no agreement by all Parties on such supplemental or 
alternative procedures, the procedures specified herein shall apply exclusively and in full. 
II Referral to Arbitration 
6. As soon as the composition of the arbitration body has been decided, a notice to that effect shall be 
circulated promptly to the Members. 
7. For purposes of Article 8.5, the date of circulation of the notice under paragraph 6 shall be deemed 
to be the date on which the matter is referred to the arbitration body. 
III Parties to the Arbitration Proceeding 
8. The Parties to the arbitration proceeding shall be the Member which has notified the subsidy 
programme in question, the Member which requests the arbitration, and any other Member which has 
become a Party to the arbitration in accordance with paragraph 4. 
iV Composition of the Arbitration Body 
9. The arbitration body shall consist of three arbitrators, unless the Parties agree to a different uneven 
number. 
10. The members of the arbitration body and its president shall be appointed by agreement of the 
Parties. If the Parties do not reach agreement within 30 days after the date of circulation of the request 
for arbitration, unless the Parties agree on a longer period, any Party may request the Director-General 
of the WTO to appoint, in consultation with the Chairman of the Committee, the arbitrator or 
arbitrators not yet appointed. Such appointment shall be made, after consultation with the Parties, 
within 10 days of the request to the Director-General. 
11. Except as the Parties otherwise agree, the arbitrators shall not be citizens of any of the Parties or 
Third Parties to the arbitration proceeding. 
12. The arbitrators shall be chosen from among persons with relevant legal economic, financial or 
technical expertise, including expertise in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
with respect to the matter referted t: the arbitration body. 
13. Based upon nominations put forward by delegations and approved by the Committee, the 
Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of qualified persons from which arbitrators may be selected. 
This list shall include an identification c: each person's academic and/or professional background and 
qualifications. 
14. Where a Party to an arbitration is a developing country Member, the arbitration body shall, if the 
developing country Member so requests, include at least one arbitrator Irom a developing country 
Member. 
V Terms of Reference of the Arbitration Body 
15. If a request for arbitration pertains to a determination of the Committee under Article 8.4, or a 
failure of the Committee to make such a determination, the arbitration body shall determine, in light of 
the specific questions raised under paragraphs 1 and 4 by the Parties to the arbitration, whether the 
subsidy-programme notified under Article 8.3 does not meet the conditions and criteria of Article 8.2. 
16. If a request for arbitration pertains to alleged violation in individual cases of the conditions set out 
in a subsidy programme notified under Article 8.3, the arbitration body shall determine, in light of the 
specific questions raised under paragraphs 1 and 4 by the Parties to the arbitration, whether or not 
individual cases of subsidization violate the conditions set out in the subsidy programme notified under 
Article 8.3. If a Party so requested under paragraph 1 or 4, the arbitration body also shall determine 
whether the programme in question does not meet the conditions and criteria of Article 8.2. 
VI Third Parties 
17. A Member not wishing to become a Party to the arbitration, but wishing instead to participate in 
the arbitration on a limited basis, shall have a period of 20 days after the date of circulation of the 
request for arbitration to inform the Chairman of the Committee in writing that it wishes to become a 
Third Party to the arbitration proceeding. A Third Party may intervene only with respect to specific 
questions raised by Parties. 
18. A Member that has informed the Committee under paragraph 17 of its interest to participate as a 
Third Party in the arbitration proceeding shall have the right to make a written submission to the 
arbitration body and to receive copies of written submissions of the Parties to the arbitration 
proceeding, shall have an opportunity to be heard at meetings of the arbitration body, and shall 
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otherwise have the right to participate in the arbitration proceeding as specified elsewhere in these 
procedures. A Third Party may not participate in the selection of arbitrators or in the establishment of 
the arbitration body's working procedures. 
VII Working Procedures 
19. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of written submissions and documents. 
The Parties and Third Parties to the arbitration proceedings shall make written submissions within time 
periods to be determined by the arbitration body after consultation with the Parties. The arbitration 
body shall decide whether fiirther written submissions are necessary and shall fix a period of time for 
such submissions after consulting the Parties. 
20. The arbitration body also may hold meetings with the Parties and shall hold one such meeting if 
any Party so requests at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. Any such meeting normally shall 
include Third Parties. If in exceptional circumstances the arbitration body holds a meeting with Parties 
only, the arbitration body also shall, upon request of a Third Party, hold one session for Third Parties to 
present their views, at which Parries shall have the right to be present. Written texts of the oral 
statemet\ts made by Parties and Third Parties shall be submitted to the arbitration body, and shall 
consist only of the information and views actually presented orally. 
VIII Process 
21. The proceedings of the arbitration body shall be confidential. Written submissions to the 
arbitration body shall be treated as confidential. The arbitration body and all Parties and Third Parties 
to a proceeding shall treat as confidential any information submitted to the arbitration body which the 
submitter has designated as confidential. Nothing in these procedures shall preclude a Party or a Third 
Party to an arbitration from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. 
22. A Party or Third Party to an arbitration shall make available to all other Parties and Third Parties 
its written submissions. A Party or a Third Party shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to 
the public. When providing a non-confidential summary, a Party or Third Party will duly take into 
account the expeditious nature of these proceedings. 
23. There shall be no ex parte communications with the arbitration body concerning matters under 
consideration by the arbitration body. 
24. Before presenting its conclusions, the arbitration body shall provide to the Parties and Third Parties 
a written summary of the information on which it intend to base its conclusions. The arbitration body 
shall provide an opportunity for the Parties and Third Parties to comment, within a time period to be 
established by the arbitration body, on the written summary. Each Third Party shall have the right to 
comment only on those sections of the written summary which pertain to the specific questions that 
that Third Party has addressed. 
25. The arbitration proceedings shall take place at the seat of the World Trade Organization. 
26. The WTO Secretariat shall act as Secretariat to the arbitration body, and shall perform all 
administrative functions necessary to assist the arbitration body including the receipt and circulation of 
communications related to arbitration requests, and the maintenance of an organized permanent record 
for each arbitration proceeding. 
IX Information Before the Arbitration Body 
27. The arbitration body shall proceed on the basis of the information before it, to include such of the 
following as exist and are relevant: 
(a) the notifications of the subsidy programme in question, and any yearly updates of such 
notifications; 
(b) the findings of the Secretariat, the minutes of the Committee and the determination by the 
Committee, as recorded during the procedure under Article 8.4; 
(c) the documents and arguments submitted to the Secretariat and the Committee in the procedure 
under Article 8.4; 
(d) the record(s) of any previous arbitration(s) related to the same programme 
(e) any information provided to the arbitration body by the Parties and Third Parties under these 
procedures; 
(f) any information or technical advice obtained by the arbitration body under the provisions of 
paragraphs 28, 29, and 30. 
28. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by an arbitration body for such 
information as the arbitration body considers necessary ark appropriate. 
29. The arbitration body shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before an arbitration body seeks such 
information or technical advice fi-om any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall 
inform the authorities of that Member. 
30. The Parties and Third Parties shall have ftill access to any requests for information or technical 
advice under this or the precedmg two paragraphs, as well as to any information or technical advice 
obtauied thereby. At the time that it requests information or technical advice under this or the preceding 
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two paragraphs, the arbitration body shall obtain the agreement of the individual body or Member to 
disclose to the Parties and Third Parties all such information or technical advice. The Parties and Third 
Parties shall treat as confidential any information or technical advice that an individual, body or 
Member has designated as confidential. The arbitration body shall provide an opportunity to the Parties 
and Third Parties to comment upon any information or technical advice obtained under this or the 
preceding two paragraphs. 
X Rules of Conduct 
31. As provided in paragraph IV: 1 of the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding [Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, the Rules of Conduct apply to arbitrators acting 
pursuant to Article 8.5, and to those members the Secretariat called upon to assist in arbitration 
proceedings pursuant to Article 8.5. In addition, the Rules of Conduct shall apply to any individual 
from horn any information or technical advice is sought under paragraphs 28, 29 and of these 
procedures. 
XI Conclusions of the Arbitration Body 
32. The conclusions of the arbitration body shall consist of a determination, in light of the specific 
questions raised under paragraphs 1 and 4 by the Parties to the arbitration, of whether the subsidy 
programme notified under Article 8.3 does not meet the conditions and criteria of Article 8.2, and/ or 
whether or not the individual cases of subsidization violate the conditions set out in the subsidy 
programme notified under Article 8.3. 
33. The arbitration body shall present to the Members its conclusions and the reasons on which those 
conclusions are based in the form of a single, collegial decision, within 120 days from the date of 
circulation of the notice under paragraph 6. 
54. These conclusions shall be binding in accordance with Article 8.5. 
XII Review of these Procedures 
35. Without prejudice to Article 31 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the 
Committee shall, no later than five years after the adoption of these procedures, review their operation, 
and may decide at that time on any modifications to them. 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Article 11 Consultations and Dispute Settlement 
1. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this 
Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 
2. In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel should seek 
advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the 
panel may, when it deems it appropriate establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the 
relevant international organizations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international agreements, 
including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement mechanisms of other international 
organizations or established under any international agreement. 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
Article 4 
1. Restrictions referred to in Article 2, and those applied under Article 6, shall be administered by the 
exporting Members. Importing Members shall not be obliged to accept shipments in excess of the 
restrictions notified under Article 2, or of restrictions applied pursuant to Article 6. 
2. Members agree that the introduction of changes, such as changes in practices, rules, procedures and 
categorization of textile and clothing products, including those changes relating to the Harmonized 
System, in the implementation or administration of those restrictions notified or applied under this 
Agreement should not: upset the balance of rights and obligations between the Members concerned 
under this Agreement; adversely affect the access available to a Member; impede the full utilization of 
such access; or disrupt trade under this Agreement. 
3. If a product which constitutes only part of a restriction is notified for integration pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 2, Members agree that any change in the level of that restriction shall not upset 
the balance of rights and obligations between the Members concerned under this Agreement. 
4. When changes mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 are necessary, however. Members agree that the 
Member initiating such changes shall inform and, wherever possible, initiate consultations with the 
affected Member or Members prior to the implementation of such changes, with a view to reaching a 
mutually acceptable solution regarding appropriate and equitable adjustment. Members further agree 
that where consultation prior to implementation is not feasible, the Member inhiating such changes 
will, at the request of the affected Member, consult, within 60 days if possible, with the Members 
concerned with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution regarding appropriate and equitable 
adjustments. If a mutually satisfactory solution is not reached, any Member involved may refer the 
matter to the TMB for recommendations as provided in Article 8. Should the TSB not have had the 
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opportunity to review a dispute concerning such changes introduced prior to the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, it shall be reviewed by the TMB in accordance with the rules and procedures of the 
MFA applicable for such a review. 
Article 5 
1. Members agree that circumvention by transhipment, re-routing, false declaration concerning country 
or place of origin, and falsification of official documents, finistrates the implementation of this 
Agreement to integrate the textiles and clothing sector into GATT 1994. Accordingly, Members should 
establish the necessary legal provisions and/or administrative procedures to address and take action 
against such circumvention. Members further agree that, consistent with their domestic laws and 
procedures, they will cooperate fully to address problems arising from circumvention. 
2. Should any Member believe that this Agreement is being circumvented by transhipment, re-routing, 
false declaration concerning country or place of origin, or falsification of official documents, and that 
no, or inadequate, measures are being applied to address and/ or to take action against such 
circumvention, that Member should consult with the Member or Members concerned with a view to 
seeking a mutually satisfactory solution. Such consultations should be held promptly, and within 30 
days when possible. If a mutually satisfactory solution is not reached, the matter may be referred by 
any Member involved to the TMB for recommendations. 
3. Members agree to take necessary action, consistent with their domestic laws and procedures, to 
prevent, to investigate and, where appropriate, to take legal and/or administrative action against 
circumvention practices within their territory. Members agree to cooperate flilly, consistent with their 
domestic laws and procedures, in instances of circumvention or alleged circumvention of this 
Agreement, to establish the relevant facts in the places of import, export and, where applicable, 
transhipment. It is agreed that such cooperation, consistent with domestic laws and procedures, will 
include: investigation of circumvention practices which increase restrained exports to the Member 
maintaining such restraints; exchange of documents, correspondence, reports and other relevant 
information to the extent available; and facilitation of plant visits and contacts, upon request and on a 
case-by-case basis. Members should endeavour to clarify the circumstances of any such instances of 
circumvention or alleged circumvention, including the respective roles of the exporters or importers 
involved. 
4. Where, as a result of investigation, there is sufficient evidence that circumvention has occurred (e.g. 
where evidence is available concerning the country or place of true origin, and the circumstances of 
such circumvention). Members agree that appropriate action, to the extent necessary to address the 
problem, should be taken. Such action may include the denial of entry of goods or, where goods have 
entered, having due regard to the actual circumstances and the involvement of the country or place of 
true origin, the adjustment of charges to restraint levels to reflect the true country or place of origin. 
Also, where there is evidence of the involvement of the territories of the Members through which the 
goods have been transhipped, such action may include the introduction of restraints with respect to 
such Members. Any such actions, together with their timing and scope, may be taken after 
consultations held with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory solution between the concerned 
Members and shall be notified to the TMB with full justification. The Members concerned may agree 
on other remedies in consultation. Any such agreement shall also be notified to the TMB, and the TMB 
may make such recommendations to the Members concerned as it deems appropriate. If a mutually 
satisfactory solution is not reached, any Member concerned may refer the matter to the TMB for 
prompt review and recommendations. 
5. Members note that some cases of circumvention may involve shipments transiting through countries 
or places with no changes or alterations made to the goods contained in such shipments in the places of 
transit. They note that it may not be generally practicable for such places of transit to exercise control 
over such shipments. 
6. Members agree that false declaration concerning fibre content, quantities, description or 
classification of merchandise also frustrates the objective of this Agreement. Where there is evidence 
that any such false declaration has been made for purposes of circumvention. Members agree that 
appropriate measures, consistent with domestic laws and procedures, should be taken against the 
exporters or importers involved. Should any Member believe that this Agreement is being 
circumvented by such false declaration and that no, or inadequate, administrative measures are being 
applied to address and/or to take action against such circumvention, that Member should consult 
promptly with the Member involved with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory solution. If such a 
solution is not reached, the matter may be referred by any Member involved to the TMB for 
recommendations. This provision is not intended to prevent Members from making technical 
adjustments when inadvertent errors in declarations have been made. 
Article 6 
1. Members recognize that during the transition period it may be necessary to apply a specific 
transitional safeguard mechanism (referred to in this Agreement as "transitional safeguard"). The 
transitional safeguard may be applied by any Member to products covered by the Annex, except those 
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integrated into GATT' 1994 under the provisions of Article 2. Members not maintaining restrictions 
falling under Article 2 shall notify the TMB within 60 days following the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, as to whether or not they wish to retain the right to use the provisions of this Article 
Members which have not accepted the Protocols extending the MFA since 1986 shall make such 
notification within 6 months following the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. The transitional 
safeguard should be applied as sparingly as possible, consistently with the provisions of this Article 
and the effective implementation of the integration process under this Agreement. 
2. Safeguard action may be taken under this Article when, on the basis of a determination by a 
Member'*, it is demonstrated that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such 
increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry 
producing like and/or directly competitive products. Serious damage or actual threat thereof must 
demonstrably be caused by such increased quantities in total imports of that product and not by such 
other factors as technological changes or changes in consumer preference. 
3. In making a determination of serious damage, or actual threat thereof, as referred to in paragraph 2, 
the Member shall examine the effect of those imports on the state of the particular industry, as reflected 
in changes in such relevant economic variables as output, productivity, utilization of capacity, 
inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, profits and investment; none 
of which, either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give decisive guidance 
4. Any measure invoked pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be applied on a Member-by-
Member basis. The Member or Members to whom serious damage, or actual threat thereof, referred to 
in paragraphs 2 and 3, is attributed, shall be determined on the basis of a sharp and substantial increase 
in imports, actual or imminent", from such a Member or Members individually, and on the basis of the 
level of imports as compared with imports from other sources, market share, and import and domestic 
prices at a comparable stage of commercial transaction; none of these factors, either alone or combined 
with other factors, can necessarily give decisive guidance. Such safeguard measure shall not be applied 
to the exports of any Member whose exports of the particular product are already under restraint under 
this Agreement. 
5. The period of validity of a determination of serious damage or actual threat thereof for the purpose 
of invoking safeguard action shall not exceed 90 days from the date of initial notification as set forth in 
paragraph 7. 
6. In the application of the transitional safeguard, particular account shall be taken of the interests of 
exporting Members as set out below: 
(a) least-developed country Members shall be accorded treatment significantly more favourable than 
that provided to the other groups of Members referred to in this paragraph, preferably in all its elements 
but, at least, on overall terms; 
(b) Members whose total volume of textile and clothing exports is small in comparison with the total 
volume of exports of other Members and who account for only a small percentage of total imports of 
that product into the importing Member shall be accorded differential and more favourable treatment in 
the fixing of the economic terms provided in paragraphs 8,13 and 14. For those suppliers, due account 
will be taken, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1, of the future possibilities for the 
development of their trade and the need to allow commercial quantities of imports from them, 
(c) with respect to wool products from wool-producing developing country Members whose economy 
and textiles and clothing trade are dependent on the wool sector, whose total textile and clothing 
exports consist almost exclusively of wool products, and whose volume of textiles and clothing trade is 
comparatively small in the markets of the importing Members, special consideration shall be given to 
the export needs of such Members when considering quota levels, growth rates and flexibility, 
(d) more favourable treatment shall be accorded to re-imports by a Member of textile and clothing 
products which that Member has exported to another Member for processing and subsequent 
reimportation, as defined by the laws and practices of the importing Member, and subject to 
satisfactory control and certification procedures, when these products are imported from a Member for 
which this type of trade represents a significant proportion of its total exports of textiles and clothing 
7. The Member proposing to take safeguard action shall seek consultations with the Member or 
Members which would be affected by such action The request for consultations shall be accompanied 
by specific and relevant factual information, as up-to-date as possible, particularly in regard to (a) the 
factors, referred to in paragraph 3, on which the Member invoking the action has based its 
18 A customs union may apply a safeguard measure as a single unit or on behalf of a member State When a customs union 
applies a safeguard measure as a single unit, all the requirements for the determination of serious damage or actual threat 
thereof under this Agreement shall be based on the conditions existing in the customs union as a whole When a 
safeguard measure is applied on behalf of a member State, all the requirements for the determination of serious damage 
or actual threat thereof, shall be based on the conditions existing m that member State and the measure shall be limited to 
that member State 
19 Such an imminent increase shall be a measurable one and shall not be determined to exist on the basis of allegation, 
conjecture or mere possibility arising, for example, from the existence of production capacity in the exporting Members 
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determination of the existence of serious damage or actual threat thereof; and (b) the factors, referred to 
in paragraph 4, on the basis of which it proposes to invoice the safeguard action with respect to the 
Member or Members concerned. In respect of requests made under this paragraph, the information 
shall be related, as closely as possible, to identifiable segments of production and to the reference 
period set out in paragraph 8. The Member invoking the action shall also indicate the specific level at 
which imports of the product in question from the Member or Members concerned are proposed to be 
restrained; such level shall not be lower than the level referred to in paragraph 8. The Member seeking 
consultations shall, at the same time, communicate to the Chairman of the TMB the request for 
consultations, including all the relevant factual data outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4, together with the 
proposed restraint level. The Chairman shall inform the members of the TMB of the request for 
consultations, indicating the requesting Member, the product in question and the Member having 
received the request. The Member or Members concerned shall respond to this request promptly and 
the consultations shall be held without delay and normally be completed within 60 days of the date on 
which the request was received. 
8. If, in the consultations, there is mutual understanding that the situation calls for restraint on the 
exports of the particular product from the Member or Members concerned, the level of such restraint 
shall be fixed at a level not lower than the actual level of exports or imports from the Member 
concerned during the 12-month period terminating two months preceding the month in which the 
request for consultation was made. 
9. Details of the agreed restraint measure shall be communicated to the TMB within 60 days from the 
date of conclusion of the agreement. The TMB shall determine whether the agreement is justified in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article. In order to make its determination, the TMB shall have 
available to it the factual data provided to the Chairman of the TMB, referred to in paragraph 7, as well 
as any other relevant information provided by the Members concerned. The TMB may make such 
recommendations as it deems appropriate to the Members concerned. 
10. If, however, after the expiry of the period of 60 days from the date on which the request for 
consultations was received, there has been no agreement between the Members, the Member which 
proposed to take safeguard action may apply the restraint by date of import or date of export, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article, within 30 days following the 60-day period for 
consultations, and at the same time refer the matter to the TMB. It shall be open to either Member to 
refer the matter to the TMB before the expiry of the period of 60 days. In either case, the TMB shall 
promptly conduct an examination of the matter, including the determination of serious damage, or 
actual threat thereof, and its causes, and make appropriate recommendations to the Members concerned 
within 30 days. In order to conduct such examination, the TMB shall have available to it the factual 
data provided to the Chairman of the TMB, referred to in paragraph 7, as well as any other relevant 
information provided by the Members concerned. 
11. In highly unusual and critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which would be 
difficult to repair, action under paragraph 10 may be taken provisionally on the condition that the 
request for consultations and notification to the TMB shall be effected within no more than five 
working days after taking the action. In the case that consultations do not produce agreement, the TMB 
shall be notified at the conclusion of consultations, but in any case no later than 60 days from the date 
of the implementation of the action. The TMB shall promptly conduct an examination of the matter, 
and make appropriate recommendations to the Members concerned within 30 days. In the case that 
consultations do produce agreement, Members shall notify the TMB upon conclusion but, in any case, 
no later than 90 days from the date of the implementation of the action. The TMB may make such 
recommendations as it deems appropriate to the Members concerned. 
12. A Member may maintain measures invoked pursuant to the provisions o: this Article: (a) for up to 
three years without extension, or (V) until the product is integrated into GATT 1994, whichever comes 
first. 
13. Should the restraint measure remain in force for a period exceeding one year, the level for 
subsequent years shall be the level specified for the first year increased by a growth rate of not less than 
6 per cent per annum, unless otherwise justified to the TMB. The restraint level for the product 
concerned may be exceeded in either year of any two subsequent years by carry forward and/or 
carryover of 10 per cent of which carry forward shall not represent more than 5 per cent. No 
quantitative limits shall be placed on the combined use of carryover, carry forward and the provision of 
paragraph 14. 
14. When more than one product from another Member is placed under restraint under this Article by a 
Member, the level of restraint agreed, pursuant to the provisions of this Article, for each of these 
products may be exceeded by 7 percent provided that the total exports subject to restraint do not exceed 
the total of the levels for all products so restrained under this Article, on the basis of agreed common 
units. Where the periods of application of restraints of these products do not coincide with each other, 
this provision shall be applied to any overlapping period on a pro rata basis. 
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15. If a safeguard action is applied under this Article to a product for which a restraint was previously 
in place under the MFA during the 12-month period prior to the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement, or pursuant to the provisions of Article 2 or 6, the level of the new restraint shall be the 
level provided for in paragraph 8 unless the new restraint comes into force within one year of: 
(a) the date of notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Article 2 for the elimination of the previous 
restraint; or 
(b) the date of removal of the previous restraint put in place pursuant to the provisions of this Article 
or of the MFA 
in which case the level shall not be less than the higher of (i) the level of restraint for the last 12-month 
period during which the product was under restraint, or (ii) the level of restraint provided for in 
paragraph 8. 
16. When a Member which is not maintaining a restraint under Article 2 decides to apply a restraint 
pursuant to the provisions of this Article, it shall establish appropriate arrangements which: (a) take full 
account of such factors as established tariff classification and quantitative units based on normal 
commercial practices in export and import transactions, both as regards fibre composition and in terms 
of competing for the same segment of its domestic market, and (b) avoid over-categorization. The 
request for consultations referred to in paragraphs 7 or 11 shall include fiiU information on such 
arrangements. 
Article 7 
1. As part of the integration process and with reference to the specific commitments undertaken by the 
Members as a result of the Uruguay Round, all Members shall take such actions as may be necessary to 
abide by GATT 1994 rules and disciplines so as to: 
(a) achieve improved access to markets for textile and clothing products through such measures as 
tariff reductions and bindings, reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers, and facilitation of 
customs, administrative and licensing formalities; 
(b) ensure the application of policies relating to fair and equitable trading conditions as regards textiles 
and clothing in such areas as dumping and anti-dumping rules and procedures, subsidies and 
countervailing measures, and protection of intellectual property rights; and 
(c) avoid discrimination against imports in the textiles and clothing sector when taking measures for 
general trade policy reasons. 
Such actions shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members under GATT 1994. 
2. Members shall notify to the TMB the actions referred to in paragraph 1 which have a bearing on the 
implementation of this Agreement. To the extent that these have been notified to other WTO bodies, a 
summary, with reference to the original notification, shall be sufficient to fulfil the requirements under 
this paragraph. It shall be open to any Member to make reverse notifications to the TMB. 
3. Where any Member considers that another Member has not taken the actions referred to in 
paragraph 1, and that the balance of rights and obligations under this Agreement has been upset, that 
Member may bring the matter before the relevant WTO bodies and inform the TMB. Any subsequent 
findings or conclusions by the WTO bodies concerned shall form a part of the TMB's comprehensive 
report. 
Article 8 
1. In order to supervise the implementation of this Agreement, to examine all measures taken under this 
Agreement and their conformity therewith, and to take the actions specifically required of it by this 
Agreement, the Textiles Monitoring Body ("TMB") is hereby established. The TMB shall consist of a 
Chairman and 10 members. Its membership shall be balanced and broadly representative of the 
Members and shall provide for rotation of its members at appropriate intervals. The members shall be 
appointed by Members designated by the Council for Trade in Goods to serve on the TMB, discharging 
their function on an ad personam basis. 
2. The TMB shall develop its own working procedures. It is understood, however, that consensus 
within the TMB does not require the assent or concurrence of members appointed by Members 
involved in an unresolved issue under review by the TMB. 
3. The TMB shall be considered as a standing body and shall meet as necessary to carry out the 
functions required of it under this Agreement. It shall rely on notifications and information supplied by 
the Members under the relevant Articles of this Agreement, supplemented by any additional 
information or necessary details they may submit or it may decide to seek from them. It may also rely 
on notifications to and reports from other WTO bodies and fi-om such other sources as it may deem 
appropriate. 
4. Members shall afford to each other adequate opportunity for consultations with respect to any 
matters affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
5. In the absence of any mutually agreed solution in the bilateral consultations provided for in this 
Agreement, the TMB shall, at the request of either Member, and following a thorough and prompt 
consideration of the matter, make recommendations to the Members concerned. 
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6. At the request of any Member, the TMB shall review promptly any particular matter which that 
Member considers to be detrimental to its interests under this Agreement and where consultations 
between it and the Member or Members concerned have failed to produce a mutually satisfactory 
solution. On such matters, the TMB may make such observations as it deems appropriate to the 
Members concerned and for the purposes of the review provided for in paragraph 11. 
7. Before formulating its recommendations or observations, the TMB shall invite participation of such 
Members as may be directly affected by the matter in question. 
8. Whenever the TMB is called upon to make recommendations or findings, it shall do so, preferably 
within a period of 30 days, unless a different time period is specified in this Agreement. All such 
recommendations or findings shall be communicated to the Members directly concerned. All such 
recommendations or findings shall also be communicated to the Council for Trade in Goods for its 
information. 
9. The Members shall endeavour to accept in full the recommendations of the TMB, which shall 
exercise proper surveillance of the implementation of such recommendations. 
10. If a Member considers itself unable to conform with the recommendations of the TMB, it shall 
provide the TMB with the reasons therefor not later than one month after receipt of such 
recommendations. Following thorough consideration of the reasons given, the TMB shall issue any 
further recommendations it considers appropriate forthwith. If, after such further recommendations, the 
matter remains unresolved, either Member may bring the matter before the Dispute Settlement Body 
and invoke paragraph 2 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and the relevant provisions of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. 
11. In order to oversee the implementation of this Agreement, the Council for Trade in Goods shall 
conduct a major review before the end of each stage of the integration process. To assist in this review, 
the TMB shall, at least five months before the end of each stage, transmit to the Council for Trade in 
Goods a comprehensive report on the implementation of this Agreement during the stage under review, 
in particular in matters with regard to the integration process, the application of the transitional 
safeguard mechanism, and relating to the application of GATT1994 rules and disciplines as defined in 
Articles 2, 3, 6 and 7 respectively. The TMB's comprehensive report may include any recommendation 
as deemed appropriate by the TMB to the Council for Trade in Goods. 
12. In the light of its review the Council for Trade in Goods shall by consensus take such decisions as it 
deems appropriate to ensure that the balance of rights and obligations embodied in this Agreement is 
not being impaired. For the resolution of any disputes that may arise with respect to matters referred to 
in Article 7, the Dispute Settlement Body may authorize, without prejudice to the final date set out 
under Article 9, an adjustment to paragraph 14 of Article 2, for the stage subsequent to the review, with 
respect to any Member found not to be complying with its obligations under this Agreement. 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Article 14 Consultation and Dispute Settlement 
14.1 Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any matter affecting the operation of 
this Agreement shall take place under the auspices of the Dispute Settlement Body and shall follow, 
mutatis mutandis, the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
14.2 At the request of a party to a dispute, or at its own initiative, a panel may establish a technical 
expert group to assist in questions of a technical nature, requiring detailed consideration by experts. 
14.3 Technical expert groups shall be governed by the procedures of Annex 2. 
14.4 The dispute settlement provisions set out above can be invoked in cases where a Member 
considers that another Member has not achieved satisfactory results under Articles 3,4,7,8 and 9 and its 
trade interests are significantly affected. In this respect, such results shall be equivalent to those as if 
the body in question were a Member. 
Annex 2 
Technical Expert Groups 
The following procedures shall apply to technical expert groups established in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 14. 
1. Technical expert groups are under the panel's authority. Their terms of reference and detailed 
working procedures shall be decided by the panel, and they shall report to the panel. 
2. Participation in technical expert groups shall be restricted to persons of professional standing and 
experience in the field in question. 
3. Citizens of parties to the dispute shall not serve on a technical expert group without the joint 
agreement of the parties to the dispute, except in exceptional circumstances when the panel considers 
that the need for specialized scientific expertise cannot be fulfilled otherwise. Government officials of 
parties to the dispute shall not serve on a technical expert group Members of technical expert groups 
shall serve in their mdividual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives 
of any organization. Governments or organizations shall therefore not give them instructions with 
regard to matters before a technical expert group. 
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4. Technical expert groups may consult and seek information and technical advice from any source 
they deem appropriate. Before a technical expert group seeks such information or advice from a source 
within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the government of that Member. Any Member shall 
respond promptly and frilly to any request by a technical expert group for such information as the 
technical expert group considers necessary and appropriate. 
5. The parties to a dispute shall have access to all relevant information provided to a technical expert 
group, unless it is of a confidential nature. Confidential information provided to the technical expert 
group shall not be released without formal authorization from the government, organization or person 
providing the information. Where such information is requested from the technical expert group but 
release of such information by the technical expert group is not authorized, a non-confidential summary 
of the information will be provided by the government, organization or person supplying the 
information. 
6. The technical expert group shall submit a draft report to the Members concerned with a view to 
obtaining their comments, and taking them into account, as appropriate, in the final report, which shall 
also be circulated to the Members concerned when it is submitted to the panel. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 
Article 17 Consultation and Dispute Settlement 
17.1 Except as otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to 
consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement. 
17.2 Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for 
consultation regarding, representations made by another Member with respect to any matter affecting 
the operation of this Agreement. 
17.3 If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective is being impeded, by 
another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the 
matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or Members in question. Each Member shall 
afford sympathetic consideration to any request from another Member for consultation. 
17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to paragraph 
3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been taken by the 
administering authorifies of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept 
price undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). When a 
provisional measure has a significant impact and the Member that requested consultations considers 
that the measure was taken confrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may 
also refer such matter to the DSB. 
17.5 The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter 
based upon: 
(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a benefit accruing to it, 
directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has been nullified or impaired, or that the achieving of the 
objectives of the Agreement is being impeded, and 
(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of 
the importing Member. 
17.6 In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5: 
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities 
establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and 
objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, 
even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be 
overturned; 
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the 
Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' 
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible 
interpretations. 
17.7 Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal authorization 
from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such information is requested 
from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not authorized, a non-confidential 
summary of the information, authorized by the person, body or authority providing the information, 
shall be provided. 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on 
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Tariffs and Trade 1994 
Article 19 Consultations and Dispute Settlement 
1. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to 
consuhations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement. 
2. If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement 
is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective of this Agreement is being 
impeded, as a result of the actions of another Member or of other Members, it may, with a view to 
reaching a mutually satisfactory solution of this matter, request consultations with the Member or 
Members in question. Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to any request from another 
Member for consultations. 
3. The Technical Committee shall provide, upon request, advice and assistance to Members engaged in 
consultations. 
4. At the request of a party to the dispute, or on its own initiative, a panel established to examine a 
dispute relating to the provisions of this Agreement may request the Technical Committee to carry out 
an examination of any questions requiring technical consideration. The panel shall determine the terms 
of reference of the Technical Committee for the particular dispute and set a time period for receipt of 
the report of the Technical Committee. The panel shall take into consideration the report of the 
Technical Committee. In the event that the Technical Committee is unable to reach consensus on a 
matter referred to it pursuant to this paragraph, the panel should afford the parties to the dispute an 
opportunity to present their views on the matter to the panel. 
5. Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal authorization 
from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such information is requested 
from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not authorized, a non-confidential 
summary of-this information, authorized by the person, body or authority providing the information, 
shall be provided. 
Annex II 
Technical Committee on Customs Valuation 
2. The responsibilities of the Technical Committee shall include the following: 
(f) to carry out an examination of a matter referred to it by a panel under Article 19 of this Agreement; 
3. The Technical Committee shall attempt to conclude its work on specific matters, especially those 
referred to it by Members, the Committee or a panel, in a reasonably short period of time. As provided 
in paragraph 4 of Article 19, a panel shall set a specific time period for receipt of a report of the 
Technical Committee and the Technical Committee shall provide its report within that period. 
9. The Technical Committee shall meet as necessary but at least two times a year. The date of each 
meeting shall be fixed by the Technical Committee at its preceding session. The date of the meeting 
may be varied either at the request of any member of the Technical Committee concurred in by a 
simple majority of the members of the Technical Committee or, in cases requiring urgent attention, at 
the request of the Chairman. Notwithstanding the provisions in sentence 1 of this paragraph, the 
Technical Committee shall meet as necessary to consider matters referred to it by a panel under the 
provisions of Article 19 of this Agreement. 
20. Representatives of a simple majority of the members of the Technical Committee shall constitute a 
quorum. 
21. Each member of the Technical Committee shall have one vote. A decision of the Technical 
Committee shall be taken by a majority comprising at least two thirds of the members present. 
Regardless of the outcome of the vote on a particular matter, the Technical Committee shall be free to 
make a full report to the Committee and to the CCC on that matter indicating the different views 
expressed in the relevant discussions. Notwithstanding the above provisions of this paragraph, on 
matters referred to it by a panel, the Technical Committee shall take decisions by consensus. Where no 
agreement is reached in the Technical Committee on the question referred to it by a panel, the 
Technical Committee shall provide a report detailing the facts of the matter and indicating the views of 
the members. 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Article 4 Remedies 
4.1 Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is being granted or maintained 
by another Member, such Member may request consultations with such other Member. 
4.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with 
regard to the existence and nature of the subsidy in question. 
4.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph I, the Member believed to be granting or 
maintaining the subsidy in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The 
purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually 
agreed solution. 
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4.4 If no mutually agreed solution has been reached within 30 days^° of the request for consultations, 
any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") 
for the immediate establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a 
panel. 
4.5 Upon its establishment, the panel may request the assistance of the Permanent Group of Experts^' 
(referred to in this Agreement as the "PGE") with regard to whether the measure in question is a 
prohibited subsidy. If so requested, the PGE shall immediately review the evidence with regard to the 
existence and nature of the measure in question and shall provide an opportunity for the Member 
applying or maintaining the measure to demonstrate that the measure in question is not a prohibited 
subsidy. The PGE shall report its conclusions to the panel within a time-limit determined by the panel. 
The PGE's conclusions on the issue of whether or not the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy 
shall be accepted by the panel without modification. 
4.6 The panel shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The report shall be circulated to 
all Members within 90 days of the date of the composition and the establishment of the panel's terms of 
reference. 
4.7 If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the 
subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its 
recommendation the time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn. 
4.8 Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by 
the DSB unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or 
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. 
4.9 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 30 days from 
the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate 
Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the 
reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no 
case shall the proceedings exceed 60 days. The appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and 
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to 
adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.^^ 
4.10 In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period specified by 
the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's report or the Appellate 
Body's report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate^' 
countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. 
4.11 In the event a party to the dispute requests arbifration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures 
are appropriate.^ "* 
4.12 For purposes of disputes conducted pursuant to this Article, except for time-periods specifically 
prescribed in this Article, time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct of such disputes shall 
be half the time prescribed therein. 
Article 27 Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
27.7 The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the case of export 
subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 5. The relevant 
provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7. 
Part III: Actionable Subsidies 
Article 6 Serious Prejudice 
6.6 Each Member in the market of which serious prejudice is alleged to have arisen shall, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 3 of Annex V, make available to the parties to a dispute arising under Article 7, 
and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 7, all relevant information that can be 
obtained as to the changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as concerning prices of 
the products involved. 
Article 7 Remedies 
7.1 Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whenever a Member has reason 
to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article 1, granted or maintained by another Member, results in 
20 Any time-periods mentioned m this Article may be extended by mutual agreement 
21 As established in Article 24 
22 If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose 
23 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies 
dealt with under these provisions are prohibited 
24. This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies 
dealt with under these provisions are prohibited 
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injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment or serious prejudice, such Member may 
request consultations with such other Member. 
7.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with 
regard to (a) the existence and nature of the subsidy in question, and (b) the injury caused to the 
domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice^^ caused to the interests of 
the Member requesting consultations. 
7.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or 
maintaining the subsidy practice in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. 
The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually 
e^eed solution. 
7.4 If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days^*, any Member party to 
such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, unless the DSB 
decides by consensus not to establish a panel. The composition of the panel and its terms of reference 
shall be established within 15 days from the date when it is established. 
7.5 The panel shall review the matter and shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The 
report shall be circulated to all Members within 120 days of the date of the composition and 
establishment of the panel's terms of reference. 
7.6 Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to ail Members, the report shall be adopted by 
the DSB^^ unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or 
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. 
7.7 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 60 days from 
the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate 
Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the 
reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no 
case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days. The appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and 
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to 
adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.^' 
7.8 Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any 
subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 
5, the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects or shall withdraw the subsidy. 
7.9 In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the 
subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months ft-om the date when the DSB adopts the panel report 
or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, the DSB shall grant 
authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and 
nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the 
request. 
7.10 In the event that a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the 
DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are commensurate with the degree 
and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist. 
Part IV: Non-Actionable Subsidies 
Article 8 Identiflcation of Non-Actionable Subsidies 
8.5 Upon the request of a Member, the determination by the Committee referred to in paragraph 4, or a 
failure by the Committee to make such a determination, as well as the violation, in individual cases, of 
the conditions set out in a notified programme, shall be submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitration 
body shall present its conclusions to the Members within 120 days from the date when the matter was 
referred to the arbitration body. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the DSU shall apply to 
arbitrations conducted under this paragraph. 
Annex V Procedures for Developing Information Concerning Serious Prejudice 
1. Every Member shall cooperate in the development of evidence to be examined by a panel in 
procedures under paragraphs 4 through 6 of Article 7. The parties to the dispute and any third-country 
Member concerned shall notify to the DSB, as soon as the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 7 have 
been invoked, the organization responsible for administration of this provision within its territory and 
the procedures to be used to comply with requests for information. 
25 In the event that the request relates to a subsidy deemed to result in serious prejudice in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 
6, the available evidence of serious prejudice may be limited to the available evidence as to whether the conditions of 
paragraph 1 of Article 6 have been met or not. 
26 Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement 
27. If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose 
28. If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose 
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2. In cases where matters are referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7, the DSB shall, upon 
request, initiate the procedure to obtain such information from the government of the subsidizing 
Member as necessary to establish the existence and amount of subsidization, the value of total sales of 
the subsidized firms, as well as information necessary to analyze the adverse effects caused by the 
subsidized product.^' This process may include, where appropriate, presentation of questions to the 
government of the subsidizing Member and of the complaining Member to collect information, as well 
as to clarify and obtain elaboration of information available to the parties to a dispute through the 
notification procedures set forth in Part VII.^ ° 
3. In the case of effects in third-country markets, a party to a dispute may collect information, 
including through the use of questions to the government of the third-country Member, necessary to 
analyse adverse effects, which is not otherwise reasonably available from the complaining Member or 
the subsidizing Member. This requirement should be administered in such a way as not to impose an 
unreasonable burden on the third-country Member. In particular, such a Member is not expected to 
make a market or price analysis specially for that purpose. The information to be supplied is that which 
is already available or can be readily obtained by this Member (e.g. most recent statistics which have 
already been gathered by relevant statistical services but which have not yet been published, customs 
data concerning imports and declared values of the products concerned, etc.). However, if a party to a 
dispute undertakes a detailed market analysis at its own expense, the task of the person or firm 
conducting such an analysis shall be facilitated by the authorities of the third-country Member and such 
a person or firm shall be given access to all information which is not normally maintained confidential 
by the government. 
4. The DSB shall designate a representative to serve the function- of facilitating the information-
gathering process. The sole purpose of the representative shall be to ensure the timely development of 
the information necessary to facilitate expeditious subsequent multilateral review of the dispute. In 
particular, the representative may suggest ways to most efficiently solicit necessary information as well 
as encourage the cooperation of the parties. 
5. The information-gathering process outlined in paragraphs 2 through 4 shall be completed within 60 
days of the date on which the matter has been referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7. The 
information obtained during this process shall be submitted to the panel established by the DSB in 
accordance with the provisions of Part X. This information should include, inter alia, data concerning 
the amount of the subsidy in question (and, where appropriate, the value of total sales of the subsidized 
firms), prices of the subsidized product, prices of the non-subsidized product, prices of other suppliers 
to the market, changes in the supply of the subsidized product to the market in question and changes in 
market shares. It should also include rebuttal evidence, as well as such supplemental information as the 
panel deems relevant in the course of reaching its conclusions. 
6. If the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to cooperate in the information-gathering 
process, the complaining Member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on evidence available 
to it, together with facts and circumstances of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing and/or third-
country Member. Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing and/or 
third-country Member, the panel may complete the record as necessary relying on best information 
otherwise available. 
7. In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of non-
cooperation by any party involved in the information-gathering process. 
8. In making a determination to use either best information available or adverse inferences, the panel 
shall consider the advice of the DSB representative nominated under paragraph 4 as to the 
reasonableness of any requests for information and the efforts made by parties to comply with these 
requests in a cooperative and timely manner. 
9. Nothing in the information-gathering process shall limit the ability of the panel to seek such 
additional information it deems essential to a proper resolution to the dispute, and which was not 
adequately sought or developed during that process. However, ordinarily the panel should not request 
additional information to complete the record where the information would support a particular party's 
position and the absence of that information in the record is the result of unreasonable non-cooperation 
by that party in the information-gathering process. 
29 In cases where the existence of serious prejudice has to be demonstrated 
30 The information-gathering process by the DSB shall take into account the need to protect information which is by nature 
confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis by any Member involved in this process 
